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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the Supreme Court has frequently observed that most
statutes involve compromise.' In particular, when Congress enacts a clear
and precise statutory text-one that articulates not only a set of relevant
aims but also the specific means of their pursuit-the Court has assumed
that the operative details of such a statute may reflect a (frequently
unrecorded) compromise to go so far and no farther in pursuit of its
background goals.2 Accordingly, even when a precise statute seems over- or
underinclusive in relation to its ultimate aims (as is often the case), the
Court now hews closely to the rules embedded in the enacted text, rather
than adjusting that text to make it more consistent with its apparent
purposes.
3
One might think that similar principles would apply with equal, if not
greater, force to constitutional interpretation. The constitutional lawmaking
processes prescribed by Articles V and VII reflect a conscious design to
give political (or at least geographical) minorities extraordinary power to
block constitutional change.4 Such political minorities, therefore, also have
extraordinary power to insist upon compromise as the price of assent.
Although constitutional scholarship tends to emphasize those constitutional
texts that are framed in open-ended terms, many of the document's
clauses-including some rather important ones-articulate their policies at
a level of detail that suggests compromise over the acceptable means of
pursuing such clauses' apparent background aims. In this Article, I argue
that, just as in the case of statutes, when the Court confronts a precise and
detailed constitutional text, it should adhere closely to the prescribed
solution rather than stretch or contract the text in light of the apparent ratio
legis. Indeed, the heightened protection assigned to minority interests in the
amendment process may make it especially crucial for a court to adhere to
the compromises embedded in a precise constitutional text.
This premise about constitutional precision, if correct, represents an
overlooked but, I believe, quite significant consideration in the ongoing
controversy over the Eleventh Amendment's meaning. That Amendment of
course has played a central but awkward role in the development of the
1. See infra notes 185-190 and accompanying text. To say this, one need not join public
choice theorists in believing that interest groups routinely purchase statutory (or constitutional)
outcomes. Rather, compromise is routinely to be expected simply because legislation represents
"the product of a multimember assembly, comprising a large number of persons of quite radically
differing aims, interests, and backgrounds." JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 125
(1999).
2. See infra notes 199-205 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998); Brogan v. United States,
522 U.S. 398, 403 (1998).
4. See infra notes 143, 206-212 and accompanying text.
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federal law of state sovereign immunity. As the only constitutional
provision that bears directly on the states' immunity against the assertion of
federal jurisdiction, the Amendment's centrality to this body of law is
unsurprising. At the same time, it is a familiar reality that almost none of
the Court's important cases involving the Amendment deal with matters
that fall within its terms. The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[t]he
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State." Yet despite the Amendment's carefully drawn alignment of
parties, the Court has extended state sovereign immunity to include federal
lawsuits filed by a state's own citizens, 5 by federal corporations, 6 by tribal
sovereigns,7 and by foreign nations.8 The resulting immunity, moreover,
now reaches not only "any suit in law or equity," but also any suit in
admiralty.9 Finally, although the Amendment is framed as a constraint on
"[t]he Judicial power of the United States," states presently enjoy
constitutional immunity from actions before state courts and federal
administrative tribunals as well. 10 In recognizing such broad classes of
immunity, the Court has dealt with the Eleventh Amendment's text in two
(arguably inconsistent) ways, each of which raises an important and much
overlooked methodological question about the interpretation of precise
constitutional texts.
First, invoking what I have elsewhere called "strong purposivism,"'1
the Court has relied on the Amendment's perceived background purpose to
establish broad state sovereign immunity that goes well beyond its carefully
drawn text. The Court's justification for this approach has rested squarely
on historical premises. Specifically, in the ratification debates over the
original Constitution, figures no less important than Hamilton, Madison,
and Marshall offered explicit assurances that Article III's adoption would
leave intact the background sovereign immunity that states, like all other
5. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 57-73 (1996); Hans v. Louisiana, 134
U.S. 1, 18-19 (1890).
6. See Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 449 (1900).
7. See Blatchford v. Native Vill. ofNoatak, 501 U.S. 775, 781-82 (1991).
8. See Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 331-32 (1934).
9. See, e.g., Welch v. Tex. Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 489-93 (1987)
(plurality opinion) (holding that principles of immunity reflected in the Eleventh Amendment bar
admiralty suits against states, even though such actions are not technically "suit[s] in law or
equity"); Exparte New York, 256 U.S. 490,497 (1921) (same).
10. See Fed. Mar. Com'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760-61 (2002) (holding
that sovereign immunity applies to proceedings before federal administrative tribunals); Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999) (holding that sovereign immunity applies to federal causes of
action brought in state courts).
11. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3, 7
(2001).
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sovereigns, had traditionally enjoyed. 12 Soon after ratification, however, the
Court in Chisholm v. Georgia invoked the state-citizen diversity clause of
Article Ill-which governs controversies "between a State and Citizens of
another State"'13-to assert jurisdiction over a common law action by a
citizen of South Carolina to recover a debt from Georgia. 14 Although the
Eleventh Amendment quickly overturned Chisholm by adopting carefully
worded restrictions on the exercise of federal jurisdiction in suits against
states by out-of-state individuals, 5 the Court in Hans v. Louisiana held that
the Amendment stands for more than it says.16 In particular, the Hans
Court's "shock of surprise" theory maintained that the Amendment's swift
and emphatic adoption conveyed a purpose not only to deal with the
precisely drawn classes of jurisdiction described by the text, but also to
overturn Chisholm and its guiding premise that Article III made states
suable in the first place.' 7 Although the Amendment's text could not bear
that wider meaning, the Court concluded that reading it as written would
produce an absurdity, given eighteenth-century American society's obvious
support for broad sovereign immunity.
Second, the Court has sometimes read the Eleventh Amendment more
defensively, treating it merely as a nonimpediment to the independent
derivation of a broad immunity from Article III or the constitutional
structure more generally. In this line of cases, perhaps typified by Monaco
v. Mississippi, the Court has simply held that
neither the literal sweep of the words of Clause one of § 2 of
Article III, nor the absence of restriction in the letter of the
Eleventh Amendment, permits the conclusion that in all
controversies of the sort described in Clause one, and omitted from
the words of the Eleventh Amendment, a State may be sued without
her consent.
18
In other words, the Amendment's precise specification of certain types of
immunity carries no negative implication. In some tension with Hans, the
Court in this second line of cases has typically built on the assumption that
the Amendment merely sought to rectify Chisholm's narrow holding, not to
12. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
13. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
14. 2 U.S. (2 Dal].) 419, 419 (1793).
15. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1473
(1987) (noting that the Eleventh Amendment "was undeniably designed to repudiate the majority
analysis in Chisholm and overrule its holding"); William A. Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation
of the Eleventh Amendment: A Reply to Critics, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1261, 1263 (1989) ("Everyone
agrees that the Eleventh Amendment was adopted to overturn the result the Supreme Court
reached in Chisholm v. Georgia in 1793." (footnote omitted)).
16. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
17. Id. at 11.
18. Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 321 (1934).
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articulate a comprehensive but carefully limited policy about state
sovereign immunity in general.19 Under this theory, the Amendment's
specific terms do not constrain the Court's ability to derive new rules of
sovereign immunity from the general authority of "the judicial Power" in
Article III or to infer them from the constitutional structure as a whole.
Perhaps because of the Court's openly originalist approach, an
extensive body of legal scholarship has undertaken to examine the historical
foundations of sovereign immunity case law. For the most part, this
scholarship has proceeded from the Court's specific frame of reference,
relying on eighteenth-century historical context to dispute (or, much more
rarely, to buttress) the Court's reading of the intentions or background
understandings of those who adopted Article III and the Eleventh
Amendment.20 To be sure, most such writings rely on the Amendment's
text or the text and structure of the Constitution to anchor their criticism of
the Court's analysis. 21 But with rare exceptions, work in this area gives
little if any attention to the more fundamental methodological question
embedded in the cases: How should a federal court interpret a precise
constitutional text like the Eleventh Amendment? 22 In particular, no one has
19. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 723 (1999).
20. Scholarship in this area typically is critical of the Court's position. See, e.g., Martha A.
Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA.
L. REV. 515, 536-46 (1978) (contending that sovereign immunity survived the adoption of Article
III as a common law doctrine subject to legislative revision, and adding that this interpretation fits
comfortably with the text of the Eleventh Amendment); William A. Fletcher, A Historical
Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of
Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1054-63
(1983) (arguing that the Eleventh Amendment is properly understood merely to impose a limiting
construction on the heads of Article III jurisdiction that authorize suits between states and out-of-
state individuals); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A
Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1926-38 (1983) (arguing that the Eleventh
Amendment was framed narrowly to accommodate the Federalists' diplomatic concerns about the
enforceability of British claims under the Treaty of Paris); James E. Pfander, History and State
Suability: An "Explanatory" Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269,
1323-52 (1998) (arguing that the Eleventh Amendment operated as an "explanatory amendment,"
meant to ensure that the states were not subject to liability in federal court for debts incurred under
the Articles of Confederation). Those who find state sovereign immunity consistent with either the
original understanding of Article III or the Eleventh Amendment are fewer in number. In a
characteristically thoughtful recent article, Caleb Nelson has suggested that state sovereign
immunity in fact survived Article III because a "Case" or "Controversy" presupposed a party
amenable to compulsory process and because states were traditionally not amenable to such
process. See Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction,
115 HARV. L. REV. 1559, 1567-608 (2002).
21. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 15, at 1481-83 (parsing the text of the Eleventh Amendment);
Field, supra note 20, at 543-44 (arguing that treating state sovereign immunity as a common law
construct makes sense of the Eleventh Amendment's text); Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1060-62
(closely reading the Amendment's text and comparing it with various unadopted drafts of the
Amendment); Pfander, supra note 20, at 1323 (arguing that under interpretive customs of the
time, the insertion of the words "be construed to" in the Eleventh Amendment suggests that it was
intended as an explanatory amendment).
22. As one of the debate's leading participants has put it, "Seeking a historical understanding
of the Eleventh Amendment is not a particularly theoretical enterprise. As I view it, the task is to
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examined the legitimacy of using an amendment's background purpose to
depart from the otherwise clear import of the adopted text.23 Nor has
existing scholarship, with one exception, examined how the specification of
a precise constitutional policy on a given topic (state sovereign immunity
against federal jurisdiction) ought to affect the Court's capacity to invoke
otherwise applicable general authority ("the judicial Power") to craft
additional law on the same question.24
These methodological arguments have become more salient in recent
years. The Rehnquist Court has not only credited Hans under rules of stare
decisis, but has also endorsed and utilized its strongly purposive method of
constitutional reasoning to resolve open questions about the scope of
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.25 Alternatively, as in
the Monaco case of an earlier era, the Rehnquist Court has also held that the
line-drawing implicit in the Eleventh Amendment carries no negative
implication, thereby allowing the Court to cull new unenumerated
sovereign immunities from general features of constitutional structure.26
These decisions create an apparent incongruity in the modem Court's
interpretive jurisprudence. In matters of statutory interpretation, a defining
trait of the Rehnquist Court has been its assiduous observance of the lines
arrive at the best explanation of what the adopters intended, based on the known historical facts
and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them." Fletcher, supra note 15, at 1263.
Judge Fletcher's observation nicely captures the general tenor of the debate.
23. In an influential piece arguing for a literal interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment,
Lawrence Marshall gave the methodological question its most extended consideration. See
Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1342
(1989). Even Marshall, however, simply assumed the legitimacy of measuring a text's congruence
with its apparent background goals. See id. at 1345. He noted, in particular, that "an originalist
may feel compelled to abandon a determinate text when the results of following the text are so
ridiculous that it is unreasonable to conclude that the drafters and supporters of the provision
intended to reach the results that the common understanding of the text dictates." Id. Although he
concluded that the Eleventh Amendment was sufficiently congruous with its underlying goals to
justify its implementation as written, he never examined the more basic legitimacy of engaging in
the strong constitutional purposivism that his-and ultimately the Court's-framework
contemplates. For a thoughtful article that analyzes this problem by assuming (but not defending)
the legitimacy of constitutional textualism, see Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Textualism and
Federalism: The Proper Textual Basis of the Supreme Court's Tenth and Eleventh Amendment
Decisions, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 819 (1999).
24. The exception is Nelson, supra note 20, at 1617-20. Professor Nelson argues that the
limited scope of the Eleventh Amendment tells us, at most, that the Framers doubted their
capacity to obtain the requisite supermajorities for other categories of immunity. See id. at 1619.
Accordingly, the Amendment, properly understood, left intact whatever authority the Court
previously had to derive sovereign immunity from (or read it into) Article 111. See id. at 1618-19.
As I explain below, I attach different significance to the line-drawing reflected in the
Amendment's precise terms. See infra Section II.C.
25. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 64-72 (1996); see also infra notes 91-101 and
accompanying text (discussing the current Court's strongly purposive reading of the Eleventh
Amendment).
26. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 723 (1999); see also infra notes 239-244 and
accompanying text (describing alternative justifications for sovereign immunity rooted in "the
judicial Power" of Article III and the constitutional structure as a whole).
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drawn by a clear and precise statutory text, even when the outcomes seem
difficult to square with the statute's apparent background purpose. 7 The
Court has suggested that enacting a statute is always path-dependent and
often predicated on unknowable compromise; hence, in a system based on
legislative supremacy, respect for the legislative process requires the judge
to hew closely to the enacted text when clear. This form of textualism
contrasts sharply with the interpretive approach prevailing at the time of
Hans and most of its progeny; until quite recently, the Court started from
the assumption that lawmakers often express their intentions clearly but
imprecisely, and that judges may show greater fidelity to the lawmaker by
enforcing the spirit rather than the letter of the law.28 Accordingly, while
Hans and all but its most recent progeny fit tightly with the interpretive
norms prevailing at the time of their decision, the Rehnquist Court's
continued application of strong purposivism to clarify and extend state
sovereign immunity creates an apparent methodological incongruity that
requires explanation.
The most plausible resolution of that anomaly is this: Whereas the
Rehnquist Court has tended toward textualism in statutory cases, few would
contend that constitutional interpretation warrants the same strictness as
statutory interpretation. Instead, the conventional wisdom, often traced
(mistakenly) to McCulloch v. Maryland,29 presupposes that judges have
greater freedom to interpret the Constitution atextually to effectuate its
broader purposes. Because the Constitution .prescribes a charter of
government for the ages and is, by design, prohibitively difficult to amend,
that document quite simply compels greater flexibility from its interpreters
than typically shorter-lived and more easily altered statutes. 30 Accordingly,
even if the modem Court takes pains to read a clear and precise statute
strictly according to its terms, it is nonetheless justified in treating the
Eleventh Amendment as part of the living Constitution.
I argue here that the conventional wisdom is backwards-at least where
the Constitution speaks in precise rule-like terms, as the Eleventh
Amendment does. I start from the Court's own premise that it must enforce
even the seemingly awkward lines drawn by a clear and precise statutory
text, because such a text frequently represents an unknowable compromise
and, at least in our system of government, legislative compromise merits
judicial solicitude. In light of the elaborate process of constitutional
lawmaking prescribed by Article V, the Rehnquist Court's interpretive
assumptions about compromise apply with greater force, ceteris paribus, to
27. See infra notes 112-117 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 78-87 and accompanying text.
29. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) ("[W]e must never forget that it is a constitution we
are expounding.").
30. See infra Section II.A.
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a precise constitutional text. In the typical invocation of the amendment
process, any amendment must secure distinct supermajorities of two-thirds
of each chamber of Congress and three-quarters of the states. By design,
this process seeks to ensure that a small minority of society or, more
accurately, several distinct small minorities have the right to veto
constitutional change or to insist upon compromise as the price of assent.
Accordingly, using a precisely worded constitutional amendment's apparent
background purpose to circumvent the clear lines drawn by its text dilutes
the constitutional protection that Article V assigns to political minorities.
For similar reasons, the Court should perhaps not be so quick to dismiss
the possibility that the Eleventh Amendment carries a negative implication,
precluding judicial recognition of additional categories of state sovereign
immunity under the general authority of Article III or the constitutional
structure. Given its emphasis in recent years on the importance of
compromise, the Rehnquist Court has enthusiastically applied to statutes the
ancient maxim that the specific governs the general. 31 The "specificity
canon" holds that if one statute speaks in precise terms to a specific
question, that fact may preclude judges from addressing the same question
in a different way under an otherwise applicable general statute. Like its
close relative expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the specificity canon of
course applies only when a reasonable person would justifiably infer a
negative implication from reading the specific text in context.32 Still, it does
alert the interpreter to read potentially overlapping statutes with the
following concern in mind: When Congress has focused explicitly on a
particular question and prescribed a precise rule to address it, the outcome
may reflect the specific compromise that the relevant political forces could
reach on that question. If courts or agencies are able to invoke more general
authority to prescribe further law on the same question, the result might be
an end run around a legislative compromise on the precise question in issue.
Because of the importance of compromise reflected in the Article V
process, I argue here that justification for the specificity canon has at least
as much force where a precise constitutional provision is concerned. 33 I
further contend that although the question is close, the specific text of the
Eleventh Amendment, read in context, appears to convey a negative
implication that should preclude the derivation of further classes of state
sovereign immunity from suit in federal court.34
31. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000); United
States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 532 (1998); United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453
(1988).
32. See infra notes 222-231 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 282-283 and accompanying text.
34. See infra Section III.C.
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Part I sets the stage by examining the Court's strongly purposivist
approach to the precise terms of the Eleventh Amendment. It then compares
that case law with the Rehnquist Court's more textualist approach to precise
statutes. In Part II, I consider first whether a plausible distinction between
constitutional and statutory adjudication makes strong purposivism more
acceptable in the former context, even if rejected in the latter. I conclude,
however, that the modem insights of statutory textualism also preclude the
application of strong purposivism when interpreting a precise constitutional
amendment such as the Eleventh Amendment. As compared to the
legislative process prescribed by Article I, Section 7, Article V's process
calls upon the judiciary to place, if anything, a greater premium on
respecting the lines of compromise. More tentatively, Part III contends that
the specificity canon may have a crucial role to play in applying the
Eleventh Amendment. To the extent that the amendment process focused
specifically on the question of state sovereign immunity in federal courts
and produced a precise solution that went so far and no farther, judges
should hesitate before invoking general authority such as "the judicial
Power" to alter the balance struck by the Eleventh Amendment.
Before being asked to venture forth into the complicated analysis that
follows, the reader is entitled to a precise statement of why it is worth
studying the methodology of a case, like Hans, that has been entrenched
law for more than a century. Two considerations, I believe, justify the
effort. First, if one believes that the present law of state sovereign immunity
has practical importance,35 it is relevant to consider the legitimacy of a
precedent and, indeed, an interpretive method that the Court has used in
recent years to consolidate and extend that law.36 Second, examining the
35. Some believe that remaining avenues of relief make the present doctrine of sovereign
immunity less significant. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and
Section 1983, 84 VA. L. REv. 47, 68-81 (1998) (arguing that the Eleventh Amendment and
42 U.S.C. § 1983 together establish a coherent system of constitutional remedies based on fault);
Henry Paul Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Comment: The Sovereign Immunity
"Exception," 110 HARV. L. REv. 102, 126-32 (1996) (discussing the availability of suits for
prospective relief against state officers acting in violation of federal law).
36. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363-65 (2001) (using
Eleventh Amendment immunity as the trigger for enforcing "congruence" and "proportionality"
requirements against a statute purporting to rest on Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment);
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72-73, 78-81 (2000) (same); Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 634-35 (1999) (same);
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 57-73 (1996) (relying on Hans and strongly purposive
methods to hold that Congress lacks Article I power to abrogate unenumerated Eleventh
Amendment immunity); Blatchford v. Native Viii. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779-82 (1991)
(extending Eleventh Amendment immunity to a federal question action by a tribal sovereign).
Although I start from the assumption that some meaningful form of stare decisis is
appropriate to our system of government, consideration of the proper circumstances for applying
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mode of interpreting the Eleventh Amendment should help to clarify the
appropriate methods of interpreting precise constitutional provisions in
general. In particular, it suggests that the Court should adhere to the
boundaries of a precisely worded constitutional text at least as strictly as it
presently observes the limits of a precisely worded statute.37 In short,
examining questions of interpretive method should cast light on the
Eleventh Amendment debate, and examining that debate should, in turn,
cast reciprocal light on questions of interpretive method.
I. THE "SPIRIT" OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
For more than a century, the Court has acted on the premise that the
Eleventh Amendment's precise text means more than it says. In particular,
beginning with Hans v. Louisiana,38 the Court has held that the Amendment
must be read in light of its animating purpose to overturn the Court's
opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia39 and thereby to make clear that state
sovereign immunity survived the establishment of federal jurisdiction in
Article III. After Chisholm found a state suable under the state-citizen
diversity clause of Article III, the Amendment followed swiftly and
decisively. The Amendment's text, of course, deals narrowly with
the availability of federal jurisdiction in various suits against states by
out-of-state parties. But in view of the strong reaction against Chisholm and
eighteenth-century society's widespread commitment to state sovereign
immunity in general, the Hans Court found it unthinkable that the
Amendment was intended merely to shield states from the narrow class of
suits described by its text, rather than to establish a more comprehensive
form of immunity that extended even to federal questions by in-staters.4 °
Today, the Rehnquist Court has used the same strongly purposive reasoning
to resolve (in the negative) the longstanding question whether Congress
possesses Article I power to abrogate the immunity previously read into the
Eleventh Amendment.
This Part sets the stage for examining the legitimacy of atextual and
strongly purposive interpretation of a precise constitutional text like the
Eleventh Amendment. In particular, I elaborate on both the Hans Court's
or departing from precedent lies beyond the scope of this Article. See Frank H. Easterbrook,
Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 422 (1988) (describing the
virtues of stare decisis while acknowledging the many difficulties that govern its application).
Accordingly, I take no position on the further question whether Hans, if wrongly decided, should
be overruled. In any case, even if one were to assume that it is too late in the day to overturn Hans
itself, the analysis that follows is relevant to the many open questions not fairly encompassed
within the holding of Hans or its progeny.
37. See infra Section lI.B.
38. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
39. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
40. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 14-15.
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and the modem Court's strongly purposive interpretation of the
Amendment. I then compare the Rehnquist Court's strongly purposive
approach to the Amendment with its concomitant insistence upon
protecting legislative compromise in statutory cases, even when the
outcome seems at odds with background statutory purposes. This
comparison supplies the necessary context for examining (in Part II)
whether process concerns emanating from Article V suggest that
interpreters should, if anything, show greater solicitude for the apparent
lines of compromise drawn by a precise constitutional, as opposed to
statutory, text.
A. The Immediate Context: Chisholm v. Georgia
Because Hans effectively "treat[ed] the Eleventh Amendment as if it
were a precedent to the opposite of Chisholm v. Georgia,"41 rather than a
set of precise rules about the proper limits of Article III, brief consideration
of both Chisholm and the pre-Chisholm context will help to frame the Hans
Court's strongly purposive methodology. It is fair to say that Chisholm
itself worked against the backdrop of a Constitution that had left the
question of state sovereign immunity, like many other structural questions,
relatively unsettled. No constitutional provision addressed the matter
directly. State sovereign immunity went unmentioned in the Philadelphia
Convention. Although important figures in various ratifying debates-
including Hamilton (qua Publius), Madison, and Marshall-gave broadly
worded assurances that states would retain their traditional immunity from
unconsented suits after Article III's adoption, opinion on that question was
hardly uniform.4 2 In other words, the direct evidence of the original
understanding of Article III was at best inconclusive on the question of the
states' suability.43
Although I do not intend here to join an already extensive debate over
the original meaning of Article III on the question of state suability, it is
worth noting that the contextual evidence frequently invoked in the
41. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 782 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
1994).
42. See, e.g., Field, supra note 20, at 527-36 (analyzing diverse views on the question in the
ratifying debates); Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1045-54 (same). For me, in any case, scattered
remarks in the ratifying debates demand a heavy discount: One cannot know how widely such
remarks circulated across thirteen distinct conventions, or who may have agreed or disagreed with
them, or to what extent the utterers shaped their contributions in light of strategic concerns in
decidedly political ratification contests. See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Role of The
Federalist in Constitutional Adjudication, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1337, 1340, 1348-54 (1998).
43. See Welch v. Tex. Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 483-84 (1987)
(plurality opinion) ("At most,... the historical materials show that-to the extent this question
was debated-the intentions of the Framers and Ratifiers were ambiguous.").
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scholarly debate seems relatively indeterminate. For example, even if one
assumes that the English judicial practice at the time still embodied
meaningful limitations on suits against the sovereign, 4 English common
law traditions do not always supply an appropriate reference point for
understanding the distinctive features of our constitutional structure.
45 Even
assuming, moreover, that a vibrant tradition of sovereign immunity
characterized state judicial practice in the years leading up to the
Philadelphia Convention,46 that fact alone cannot resolve the question
whether Article III implicitly incorporated that tradition into "the judicial
Power" or, instead, repudiated it by extending an unqualified federal
judicial power to heads of jurisdiction that included states as potential
defendants.47 If sovereign immunity ultimately derived from feudal
premises about the sovereignty of the Crown, those origins might make it
inapposite to a republic in which the people delegated sovereignty on
limited terms to its governors.48 Conversely, if suits against sovereigns were
44. Compare, e.g., Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign
Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1-18 (1963) (arguing that the practical effect of the English
doctrine of sovereign immunity had diminished to insignificance in the years before the nation's
Founding), with Nelson, supra note 20, at 1574-79 (arguing that the sovereign was not amenable
to process under English judicial practice in the years before the Founding). Examination of this
question is beyond the scope of this Article. For purposes of the analysis here, I assume the
Founders took a robust common law doctrine of sovereign immunity as their baseline.
45. See Manning, supra note 11, at 56. The practices prevailing at Westminster in 1789 may
inform our understanding of aspects of the judicial power. See, e.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide
Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 587 (1985) (defining core Article III business); Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (determining
justiciability in light of "the business of the Colonial courts and the courts of Westminster when
the Constitution was framed"). But in many respects, such practices were simply inapposite to the
very different premises about the judiciary implicit in the structure of the U.S. Constitution. For
example, Blackstone stated that English judges lacked the power of judicial review. See
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *91. But in an American government established by
"a written constitution," the Supreme Court of course found such authority to be implicit in the
judicial power "to say what the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803);
see also United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 872 (1996) (plurality opinion) (noting that
the legislative supremacy principle described by Blackstone is modified by the premise that "the
power of American legislative bodies ... is subject to the overriding dictates of the Constitution
and the obligations that it authorizes").
46. Compare, e.g., Gibbons, supra note 20, at 1898-99 (arguing that many early state
constitutions implicitly provided for the amenability of states to suit), with Nelson, supra note 20,
at 1574-79 (contending that the common understanding in the preconstitutional period was that
the states were not amenable to judicial process without their consent).
47. In general, given the Founding generation's widespread dissatisfaction with the way
many state governments had operated in the years leading up to the Philadelphia Convention, it is
not clear to what extent early state governments and practices served as affirmative, rather than
negative, models for understanding the U.S. Constitution. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776-1787, at 549-53 (1969). On this assumption, I have
previously argued that it is dangerous simply to assume that early state judicial practice supplied
the baseline for understanding any particular aspect of "the judicial Power." See John F. Manning,
Deriving Rules of Statutory Interpretation from the Constitution, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1648,
1660-65 (2001).
48. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 15, at 1466, 1480-81, 1485-86 (arguing that broad sovereign
immunity is antithetical to the guiding constitutional premise that a sovereign people has
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unknown to the law, could one fairly assume that the states conceded their
immunity to the federal sovereign without some clear statement to that
effect in the constitutional plan?49 How should one understand sovereign
immunity in a dual republic in which the states seem to have ceded some
measure of sovereignty to the federal government on matters within a
limited sphere of federal power and, beyond that, seem to have agreed to
certain express constitutional restrictions on their own sovereign powers? 50
I do not mention these questions to intimate any kind of answer, but rather
to note that the survival of broad state sovereign immunity under Article III
seems not to have been a foregone conclusion.
Certainly, that is the import of the seriatim opinions in Chisholm v.
Georgia, which confronted such questions from a perspective far closer
than the present. The precise factual context involved the narrow question
of whether an out-of-state plaintiff seeking to recover a debt from a state
could invoke Article III, Section 2's extension of federal jurisdiction to
"Controversies ... between a State and citizens of another State." Most
basically, Chisholm held that state sovereign immunity did not survive
Article III's unqualified extension of "the judicial Power" to a head of
jurisdiction whose text plainly included states as potential defendants.5 But
the majority opinions and the dissent also addressed the problem of state
sovereign immunity more generally. Ultimately, as discussed below, the
breadth of the majority opinions' analysis and the dissent's refutation of
that analysis laid much of the groundwork for the atextual and purposive
interpretation subsequently applied to the Eleventh Amendment by Hans v.
Louisiana and its progeny. Accordingly, it is worth outlining some of the
crucial reasoning of the five Chisholm opinions.
First, two opinions emphasized that because sovereign immunity
originated in the feudal notion that the Crown was a sovereign who was
above his or her subjects,52 its premises did not apply to a republican
delegated limited authority and that the people's agents lose any veneer of sovereignty when
acting ultra vires).
49. See Nelson, supra note 20, at 1598-99 (recounting certain post-ratification arguments
against the suability of states in federal court).
50. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1064-78.
51. See 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 450-51 (1793) (Blair, J.) (explaining that the judicial power is
"expressly extended" to suits between a state and citizens of another state and that Chisholm's
action "[u]ndoubtedly" fits that description); id. at 466 (Wilson, J.) ("[C]ould this strict and
appropriated language [of the state-citizen diversity clause], describe, with more precise accuracy,
the cause now depending before the tribunal?"); id. at 467 (Cushing, J.) ("The case .. . seems
clearly to fall within the letter of the Constitution."); id. at 477 (Jay, C.J.) (emphasizing that
Chisholm's suit "clearly falls not only within the spirit, but the very words of the Constitution").
52. Justice Wilson, for example, traced sovereign immunity to feudal notions that the Crown,
as sovereign, was not subject to the jurisdiction of any superior power. Id. at 458 (Wilson, J.); see
also id. at 457 (noting that "sovereignty is derived from a feudal source; and like many other parts
of that system so degrading to man, still retains its influence over our sentiments and conduct,
though the cause, by which that influence was produced, never extended to the American States");
id. at 471 (Jay, C.J.) (observing that European sovereignties rest on "feudal principles" and that
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system of government in which sovereignty resides with the people.53
Second, several Justices reasoned that even if sovereign immunity survived
a republican form of government, the states necessarily ceded a measure of
their sovereignty to the nation when they assented to the Constitution.54
Because the Constitution conferred upon Congress certain powers affecting
the states and also imposed various express restrictions on state power, it
followed that the judiciary should possess authority sufficient to vindicate
such federal laws. 55 Third, certain majority opinions invoked other heads of
such a system regards "the Prince as the sovereign" and "excludes the idea of his being on an
equal footing with a subject, either in a Court of Justice or elsewhere").
53. See id. at 458 (Wilson, J.) (emphasizing that laws "must be founded on the CONSENT of
those, whose obedience they require," and that sovereignty must be traced to the people); id. at
479 (Jay, C.J.) (arguing that the extension of federal jurisdiction to actions such as Chisholm's
"enforces this great and glorious principle, that the people are the sovereign of this country, and
consequently that fellow citizens and joint sovereigns cannot be degraded by appearing with each
other in their own Courts to have their controversies determined").
54. Justice Wilson offered a general statement of this premise:
[Tlhe citizens of Georgia, when they acted upon the large scale of the Union, as a part
of the "People of the United States," did not surrender the Supreme or sovereign Power
to that State; but, as to the purposes of the Union, retained it to themselves. As to the
purposes of the Union, therefore, Georgia is NOT a sovereign State.
Id. at 457 (Wilson, J.). One opinion emphasized that by submitting themselves to the judicial
power of the United States, the states had ceded whatever immunity had accrued from exclusive
control over access to their own courts. Justice Blair thus argued:
When sovereigns are sued in their own Courts, such a method [the traditional petition
of right] may have been established as the most respectful form of demand; but we are
not now in a State-Court; and if sovereignty be an exemption from suit in any other
than the sovereign's own Courts, it follows that when a State, by adopting the
Constitution, has agreed to be amenable to the judicial power of the United States, she
has, in that respect, given up her right of sovereignty.
Id. at 452 (Blair, J.).
55. Justice Cushing thus made the following argument:
Whatever power is deposited with the Union by the people for their own necessary
security, is so far a curtailing of the power and prerogatives of States. This is, as it
were, a self-evident proposition; at least it cannot be contested. Thus the power of
declaring war, making peace, raising and supporting armies for public defence, levying
duties, excises and taxes, if necessary, with many other powers, are lodged in
Congress; and are a most essential abridgement of State sovereignty. Again; the
restrictions upon States; "No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or
confederation, coin money, emit bills of credit, make any thing but gold and silver a
tender in payment of debts, pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts;" these,
with a number of others, are important restrictions of the power of States, and were
thought necessary to maintain the Union; and to establish some fundamental uniform
principles of public justice, throughout the whole Union. So that, I think, no argument
of force can be taken from the sovereignty of States. Where it has been abridged, it was
thought necessary for the greater indispensable good of the whole. If the Constitution is
found inconvenient in practice in this or any other particular, it is well that a regular
mode is pointed out for amendment. But, while it remains, all offices Legislative,
Executive, and Judicial, both of the States and of the Union, are bound by oath to
support it.
Id. at 468 (Cushing, J.). Justice Wilson made a similar point. He started from the premise that the
Constitution authorizes the legislative power to act upon the states. See id. at 464 (Wilson, J.)
("When certain laws of the States are declared to be 'subject to the revision and controul of the
Congress;' it cannot, surely, be contended that the Legislative power.., was meant to have no
operation on the several States." (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (emphasis added))). He then
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Article III jurisdiction to establish the basic point that the states did not join
the union with their background immunity intact. In particular, Article III
created jurisdiction in controversies "between two or more States,"
a meaningless provision unless a state could subject another state to suit
in federal court. 6 And two Justices found it obvious that foreign states
could sue states under the head of jurisdiction governing controversies
between "a State.." and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. ' 7 If a state
could assert sovereign immunity against the exercise of such jurisdiction, it
would defeat the constitutional purpose of denying states the ability "to
embroil the whole confederacy in disputes" with foreign powers. 58 This
conclusion, in turn, made it more difficult to find that Article III
simultaneously preserved state sovereign immunity under the similarly
structured and worded state-citizen diversity clause.59
Justice Iredell's dissent displays the greatest humility about the difficult
question of "first impression" before. the Court.60  Starting from the
assumption that the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress power to
prescribe the federal courts' "manner of... proceeding," Justice Iredell
stressed that "[n]othing could be more natural than to intend that this Legislative power should be
enforced by powers Executive and Judicial." Id. at 465. Similarly, with respect to constitutional
restrictions such as those contained in the Contract Clause, Justice Wilson asked: "What good
purpose could this Constitutional provision secure, if a State might pass a law impairing the
obligation of its own contracts; and be amenable, for such a violation of right, to no controuling
judiciary power?" Id.
56. Id. at 45 1 (Blair, J.) (noting that under the state-state clause, "a State must, of necessity,
be a Defendant").
57. See id.; id. at 467-68 (Cushing, J.).
58. See id. at 451 (Blair, J.). Along similar lines, Justice Cushing wrote:
[A]lthough the words appear reciprocally to affect the State here and a foreign State,
and put them on the same footing as far as may be, yet ingenuity may say, that the State
here may sue, but cannot be sued; but that the foreign State may be sued but cannot sue.
We may touch foreign sovereignties but not our own. But I conceive the reason of the
thing, as well as the words of-the Constitution, tend to shew that the Federal Judicial
power extends to a suit brought by a foreign State against any one of the United States.
ONE design of the general Government was for managing the great affairs of peace and
war and the general defence; which were impossible to be conducted, with safety, by
the States separately. Incident to these powers, and for preventing controversies
between foreign powers or citizens from rising to extremities and to an appeal to the
sword, a national tribunal was necessary, amicably to decide them, and thus ward off
such fatal, public calamity. Thus, States at home and their citizens, and foreign States
and their citizens, are put together without distinction upon the same footing, as far as
may be, as to controversies between them.
Id. at 467-68 (Cushing, J.).
59. See id. at 468 ("So also, with respect to controversies between a State and citizens of
another State (at home) comparing all the clauses together, the remedy is reciprocal; the claim to
justice equal."). Justice Blair relied on his conclusions about the state-foreign state diversity
clause to refute the argument that controversies "between a State and citizens of another State"
only envisioned states as plaintiffs, given the order of their appearance in the clause. See id. at 450
(Blair, J.) (noting that the state-citizen diversity clause of Article Ill, Section 2 "[u]ndoubtedly"
reaches Chisholm's suit, "unless it may be a sufficient denial to say, that it is a controversy
between a citizen of one State and another State").
60. Id. at 449 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
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emphasized that section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 authorized such
courts merely to issue writs "'agreeable to the principles and usages of
law."' 6 1 For him, the crucial point was that Congress had instructed the
federal courts (including the Supreme Court) to look to existing law in
determining the availability of compulsory process against the states. In the
absence of any state or federal statute specifically addressing that question,
Justice Iredell reasoned that section 14 necessarily incorporated the
common law of the states-a body of law that, in his view, had not
materially deviated from the common law pertaining to the sovereign
immunity of the English Crown. 62 That tradition excluded an unconsented
common law action to recover a debt from a state.
Justice Iredell's dissent emphasized, however, that the question was one
of great difficulty and delicacy and, thus, should be resolved on narrow
grounds. Indeed, even he acknowledged a potential distinction between
common law actions like Chisholm's and those involving genuine federal
interests-"the special objects of authority of the general Government,
wherein the separate sovereignties of the States are blended in one common
mass of supremacy., 63 The states, he explained, "separately possess[ed], as
to every thing simply relating to themselves, the fullest powers of
sovereignty, and yet in some other defined particulars [were] subject to a
superior power composed out of themselves for the common welfare of the
whole. 64 Still, deeming it crucial that a judge not "rashly commit" on
"important questions" of constitutional dimension, Justice Iredell never
specified his precise understanding of Congress's constitutional power, if
any, to subject states to suit.65 He intimated, however, that his "present
61. Id. at 434 (quoting Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 82 (current version at
28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000))) (emphasis omitted).
62. As Justice Iredell thus explained,
The only principles of law, then, that can be regarded, are those common to all the
States. I know of none such, which can affect this case, but those that are derived from
what is properly termed "the common law," a law which I presume is the ground-work
of the laws in every State in the Union, and which I consider, so far as it is applicable to
the peculiar circumstances of the country, and where no special act of Legislation
controuls it, to be in force in each State, as it existed in England, (unaltered by any
statute) at the time of the first settlement of the country.... No other part of the
common law of England, it appears to me, can have any reference to this subject, but
that part of it which prescribes remedies against the crown. Every State in the Union in
every instance where its sovereignty has not been delegated to the United States, I
consider to be as compleately sovereign, as the United States are in respect to the
powers surrendered. The United States are sovereign as to all the powers of
Government actually surrendered: Each State in the Union is sovereign as to all the
powers reserved. It must necessarily be so, because the United States have no claim to
any authority but such as the States have surrendered to them: Of course the part not
surrendered must remain as it did before.
Id. at 435.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 447.
65. Id. at 449.
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opinion [was] strongly against any construction of [the Constitution], which
will admit, under any circumstances, a compulsive suit against a State for
the recovery of money. 66 Given the strong background of sovereign
immunity, "nothing but express words, or an insurmountable
implication.., would authorize the deduction of so high a power."
67
Although Chisholm involved a fairly circumscribed set of facts (a
common law action for debt grounded in diversity jurisdiction), the broad
reasoning discussed above would have major interpretive consequences in
later years. The four majority opinions rested the assertion of jurisdiction on
a general theory of "the judicial Power" in a constitutional republic. That
justification, moreover, seemed to apply a fortiori to other heads of
jurisdiction. Indeed, in support of the broader conclusion that sovereign
immunity did not survive the adoption of Article III, the seriatim opinions
cited a number of specific categories for which such abrogation seemed
obvious-such as federal question jurisdiction, suits in admiralty, suits
between states, and suits against states by foreign states. This breadth of
reasoning was to open the door for future generations to read the Eleventh
Amendment's subsequent repudiation of Chisholm not as the Amendment
was written (a set of precise rules for reading the judicial power), but rather
as a sweeping rejection of the broader animating principles that underlay
Chisholm's specific holding.
B. Hans and Holy Trinity
No one questions that the nation adopted the Eleventh Amendment in
response to Chisholm. The text of the Amendment, however, addresses the
problem posed by that decision through the articulation of rather precise
rules limiting the proper construction of Article III power: "The Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
Although this text is open to more than one plausible interpretation,68 one
66. Id.
67. Id. at 450.
68. Two leading schools of thought exist on the question of how to read the Eleventh
Amendment's text. The diversity theory maintains that when viewed alongside the text that it
modifies (Article III), the Amendment simply adopts a narrowing construction of Article Ii,
Section 2's subclauses dealing with suits against states by out-of-state individuals. Specifically,
Article III, Section 2 authorizes jurisdiction over controversies "between a State and Citizens of
another State" and "between a State... and foreign... Citizens or Subjects." U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 2, cl. 1. After the Amendment, a federal court could no longer rely on those precise
subclauses to sustain jurisdiction over the state as a defendant. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 20,
at 1045-54, 1060-63; Gibbons, supra note 20, at 1894, 1936-37. On this view, the Amendment
does not affect federal question actions against states even if the alignment of parties happens to
correspond to one described by the Amendment. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1063;
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thing about it is quite clear: It cannot bear the meaning assigned to it by
Hans v. Louisiana, which initiated the strongly purposive approach to the
Amendment that governs its interpretation to this day. The facts of Hans are
too familiar to require extensive recitation. Hans involved a suit filed by a
citizen of Louisiana against the State of Louisiana. Louisiana had
repudiated the interest on state bonds held by Hans. Hans sued in federal
court, alleging that the state's refusal to make the required payments
violated the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 69 On the premise that
his case arose under the Constitution, Hans filed in federal circuit court
under the relatively new statute providing for federal question jurisdiction.7 °
Against this assertion of federal jurisdiction, the State interposed the bar of
the Eleventh Amendment.
Unsurprisingly, the plaintiff argued that he was "not embarrassed by the
obstacle of the Eleventh Amendment, inasmuch as that amendment only
prohibits suits. .. brought by the citizens of another State, or by citizens or
subjects of a foreign State. 71 While acknowledging that "the amendment
does so read,, 72 the Court interpreted it against the backdrop of the "shock
of surprise" that had swept the nation after Chisholm:
[A]t the first meeting of Congress [after Chisholm], the Eleventh
Amendment to the Constitution was almost unanimously proposed,
and was in due course adopted by the legislatures of the States.
This amendment, expressing the will of the ultimate sovereignty of
the whole country, superior to all legislatures and all courts,
actually reversed the decision of the Supreme Court. It did not in
terms prohibit suits by individuals against the States, but declared
that the Constitution should not be construed to import any power
to authorize the bringing of such suits....
This view of the force and meaning of the amendment is
important. It shows that, on this question of the suability of the
States by individuals, the highest authority of this country was in
Gibbons, supra note 20, at 1937. Literal theorists, by contrast, view the Amendment more
broadly. Emphasizing that the plain meaning of the text reaches "any suit in law or equity" that
has the alignment of parties described in the Amendment, such theorists argue that the
Amendment precludes even a federal question action if brought against a state by a citizen of
another state or a citizen or subject of a foreign state. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 23, at 1346-
49. On the assumption that both interpretations represent a plausible reading of the Amendment's
text, I do not attempt here to adjudicate the dispute between diversity and literal theories.
69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall.., pass any ... Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts .... ").
70. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (granting the federal circuit courts
"original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature
at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or
value of five hundred dollars, and arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States").
71. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890).
72. Id.
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accord rather with the minority than with the majority of the court
in the decision of the case of Chisholm v. Georgia; and this fact
lends additional interest to the able opinion of Mr. Justice Iredell on
that occasion. The other justices were more swayed by a close
observance of the letter of the Constitution .... Justice Iredell, on
the contrary, contended that it was not the intention to create new
and unheard of remedies, by subjecting sovereign States to actions
at the suit of individuals, (which he conclusively showed was never
done before,) but only, by proper legislation, to invest the federal
courts with jurisdiction to hear and determine controversies and
cases, between the parties designated, that were properly
susceptible of litigation in courts.73
In other words, the Eleventh Amendment's purpose was not merely to
limit the federal judicial power in cases involving the party alignments
described by the Amendment's precise text, but also to repudiate Chisholm
and all that it stood for. To the extent that Chisholm's reasoning indicated
that state sovereign immunity generally did not survive Article III's
adoption, the Eleventh Amendment established just the opposite. In so
doing, the Amendment also gave constitutional force to (a broad reading of)
Justice Iredell's dissent and to the views of "the great defenders of the
Constitution" (Hamilton, Madison, and Marshall), whose statements during
the ratification debates had "expressly disclaimed, and even resented" any
notion that "the judicial Power" authorized unconsented suits by individuals
against the states.
74
The Court's reasoning gives rise to the methodological question under
consideration. While acknowledging that the letter of the Amendment did
not reach Hans's lawsuit, the Court relied on its apparent background
73. id. at I1-12.
74. Id. at 12. Thus, whatever disagreement had marked the question of immunity when the
Court had rendered its decision in Chisholm, "the people of the United States in their sovereign
capacity subsequently decided" that the views of commentators like Hamilton and Iredell "were
clearly right." Id. at 14. To be sure, Justice Bradley's opinion for the Court offered some
independent reasons for thinking that Article III, properly understood, had preserved a broad state
sovereign immunity from suit. But that reasoning did not cut deeply; it merely stressed that prior
to the Founding "[tihe suability of a State without its consent was a thing unknown to the law." Id.
at 16. The Court did frankly acknowledge that under our novel constitutional structure, "[s]ome
things... were made justiciable which were not known as such at the common law." Id. at 15.
But it did not pause to examine, in particular, whether novel considerations relating to the
enforcement of federal law in a dual republic rendered the common law of sovereign immunity
inapposite to federal question actions against states. In other words, apart from the Amendment,
the Court identified no affirmative basis for extending immunity to what Justice Iredell himself
had recognized as "the special objects of authority of the general Government, wherein the
separate sovereignties of the States are blended in one common mass of supremacy." Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 435 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting). I do not mean to suggest an
answer to that difficult question. My point here is simply that the Court in Hans did not
independently determine the meaning of Article III in relation to the overall constitutional
structure, but rather relied on the Eleventh Amendment to do the work.
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purpose to engage in "imaginative reconstruction" of the true intentions of
those who framed and ratified the Amendment. In view of the strong and
immediate political reaction against Chisholm and eightcenth-century
society's apparently widespread sentiment in favor of broad state sovereign
immunity, the Court simply found it unthinkable that the Eleventh
Amendment's framers and ratifiers would have left open federal question
actions against the states:
The letter is appealed to now, as it was [in Chisholm], as a ground
for sustaining a suit brought by an individual against a State. The
reason against it is as strong in this case as it was in that. It is an
attempt to strain the Constitution and the law to a construction
never imagined or dreamed of. Can we suppose that, when the
Eleventh Amendment was adopted, it was understood to be left
open for citizens of a State to sue their own state in the federal
courts, whilst the idea of suits by citizens of other states, or of
foreign states, was indignantly repelled? Suppose that Congress,
when proposing the Eleventh Amendment, had appended to it a
proviso that nothing therein contained should prevent a State from
being sued by its own citizens in cases arising under the
Constitution or laws of the United States: can we imagine that it
would have been adopted by the States? The supposition that it
would is almost an absurdity on its face.76
In other words, the Hans Court relied on the political context and the
temper of the times to infer a broader spirit than the Amendment's text
could bear, and then enforced that spirit over the letter of the Amendment.
Accordingly, subsequent decisions have typically credited Hans with
establishing "Eleventh Amendment immunity" against federal question
actions brought against a state by its own citizens.77
75. See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the Courtroom,
50 U. Cm. L. REV. 800, 817 (1983) ("I suggest that the task for the judge called upon to interpret a
statute is best described as one of imaginative reconstruction. The judge should try to think his
way as best he can into the minds of the enacting legislators and imagine how they would have
wanted the statute applied to the case at bar." (footnote omitted)).
76. Hans, 134 U.S. at 15.
77. See, e.g., Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 616 (2002)
(emphasizing that "[tihe Eleventh Amendment grants a State immunity from suit in federal court
by citizens of other States, ... and by its own citizens as well"); Employees of the Dep't of Pub.
Health & Welfare v. Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 280 (1973) ("Although the
Eleventh Amendment is not literally applicable since petitioners who brought suit are citizens of
Missouri, it is established that an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal
courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another State."); Great N. Life Ins. Co. v.
Read, 322 U.S. 47, 51 (1944) ("A state's freedom from litigation was established as a
constitutional right through the Eleventh Amendment. The inherent nature of sovereignty prevents
actions against a state by its own citizens without its consent."); David L. Shapiro, The Supreme
Court, 1983 Term-Comment: Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case,
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The Hans Court's approach was hardly unusual for its time. The
tradition of strong purposivism was already an important cornerstone of the
law of statutory interpretation. By the late nineteenth century, it was
axiomatic that statutory interpretation entailed the accurate discernment and
faithful implementation of the legislature's genuine intent.78 That premise
created the opening for atextual, purposive interpretation. Because
legislatures inevitably work under the constraints of limited foresight and
imperfect language, the expression of policy contained in an enacted text,
however clear, might fail to capture the legislature's true intent as applied
to some overlooked or even unforeseeable circumstance.7 9 Among other
things, if the commands embodied in a precise statute seemed dramatically
over- or underinclusive in relation to the statute's apparent background
purpose (viz. its general aims),8 ° the Court took such incongruity to indicate
that the statutory language had failed to capture Congress's intended
meaning.81 Thus, when factors such as the circumstances surrounding the
statute's enactment, the dominant values of society, or the absurdity of a
particular result suggested such a mismatch, the Court would not hesitate to
82forego the letter of a statute in favor of its spirit or purpose.
98 HARV. L. REv. 61, 71 (1984) (noting that the Court's reasoning in Hans "has been folded into
the eleventh amendment itself').
78. See, e.g., Dewey v. United States, 178 U.S. 510, 521 (1900) ("Our duty is to give effect to
the will of Congress, as thus plainly expressed."); Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 144 U.S. 47, 59
(1892) ("Nothing is better settled than that statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as
will effectuate the legislative intention, and, if possible, so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd
conclusion."); Platt v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 99 U.S. 48, 64 (1879) ("[lun endeavoring to ascertain
what the Congress of 1862 intended, we must, as far as possible, place ourselves in the light that
Congress enjoyed, look at things as they appeared to it, and discover its purpose from the
language used in connection with the attending circumstances."); Mo., Kan., & Tex. Ry. Co. v.
Kan. Pac. Ry. Co., 97 U.S. 491, 497 (1878) ("It is always to be borne in mind, in construing a
congressional grant, . . that such effect must be given to it as will carry out the intent of
Congress.").
79. See Manning, supra note 11, at 10-15 (describing the premises of strong purposivism).
80. While the terms are often used interchangeably, an analytically important distinction
exists between "purpose" and "intent." If purpose refers to "the general aims" of legislation, intent
can be understood, more precisely, to connote "meaning"--that is, "the specific particularized
application which the statute was 'intended' to be given." Archibald Cox, Judge Learned Hand
and the Interpretation of Statutes, 60 HARV. L. REv. 370, 370-71 (1947).
81. See Manning, supra note 11, at 6, 12-13 (examining the analytical relationship between
background purpose and specific intent reflected in the Court's traditional approach).
82. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 212 (1903) (acknowledging that a literal
application of the resolution annexing Hawaii would violate "the intention of the legislative
body"); United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 706-07 (1899) (refusing
to accept a construction that "ignores the spirit of the legislation and carries the statute to the
verge of the letter and far beyond what under the circumstances of the case must be held to have
been the intent of Congress"); Price v. Forrest, 173 U.S. 410, 419, 423 (1899) (holding that a
statute restricting "all transfers and assignments made of any claim upon the United States" did
not apply to transfers made by judgment of a state court of competent jurisdiction, as such
transfers failed to implicate "the object of Congress... to protect the Government, and not the
claimant, and to prevent frauds upon the Treasury"); Calderon v. Atlas S.S. Co., 170 U.S. 272,
281 (1898) (concluding that the rule that "'intention must be gathered from the words"' does not
preclude avoidance of "'absurdity, which -the legislature ought not to be presumed to have
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By applying the same technique to a constitutional amendment, Hans
fit nicely within the strongly purposive tradition typified by its equally
famous contemporary, Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States83 -a
decision whose interpretive approach has become an important and often
controversial focal point of the modem statutory interpretation debate.84 To
see the close (but generally overlooked) family resemblance, it is worth
briefly recounting Holy Trinity's reasoning. The Court held that the Church
of the Holy Trinity did not violate the Alien Contract Labor Act by
contracting for Reverend E. Walpole Warren to come from Britain to the
United States to work as a pastor. The Act broadly forbade contracting with
or assisting an alien to come to the United States "to perform labor or
service of any kind., 85 Although acknowledging that the church's
employment contract fell squarely within the clear terms of the Act's
prohibition, the Court rested on the "familiar rule, that a thing may be
within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not
within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers., 86 Just as Hans had
reasoned that the Eleventh Amendment would have foundered if its framers
and ratifiers had thought it to allow federal question suits by in-staters
against states, Holy Trinity reasoned that the Alien Contract Labor Act
would have failed to pass if legislators had understood it to preclude the
engagement of foreign clerics for work in the United States. Justice Brewer
thus famously wrote for the Court:
Suppose in the Congress that passed this act some member had
offered a bill which in terms declared that, if any Roman Catholic
church in this country should contract with Cardinal Manning to
come to this country and enter into its service as pastor and priest;
or any Episcopal church should enter into a like contract with
Canon Farrar; or any Baptist church should make similar
intended' (quoting United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385, 396 (1868))); Fallbrook
Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 172 (1896) ("Such an absurdity cannot be imputed to the
legislature."); Folsom v. United States, 160 U.S. 121, 127 (1895) ("[W]here the language of a
statute leads to an absurdity, hardship, or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may
be put upon it modifying the meaning of the words so as to carry out the real intention . .
83. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
84. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 18-23 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (using
Holy Trinity to frame a criticism of intentionalism); Frederick Schauer, Constitutional
Invocations, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1295, 1307 (1997) ("Church of the Holy Trinity v. United
States is not only a case, but is the marker for an entire legal tradition, a
tradition .... emphasizing... that there is far more to law than the plain meaning of authoritative
legal texts .. " (footnote omitted)); Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of
Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1833, 1835-36
(1998) (discussing the centrality of Holy Trinity to the contemporary debate over textualism).
85. Alien Contract Labor Act, ch. 164, § 1, 23 Stat. 332, 333 (1885) (repealed 1952), quoted
in Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 458.
86. Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 459.
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arrangements with Rev. Mr. Spurgeon; or any Jewish synagogue
with some eminent Rabbi, such contract should be adjudged
unlawful and void, and the church making it be subject to
prosecution and punishment, can it be believed that it would have
received a minute of approving thought or a single vote? Yet it is
contended that such was in effect the meaning of this statute.87
This reasoning could scarcely be more similar to that deployed two
years earlier in Hans. In both cases, the Court concluded that the political
context and the widely shared social attitudes held at the time of enactment
necessarily precluded reading a precise text as written. Using the technique
of imaginative reconstruction, the Court in both cases cast itself into the
minds of the relevant lawmakers and concluded that neither text would
have been adopted unless it had, in fact, stood for more (Hans) or less (Holy
Trinity) than indicated by the clear import of the applicable text.
C. Seminole Tribe and the New Textualism
As discussed below, the Rehnquist Court's interpretive approach to
statutes has, in recent years, shifted quite noticeably away from the strong
purposivism of Holy Trinity.88 The Court has based this shift on rather
explicit premises about the legitimate role of the courts in exercising the
law-declaration function in our system of government. Contrary to prior
conceptions, the Court's recent cases suggest that judges show greater
fidelity to the carefully designed legislative process prescribed by Article I,
Section 7 if they adhere to the clearly worded statutes that emerge from that
process, rather than trying to conform an otherwise precise text to its
perceived background purpose.89 I have more to say about this proposition
shortly. For now, it suffices to note that the idea, if correct, might also be
thought to govern those instances, however infrequent, when the finely
wrought processes for adopting or amending the Constitution themselves
have produced clear and precise constitutional texts. This complicated
question, which supplies the focus of Part II of this Article, is brought into
high relief by one line of the Rehnquist Court's Eleventh Amendment
cases.
90
87. Id. at 472.
88. See infra notes 102-117 and accompanying text.
89. See infra notes 112-117 and accompanying text.
90. As discussed below, certain of the Rehnquist Court's recent decisions approach the
Eleventh Amendment defensively, treating it merely as a nonimpediment to the recognition of
new forms of state sovereign immunity under the constitutional structure. See infra notes 239-245
and accompanying text. In other cases, however, the Court continues to invoke the Eleventh
Amendment more directly, relying on its apparent background purposes as an affirmative source
of state sovereign immunity against suits in federal court. See infra notes 91-101 and
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In particular, the Rehnquist Court has not merely adhered to Hans as a
matter of stare decisis, but rather has continued to rely on its strongly
purposive technique as a means to resolve unsettled questions about the
very reach and implications of Hans and its progeny. For the modem
development of state sovereign immunity, the defining moment came with
the Rehnquist Court's decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, which held
that Congress lacks authority under Article I to abrogate the state sovereign
immunity provided by the Eleventh Amendment. 91 Previously, that
outcome had been far from obvious; indeed, the Court in Seminole Tribe
found it necessary to overrule a recent (albeit fractured) precedent that had
explicitly recognized Article I power to abrogate such immunity.92 Perhaps
because it was overruling its own recent precedent, perhaps because Hans
itself did not explicitly address congressional power to abrogate state
sovereign immunity, 9 or perhaps because Justice Souter's Seminole Tribe
accompanying text. The latter cases reflect the strongly purposive, atextual technique under
consideration in this Section and in Part II.
91. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
92. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (plurality opinion), overruled by
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44. In a plurality opinion for four members of the Court in Union Gas,
Justice Brennan concluded that Congress possessed Article I authority to abrogate state sovereign
immunity. In a separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice White provided an opaque
fifth vote for that conclusion. Id. at 57 (White, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part). Several developments had paved the way for that decision. First, the Court had
suggested that Congress could, under certain circumstances, use the commerce power to compel a
constructive waiver of sovereign immunity by states undertaking activities in interstate commerce.
See Parden v. Terminal Ry. of the Ala. State Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184 (1964). Second, the Court
had recognized congressional authority to abrogate "Eleventh Amendment immunity" pursuant to
the enforcement powers prescribed by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (assigning Congress the
"power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article"). Third, based on the
foregoing developments, the Court had at times assumed without deciding that Congress had
Article I authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity, provided that the statute made an
unmistakably clear statement to that effect. See, e.g., Welch v. Tex. Dep't of Highways & Pub.
Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987) (plurality opinion); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234
(1985).
Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Union Gas built directly on the decisions holding that
Congress had authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate state sovereign
immunity. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, then-Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court had emphasized
that the Civil War Amendments "'were intended to be, what they really are, limitations of the
power of the States and enlargements of the power of Congress."' 427 U.S. at 454 (quoting Ex
parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1880)). Because the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive
guarantees expressly restricted state sovereignty, "the principle of state sovereignty which [the
Eleventh Amendment] embodies. .. [was] necessarily limited by [Section 5's] enforcement
provisions." Id. at 456. Justice Brennan's (short-lived) plurality opinion in Union Gas reasoned
that "[l]ike the Fourteenth Amendment, the Commerce Clause with one hand gives power to
Congress while, with the other, it takes power away from the States." 491 U.S. at 16 (plurality
opinion). On that assumption, Justice Brennan concluded that Article I, like the Fourteenth
Amendment, must also authorize Congress to abrogate sovereign immunity. See id. at 17-19.
93. As Justice Brennan argued in his plurality opinion in Union Gas, the statute pursuant to
which Hans had filed his Contract Clause action-the federal question provision of the Judiciary
Act of 1875-did not convey an intention to abrogate state sovereign immunity. Union Gas, 491
U.S. at 18-19 (plurality opinion).
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dissent argued that the Court's opinion "immensely magnifie[d] the
century-old mistake of Hans itself, '94 the Seminole Tribe Court undertook
an unusually explicit defense of the idea that the Eleventh Amendment
embodies the broader principle "that state sovereign immunity limited the
federal courts' jurisdiction under Article II1." 95 On that understanding, the
Court held that permitting Congress to abrogate such immunity under
Article I would contradict the "fundamental" precept that Congress cannot
"expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts beyond the bounds of Article
11.
9 6
As in Hans, the facts at issue in Seminole Tribe involved a federal
question action filed by an in-stater. Although the Eleventh Amendment
does not, by its precise terms, apply to such a case, the Court reiterated its
earlier understanding that "blind reliance upon the text of the Eleventh
Amendment is 'to strain the Constitution and the law to a construction
never imagined or dreamed of.' ' 9 7 To be sure, the Amendment's text was
framed in precise terms, but that consideration did not preclude the Court
from again reading the Amendment in light of the broader purpose that
underlay its adoption. In particular, the Amendment sought to overturn not
only Chisholm's holding, but also its mistaken understanding that state
sovereign immunity did not qualify Article III's otherwise unconditional
terms. 98 That the Amendment did not speak of the broader mischief that it
purported to resolve was perfectly understandable under the circumstances:
The text [of the Eleventh Amendment] dealt in terms only with the
problem presented by the decision in Chisholm; in light of the fact
that the federal courts did not have federal-question jurisdiction at
the time the Amendment was passed (and would not have it until
94. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 117 (Souter, J., dissenting). Like the plurality opinion in
Union Gas, Justice Souter's dissent in Seminole Tribe stressed that the Hans Court had not had an
occasion to decide whether Congress could abrogate state sovereign immunity. In particular,
because state sovereign immunity had passed into our law from the common law of England, one
might read Hans narrowly to hold that (in the absence of express abrogation) "a non-constitutional
common-law immunity" framed the meaning of federal jurisdictional grants in areas not within
the Eleventh Amendment's plain text. Id. at 124. After extended consideration of various textual
and historical arguments counseling against a constitutional form of sovereign immunity (outside
the categories specified by the Eleventh Amendment), Justice Souter concluded that Hans should
be limited to its facts. See id. at 130 (arguing that several considerations counsel against extending
Hans to preclude congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity).
95. Id. at 64 (majority opinion).
96. Id. at 65. Although Fitzpatrick had nonetheless recognized abrogation authority under the
Section 5 power, the Seminole Tribe Court found it decisive that the Fourteenth Amendment came
into force "well after the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment"; hence, unlike the Commerce
Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment "operated to alter the pre-existing balance... achieved by
Article III and the Eleventh Amendment." Id. at 65-66.
97. Id. at 69 (quoting Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 326 (1934)).
98. See id. at 69-71.
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1875), it seems unlikely that much thought was given to the
prospect of federal-question jurisdiction over the States. 99
In other words, although they adopted a text to resolve the specific
problem posed by Chisholm, the Amendment's framers acted under the
impulse of a more general purpose to endorse a "background principle of
state sovereign immunity."' 00 And that general purpose extends with equal
force to unforeseen circumstances (such as federal question jurisdiction)
that the text simply failed to address. Accordingly, any argument predicated
on the Amendment's carefully limited text was but a "straw man."
10 1
But in contrast with the Fuller Court's consistent reliance on strong
purposivism when it decided Hans more than a century ago, the Rehnquist
Court's use of the same technique to resolve open questions about the
Eleventh Amendment creates at least a prima facie incongruity in its
interpretive jurisprudence. In recent years, the development of a "new
textualism" has influenced the Court's statutory jurisprudence in ways that
bear directly on its use of strong purposivism. 102 Modem textualism builds
on the premise that the legislative process is too complex, opaque, and
path-dependent to allow judges to identify, in any meaningful sense, an
unexpressed legislative intent at odds with the meaning conveyed by a text
that is clear in context. 10 3 While textualists acknowledge that legislation
99. Id. at 69-70.
100. Id. at 72. As the Court elaborated elsewhere in its opinion:
Although the text of the Amendment would appear to restrict only the Article III
diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, "we have understood the Eleventh
Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition.., which
it confirms." That presupposition, first observed over a century ago in Hans v.
Louisiana, has two parts: first, that each State is a sovereign entity in our federal
system; and second, that "[i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable
to the suit of an individual without its consent."
Id. at 54 (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890)) (alteration in original) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
101. Id. at 69. Consistent with that view, the Rehnquist Court has repeatedly followed Hans
in treating the Amendment's language as a broad statement of principle, rather than as a specific
rule embedded in a precise text. That is to say, the Court has decided a good many "Eleventh
Amendment immunity" cases that have nothing to do with the Amendment's text. See, e.g., Bd. of
Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001) ("Although by its terms the
Amendment applies only to suits against a State by citizens of another State, our cases have
extended the Amendment's applicability to suits by citizens against their own States. ... The
ultimate guarantee of the Eleventh Amendment is that nonconsenting States may not be sued by
private individuals in federal court."); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72-73 (2000)
("Although today's cases concern suits brought by citizens against their own States, this Court has
'long understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the
presupposition.., which it confirms."' (quoting Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54)); Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 634-35 (1999) (incorporating
Seminole Tribe's characterization of the Eleventh Amendment into its decision).
102. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621 (1990).
103. See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2388, 2408-19
(2003) (discussing the process assumptions underlying modem textualism as practiced by the
Rehnquist Court).
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may appear over- or underinclusive in relation to its background purpose,
they also emphasize that a seeming lack of fit may. reflect the fruits of an
unrecorded legislative compromise or the byproduct of complicated
legislative bargaining, rather than a reflection of imprecisely expressed
legislative intent. 14 By offering an alternative explanation for an apparent
lack of means-end fit, this premise of modem textualism, if correct, tends to
undercut the Court's traditional justification for departing from a clearly
expressed legislative command.°
5
Three related premises underlie the textualist position. First, where a
statute reflects bargaining among competing interest groups (as is often the
case), 10 6 the compromise reflected in the enacted text may fall short of or
exceed the background purpose that ultimately inspired it.'17 Second,
building on the work of Kenneth Arrow and others, 10 8 textualists contend
that a statute's content may reflect procedural factors such as the sequence
of the alternatives presented (agenda manipulation) or the effect of strategic
voting (including logrolling). 10 9 If true, this consideration makes it difficult,
if not impossible, to know why a statute took the particular shape that it
did.110 Courts thus lack any meaningful capacity to "reconstruct" whether
Congress would (or even could) have "corrected" a perceived mismatch
between a precise statutory text and its apparent background purpose if the
104. See id. at 2415-17 (discussing the impact of contemporary intent skepticism on the
traditional assumptions of strong purposivism).
105. See id. at 2418-19.
106. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-
Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975) (suggesting that interest groups purchase
legislation through "campaign contributions, votes, implicit promises of future favors, and
sometimes outright bribes").
107. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court
and the Economic System, 98 HARv. L. REV. 4, 46 (1984) (noting that in such instances, "[w]hat
Congress wanted was the compromise, not the objectives of the contending interests"). Indeed,
one would expect legislative compromise even where interest group influence is weak. See infra
text accompanying note 189.
108. See, e.g., KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (Yale Univ.
Press 2d ed. 1963) (1951).
109. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547 (1983)
("Although legislators have individual lists of desires, priorities, and preferences, it turns out to be
difficult, sometimes impossible, to aggregate these lists into a coherent collective choice. Every
system of voting has flaws. The one used by legislatures is particularly dependent on the order in
which decisions are made."); id. at 548 ("[W]hen logrolling is at work the legislative process is
submerged and courts lose the information they need to divine the body's design."); Kenneth A.
Shepsle, Congress Is a "They, "Not an "It": Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 239, 244 (1992) ("Many policies, in principle, can topple an existing status quo. That some
are more likely than others to actually do so is dependent on idiosyncratic, structural, procedural,
and strategic factors, which are at best tenuously related to normative principles embraced by
democratic theorists and philosophers.").
110. In other words, if one accepts the premises of public choice theory, the very notion "that
statutes have purposes or embody policies becomes quite problematic, since the content of the
statute simply reflects the haphazard effect of strategic behavior and procedural rules." DANIEL A.
FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 41 (1991)
(critically discussing the implications of Arrovian public choice theory).
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issue had come to light in the legislative process. Third, to the extent that
legislation does embody any discernible purpose, the statute's breadth says
something important about that purpose. Because Congress legislates
alternatively through open-ended standards or specific rules, shifting a
statute's level of generality to conform to its background purpose dishonors
an evident congressional choice to legislate in broader or narrower terms."1
Although the modem Court has not fully embraced textualism,112 its
implicit assimilation of many of the foregoing assumptions has led the
Court to rethink the strong purposivism of cases such as Holy Trinity and its
progeny. Almost two decades ago, the Court began to place greater
emphasis on respecting legislative compromise and the need to hew closely
to the precise textual outcomes of an opaque and often path-dependent
legislative process. As early as 1986, the Court thus explained:
Congress may be unanimous in its intent to stamp out some vague
social or economic evil; however, because its Members may differ
sharply on the means for effectuating that intent, the final language
of the legislation may reflect hard-fought compromises. Invocation
of the "plain purpose" of legislation at the expense of the terms
of the statute itself takes no account of the processes of
113compromise ....
More recently, the Court has stressed that its role is not to use a
statute's "overarching legislative purpose" to smooth over the inevitable
infelicities in a statutory text. 114 Rather, dissatisfaction with a statute's final
contours "is often the cost of legislative compromise," and "[t]he deals
brokered during a Committee markup, on the floor of the two Houses,
during a joint House and Senate Conference, or in negotiations with the
111. As Judge Easterbrook has explained, "Sometimes Congress specifies values or ends,
things for the executive and judicial branches to achieve, but often it specifies means, creating
loopholes but greater certainty." Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 68 (1994). Relying on "an imputed 'spirit' to
convert one approach into another dishonors the legislative choice as effectively as expressly
refusing to follow the law." Id.
112. See Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court, 1997 Term-Foreword: The Limits of
Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6 (1998) (describing the Court's eclectic approach to
statutory interpretation). On rare occasion, the modem Court still engages in strongly purposive
interpretation. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 428-29 (1998) (broadening an
expedited review provision because the literal meaning undermined the statutory purpose to
provide "a prompt and authoritative judicial determination of the constitutionality of the Act");
Lewis v. United States, 523 U.S. 155, 160 (1998) (refusing to enforce a statute's conventional
meaning when "a literal reading of the words.., would dramatically separate the statute from its
intended purpose").
113. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 374
(1986).
114. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 461 (2002) (Thomas, J.).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
16912004]
The Yale Law Journal
President... are not for [the courts] to judge or second-guess."' 15 Hence,
judges "are bound, not only by the ultimate purposes Congress has selected,
but by the means it has deemed appropriate, and prescribed, for the pursuit
of those purposes."' 16 As such themes have become more common in the
Court's decisions,117 the Court's reliance on strong purposivism has
lessened significantly. At a minimum, therefore, the Rehnquist Court's
continued deployment of a purposivist technique to interpret the Eleventh
Amendment requires further examination.
II. ARTICLE V AND CONSTITUTIONAL PRECISION
Even if the Rehnquist Court's new realism about the legislative process
has led it to abandon strongly purposivist interpretation in statutory cases,
one must ask if perhaps the Court can legitimately apply that technique to
constitutional texts like the Eleventh Amendment. Although historical
scholarship suggests that many in the Founding generation regarded
115. Id.; see also id. ("[N]egotiations surrounding enactment of this bill tell a typical story of
legislative battle among interest groups, Congress, and the President.... [A] change in any
individual provision could have unraveled the whole.").
116. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231 n.4 (1994) (Scalia, J.).
117. See, e.g., Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 93-94 (2002)
(Kennedy, J.) ("Like any key term in an important piece of legislation, the [relevant] figure was
the result of compromise between groups with marked but divergent interests in the contested
provision.... Courts and agencies must respect and give effect to these sorts of compromises.");
Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998) (Scalia, J.) ("[A]ssuming... that
Congress did not envisio[n] that the [Americans with Disabilities Act] would be applied to state
prisoners, in the context of an unambiguous statutory text that is irrelevant." (second alteration in
original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs.,
Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (Scalia, J.) ("[S]tatutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal
evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather
than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed."); Brogan v. United
States, 522 U.S. 398, 403 (1998) (Scalia, J.) (observing "the reality that the reach of a statute often
exceeds the precise evil to be eliminated" and explaining that "it is not, and cannot be, our
practice to restrict the unqualified language of a statute to the particular evil that Congress was
trying to remedy-even assuming that it is possible to identify that evil from something other than
the text of the statute itself"); W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98 (1991) (Scalia,
J.) (noting that "the purpose of a statute includes not only what it sets out to change, but also what
it resolves to leave alone," and that "[t]he best evidence of that purpose is the statutory text
adopted by both Houses of Congress and submitted to the President" (citation omitted)).
Nontextualist Justices have articulated similar premises. See, e.g., Bates v. United States, 522 U.S.
23, 29 (1997) (Ginsburg, J.) ("The text of § 1097(a) does not include an 'intent to defraud' state of
mind requirement, and we ordinarily resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not
appear on its face."); Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 286 (1993) (Stevens, J.)
("Statutes are seldom crafted to pursue a single goal, and compromises necessary to their
enactment may require adopting means other than those that would most effectively pursue the
main goal."); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 646-47 (1990)
(Blackmun, J.) ("'[N]o legislation pursues its purposes at all costs. Deciding what competing
values will or will not be sacrificed to the achievement of a particular objective is the very essence
of legislative choice-and it frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent simplistically to
assume that whatever furthers the statute's primary objective must be the law."' (quoting
Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1987))).
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constitutional and statutory interpretation as analogous,"18 an important
intellectual tradition suggests that the Court should approach constitutional
provisions with greater flexibility than it does with statutes."' The
supporting arguments are familiar. Because it frames a system of
government for a large nation, the Constitution is an especially complex
document. Because that document is intended "for the ages," problems of
foresight and translation are intensified with the inevitability of changed
circumstances. The well-known difficulty of amending the Constitution,
moreover, makes the necessity of judicial flexibility more pressing. These
considerations, of course, underpin one important version of the "living
Constitution" tradition, which marks off constitutional adjudication from
more conventional textual exegesis. On that account, even if one believes
that statutory interpretation calls for strict observance of the semantic
boundaries of the enacted text, one might still subscribe to a more flexible
theory of constitutional interpretation--one that permits greater reliance on
the document's background purpose to smooth out the rough edges of the
text and to adapt it to unforeseen circumstances over time.
Ultimately, however, I argue that inferences from the lawmaking
structure implicit in Article V cut in decidedly the other direction. Before
elaborating on that conclusion, it is necessary to say a word about why I
find Article V important, if not decisive, in determining the proper method
of constitutional adjudication. As I have emphasized in previous work, I
start from the assumption that rules of interpretation necessarily reflect
broader questions about constitutional structure.1 20 The Constitution does
not generally prescribe explicit rules of construction to guide the task of
constitutional adjudication. 12 1 In the absence of any express direction,
courts must craft rules of interpretation for themselves. Because these rules
necessarily define the relationship between the lawmaker and adjudicator,
their design should try to make sense rather than nonsense of the
118. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L.
REv. 885, 915-16, 936, 943-44 (1985).
119. See Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the
Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 263, 282 (1982) (observing "that virtually everyone who writes
on the question thinks that constitutional provisions should not be construed as strictly as statutory
provisions").
120. See Manning, supra note 103, at 2432-33; John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure
and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612,
636-37 (1996); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Statutory Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L.
REv. 685, 690-92 (1999).
121. The Ninth and arguably the Tenth Amendments supply specialized rules of construction.
See U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."); id. amend. X ("The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the people."). The Eleventh Amendment, of course, is also framed
as a rule for interpreting the judicial power prescribed by Article III. None of these amendments,
however, prescribes a basic method of deciphering the meaning of the text.
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institutional roles and responsibilities prescribed for such actors in the
surrounding constitutional structure. 12 2 At least in the absence of any textual
specification of the content of the judicial power "to say what the law is,
123
one should perhaps aspire to a theory of adjudication that at least does not
contradict the apparent structural aims of a fairly carefully designed and
elaborately specified lawmaking process-whether it be the legislative
process of bicameralism and presentment or the processes prescribed by
Articles V and VII for the adoption of constitutional texts. 124 This frame of
analysis reflects the widely accepted idea that in construing open-ended
grants of constitutional power, it is appropriate and, indeed, desirable to
read a discrete (but indeterminate) textual provision to make sense in light
of the overall constitutional structure.
125
The Court's new textualism rests on the idea that most statutes reflect
compromise. As I have argued elsewhere, the Court's decision to protect the
lines of a precise statutory compromise finds justification in the goals of
bicameralism and presentment. 126 Because that elaborately designed process
assigns political minorities the right to insist upon compromise as the price
of assent to legislation, disturbing the lines of compromise embedded in a
final text threatens that important constitutional safeguard. With the
constitutional amendment process, the multiple supermajority requirements
give political minorities more explicit and more pronounced rights to veto
or constrain constitutional amendments. Hence, disturbing the lines of a
precise constitutional compromise raises even greater concerns.
122. Cf Jerry L. Mashaw, As If Republican Interpretation, 97 YALE L.J. 1685, 1686 (1988)
("Any theory of statutory interpretation is at base a theory about constitutional law. It must at the
very least assume a set of legitimate institutional roles and legitimate institutional procedures that
inform interpretation."); Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy
in Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 593-94 (1995) ("To carry out its
[interpretive] task, the court must adopt-at least implicitly-a theory about its own role in
defining the goal and methodology of the interpretive enterprise and by taking an institutional
stance in relation to the legislature.").
123. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
124. Full examination of the original understanding of the judicial power to interpret the
Constitution is beyond the scope of this Article. Such an inquiry, of course, would entail a
significant examination of the history and practice of judicial review both before and after the
adoption of the Constitution. See, e.g., CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN
MARSHALL AND THE RULE OF LAW 63-64 (1996) (discussing early practice); SYLVIA SNOWISS,
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 121-25 (1990) (same); Suzanna Sherry,
The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1157-76 (1987) (same). Because
the Rehnquist Court's strictness in statutory cases rests ultimately on conclusions about the
legislative process, I focus-for purposes of comparison-on the interpretive implications of the
Article V and VII processes for adopting constitutional texts.
125. See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 8-23 (1969) (examining the use of structural inference in constitutional adjudication). As
discussed below, such a method of interpretation thus does not implicate the process concerns
underlying modem textualism. See infra note 160.
126. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 103, at 2437-40; Manning supra note 11, at 70-78.
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This Part first examines the traditional conception that interpreters
should have more flexibility when reading constitutional, as opposed to
statutory, texts. It then considers the relative process concerns associated
with disturbing constitutional versus statutory compromise. Finally, it
examines the Eleventh Amendment in light of the process concerns
emanating from Article V.
A. Constitution Versus Statutes
Although the current Rehnquist Court majority would doubtless resist
such a characterization, perhaps the most plausible defense of the Court's
current approach to the Eleventh Amendment falls within the rubric of the
"living Constitution." Before elaborating on that proposition, some
preliminary observations are necessary to avoid confusion. Vague as it is,
the "living Constitution" metaphor describes a range of constitutional
theories, 127  including the rather profound claim that constitutional
adjudication does not require interpretive fidelity to the historical
understanding or intended meaning of the language adopted by the
Constitution's framers and ratifiers. 128 Reserving that question of first
principle for another day, 129 my focus here is on a milder connotation
associated with the same metaphor-namely, that American judges are
faithful agents of lawmakers, but that true fidelity to the Constitution and its
Founders involves implementing the document's broader purposes, not
127. See, e.g., Arthur Selwyn Miller, Notes on the Concept of the "Living" Constitution,
31 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 881, 884 (1963) ("The concept of the 'living Constitution' has never been
explained in detail so as to indicate how far it goes and what it means."); William H. Rehnquist,
The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 694 (1976) (noting the ambiguity in the
concept of a "living Constitution"). For an illuminating discussion of the history of the "living
Constitution" metaphor and its permutations, see G. Edward White, The "Constitutional
Revolution" as a Crisis in Adaptivity, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 867, 872-99 (1997).
128. This strain of thought presupposes that judges in a Lockean democracy should not
ascribe binding authority to an old and hard-to-amend document because our present society "did
not adopt the Constitution, and those who did are dead and gone." Paul Brest, The Misconceived
Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 225 (1980); see also David A.
Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 880 (1996)
("Following a written constitution means accepting the judgments of people who lived centuries
ago in a society that was very different from ours."). Frequently, this claim is referred to as the
"dead hand" argument. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1119 (1998).
129. A number of scholars have elaborately defended the proposition that the constitutional
text has binding authority despite its age. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 1-9 (1980); Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and
Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 349, 363 (1992); Easterbrook, supra note 128, at 1119-21; Michael
W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1127,
1129-31 (1998); Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 383-87
(1981). For an interesting and thoughtful effort to embrace the "dead hand" problem while also
defending the authority of commitments made in the constitutional text, see Jed Rubenfeld,
Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104 YALE L.J. 1119 (1995).
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reading the text as a series of rule-bound clauses. 130 So understood, this
version of the "living Constitution" metaphor merely represents a strongly
purposive method of originalism-an effort to be more faithful to the
Founders by emphasizing their apparent goals and values rather than the
particular rules they devised to implement them.
I focus on the narrower conception of the "living Constitution" for
several reasons. First, the question of immediate interest is the legitimacy of
the Court's reasoning in cases such as Hans v. Louisiana and Seminole
Tribe v. Florida, decisions that quite clearly invoke strongly purposive
originalism. Second, and more generally, the Court's articulated frame of
reference, at least for matters of first impression, virtually always builds
upon some notion of fidelity to historical or original understanding of the
adopted text. 31 If for no other reason, this fact makes it relevant to examine
130. See infra notes 136-142 and accompanying text.
131. See, e.g., Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 474 (2002) (relying on the "text" of the Census
Clause and the "history of the constitutional phrase" "actual Enumeration" to determine the
validity of current Census Bureau practices); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779,
827 (1995) ("[T]he available historical and textual evidence, read in light of the basic principles of
democracy underlying the Constitution and recognized by this Court... reveal the Framers'
intent that neither Congress nor the States should possess the power to supplement the exclusive
qualifications set forth in the text of the Constitution."); Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 233
(1993) ("The history and contemporary understanding of the impeachment provisions support our
reading of the constitutional language."); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal,
Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 275-76 (1989) ("We shall not ignore the language of the Excessive Fines
Clause, or its history, or the theory on which it is based, in order to apply it to punitive
damages."); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) ("The Court's interpretation of the
Establishment Clause has comported with what history reveals was the contemporaneous
understanding of its guarantees."); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (construing Article I,
Section 7's bicameralism and presentment requirement in light of "the records of the
[Philadelphia] Convention, contemporaneous writings and debates"); Ingraham v. Wright,
430 U.S. 651, 670 n.39 (1977) ("The applicability of the Eighth Amendment always has turned on
its original meaning, as demonstrated by its historical derivation."); United States v. Classic,
313 U.S. 299, 317-18 (1941) ("To decide [the question at hand] we turn to the words of the
Constitution read in their historical setting as revealing the purpose of its framers, and search for
admissible meanings of its words which, in the circumstances of their application, will effectuate
those purposes."); South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 450 (1905) ("To determine the
extent of the grants of power we must, therefore, place ourselves in the position of the men who
framed and adopted the Constitution, and inquire what they must have understood to be the
meaning and scope of those grants."), overruled on other grounds by New York v. United States,
326 U.S. 572 (1946); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 219 (1901) ("[W]hen called upon to
construe and apply a provision of the Constitution of the United States, we must look not merely
to its language but to its historical origin, and to those decisions of this court in which its meaning
and the scope of its operation have received deliberate consideration."); Rhode Island v.
Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 721 (1838) (concluding that the meaning of the Constitution
"must necessarily depend on the words of the constitution [and] the meaning and intention of the
convention which framed and proposed it for adoption and ratification to the conventions ... in
the several states").
As many commentators have noted, even when the Court is deviating from any plausible
reading of the original meaning of the document, it nonetheless typically tries to fit its reasoning
into the rubric of original meaning. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its
Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 401 (1978) ("Interpretivism is no mere passing
fad.., in fact the Court has always, where plausible, tended to talk an interpretivist line.");
Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703, 706 (1975)
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competing conceptions of fidelity to the document's original understanding.
Third, focusing on a strongly purposivist version of the metaphor provides
the most apt basis for comparison to the methods of statutory construction
that frame the analysis here. Cases like Holy Trinity built on the idea that
judges were more faithful agents if they followed a statute's apparent
purpose rather than its text in cases where the two conflicted. Even though
that idea has now become less fashionable in the statutory arena, the
question posed by the Rehnquist Court's Eleventh Amendment case law is
whether the distinctive considerations involved in constitutional exegesis
permit a faithful agent to engage in strongly purposive and atextual
readings of even the most precise constitutional texts.
Recall the grounds for strong purposivism in statutory interpretation. In
a system predicated on legislative supremacy, the central task of
interpretation is to ascertain the intended meaning of the enacted text. 132 On
the assumption that human beings (even legislators) can and do choose their
words to express their intentions, a statute whose text is clear in context is
taken as prima facie evidence of such meaning.133 Yet words are imprecise,
legislators have imperfect insight, and each increment of statutory precision
makes legislative bargaining more protracted and costly.134 Because rules
("[11f judges resort to bad interpretation in preference to honest exposition of deeply held but
unwritten ideals, it must be because they perceive the latter mode of decisionmaking to be of
suspect legitimacy."); Monaghan, supra note 129, at 383 ("In virtually every instance, the court
has made an effort-often strained, to be sure-to find an acceptable textual home for its
results .... ").
132. Even if modem textualists are correct in concluding that one cannot reconstruct a
multimember body's actual intent, Joseph Raz has insightfully noted that "it makes no sense to
give any person or body law-making power unless it is assumed that the law they make is the law
they intended to make." Joseph Raz, Intention in Interpretation, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW:
ESSAYS ON LEGAL POSITIVISM 249, 258 (Robert P. George ed., 1996). As he explains:
[T]o assume that the law made by legislation is not the one intended by the legislator,
we must assume that he cannot predict what law he is making when the legislature
passes any piece of legislation. But if so, why does it matter who the members of the
legislature are, whether they are democratically elected or not, whether they represent
different regions of the country, or classes in the population, whether they are adults or
children, sane or insane? Since the law they will end by making does not represent their
intentions, the fact that their intentions are foolish or wise, partial or impartial, self-
serving or public spirited, makes no difference.
Id. at 258-59. Professor Raz explains that one can have meaningful legislative supremacy if
legislators intend to enact a law that will be decoded according to prevailing interpretive
conventions. Id. at 268 (noting that one can charge legislators with the intention "to say what one
would ordinarily be understood as saying, given the circumstances in which one said it").
133. See Manning, supra note 103, at 2395-98 (explaining the "plain meaning presumption"
in statutory interpretation).
134. See, e.g., K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 303 (1988) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that a statute's "specific wording.., was by no
means carefully considered, which provides all the more reason to avoid a hypertechnical
interpretation"); United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 118-19 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that a clear text may be "'the consequence of a legislative accident, perhaps caused by
nothing more than the unfortunate fact that Congress is too busy to do all of its work as carefully
as it should.' (quoting Del. Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 97 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting))); Friedrich v. City of Chicago, 888 F.2d 511, 514 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.)
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embedded in statutes are thus typically over- or underinclusive in relation to
their background purposes, the language of a statute sometimes fails to
capture the legislature's true intentions, particularly when that statute has
been sitting on the books for a long time. So when a rule embedded in a
statute deviates sharply from its apparent background purpose, courts have
sometimes assumed that Congress has expressed its intentions clearly but
imprecisely, and those courts have felt free to adjust their interpretations of
the statutory text accordingly.
As discussed above, a defining feature of the Rehnquist Court's
approach to statutes is its general rejection of such purposivism. Despite the
inevitable problem of incomplete fit between ends and means that marks
any written law, the Court has typically chosen to emphasize the possibility
that precise but seemingly awkward legislation may reflect, the fruits of
compromise rather than simply poor drafting. For the Court, responsibility
for the correction of apparent over- or underinclusiveness lies, if anywhere,
with Congress.
35
With constitutional texts, however, the underlying concerns that inspire
strong purposivism are often thought to have greater-and perhaps
unavoidable-force. The Constitution undertakes the large and complicated
task of prescribing governmental architecture for a great nation, and of
doing so in a manner intended to endure for the ages.136 Hence, the
problems of foresight and expression perhaps differ in kind from those of a
typical statute. In the context of statutes, moreover, Congress has at least a
realistic capacity to amend the law when the rules embedded in an enacted
("[Judges] know that statutes are purposive utterances and that language is a slippery medium in
which to encode a purpose. They know that legislatures, including the Congress of the United
States, often legislate in haste, without considering fully the potential application of their words to
novel settings.").
135. See, e.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 528 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) ("The language of the statute is entirely clear, and if that is not what Congress meant
then Congress has made a mistake and Congress will have to correct it."); W. Va. Univ. Hosps.,
Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 101 (1991) ("'To supply omissions [from a statute] transcends the
judicial function.' (quoting Iselin v. United States, 270 U.S. 245, 250-51 (1926))); Reves v. Ernst
& Young, 494 U.S. 56, 63 n.2 (1990) ("If Congress erred, however, it is for that body, and not this
Court, to correct its mistake."); cf Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 296 (1996) ("Even so,
Congress, not this Court, has the responsibility for revising its statutes. Were we to alter our
statutory interpretations from case to case, Congress would have less reason to exercise its
responsibility to correct statutes that are thought to be unwise or unfair.").
136. See, e.g., Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) ("[W]hen we are dealing with
words that also are a constituent act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize
that they have called into life a being the development of which could not have been foreseen
completely by the most gifted of its begetters."); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373
(1910) ("Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a
principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth.
This is peculiarly true of constitutions."); The Legal Tender Case, 110 U.S. 421, 439 (1884)
("A constitution, establishing a frame of government, declaring fundamental principles, and
creating a national sovereignty, and intended to endure for ages and to be adapted to the various
crises of human affairs, is not to be interpreted with the strictness of a private contract.").
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text deviate from their apparent background purpose. 13 7 Constitutional
provisions, in contrast, are notoriously difficult to amend when problems of
fit come to light.1 38 Accordingly, fidelity to the purposes underlying
constitutional text may involve the need to adjust its precise text more
significantly to unforeseen problems.
The pith of this conception is typically expressed by invoking Chief
Justice Marshall's famous dictum in McCulloch v. Maryland: "[W]e must
never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding."'' 39 Of course, in
context (sustaining congressional legislation incorporating the Second Bank
of the United States), Marshall's statement merely addressed the virtue of
137. To be sure, congressional overrides of statutory decisions are relatively infrequent. See
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101
YALE L.J. 331, 335 (1991). But the frequency of their occurrence differs in order of magnitude
from the frequency of constitutional amendments. In contrast with the voluminous legislation
passed during each Congress, our nation has adopted only twenty-seven (de jure) constitutional
amendments, eleven of which came in the first decade of the Constitution's existence. By some
estimates, moreover, only six to nine of those amendments sought to override the Supreme
Court's constitutional rulings. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: AN
INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, AND FRANCE
365-66 (7th ed. 1998); Thomas R. Marshall, Policymaking and the Modern Court: When Do
Supreme Court Rulings Prevail?, 42 W. POL. Q. 493, 493 (1989). In contrast, one recent empirical
study suggests that at least in the modem era, each Congress typically overrides several of the
Supreme Court's statutory decisions. See Eskridge, supra, at 337 (reporting that 124 of the
Supreme Court's statutory decisions were overridden during the twelve Congresses assembled
between 1967 and 1990); see also id. (estimating that the same Congresses overrode or modified
220 statutory decisions by lower courts).
138. See Terrance Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1046
(1981) ("Reference to the 'important objects' of the framers rather than their specific intentions is,
no doubt, a necessity if the evolving needs of the nation are to be served. The amendment process
established by article V simply will not sustain the entire burden of adaptation that must be borne
if the Constitution is to remain a vital instrument of government."). For a particularly clear
expression of this idea, see Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 186-87 (1984) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). As Justice Marshall thus wrote:
We do not construe constitutional provisions of this sort the way we do statutes, whose
drafters can be expected to indicate with some comprehensiveness and exactitude the
conduct they wish to forbid or control and to change those prescriptions when they
become obsolete. Rather, we strive, when interpreting these seminal constitutional
provisions, to effectuate their purposes-to lend them meanings that ensure that the
liberties the Framers sought to protect are not undermined by the changing activities of
government officials.
Id. (footnote omitted). A similar set of considerations underlies the Court's traditional application
of a stronger form of stare decisis to statutory rather than constitutional precedents. See, e.g.,
William 0. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 736-37 (1949).
139. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.). Marshall elaborated:
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great
powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried into execution,
would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the
human mind. It would probably never be understood by the public. Its nature, therefore,
requires, that only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated,
and the minor ingredients which compose those objects be deduced from the nature of
the objects themselves. That this idea was entertained by the framers of the American
constitution, is not only to be inferred from the nature of the instrument, but from the
language.
Id.
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recognizing adequate congressional authority to address unforeseen
circumstances under the Necessary and Proper Clause. 140 The aphorism
thus did not originate in the service of supporting strongly purposive
judicial interpretation of the document. Still, many have extracted from
Marshall's statement the broader conclusion that because the Constitution
could not be drafted with "the prolixity of a legal code," it should not be
interpreted as if it had been. 141 As then-Justice Stone once put it:
"[W]e must never forget, that it is a constitution we are
expounding." Its provisions are not to be interpreted like those of a
municipal code or of a penal statute, though even the latter is to be
read so as not to defeat its obvious purpose, or lead to absurd
consequences. In defining their scope something more is involved
than consultation of the dictionary and the rules of English
grammar. They are to be read as a vital part of an organic whole so
that the high purpose which illumines every sentence and phrase of
the instrument may be given effect in a consistent and harmonious
framework of government.
The Court has hitherto consistently held that a literal reading of
a provision of the Constitution which defeats a purpose evident
when the instrument is read as a whole, is not to be favored.
142
140. See Easterbrook, supra note 128, at 1124 ("There is that famous phrase: 'we must never
forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding.' But now you see its context: not to assert that
law is mush, but to say that the Constitution allows the living legislature to govern.").
141. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407. The first modem generalization of Marshall's
dictum came in Justice Brandeis's dissent in Olmstead v. United States:
"We must never forget," said Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v.
Maryland, "that it is a constitution we are expounding." Since then, this Court has
repeatedly sustained the exercise of power by Congress, under various clauses of that
instrument, over objects of which the Fathers could not have dreamed. We have
likewise held that general limitations on the powers of Government, like those
embodied in the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, do not
forbid the United States or the States from meeting modem conditions by regulations
which "a century ago, or even halfa century ago, probably would have been rejected as
arbitrary and oppressive." Clauses guaranteeing to the individual protection against
specific abuses of power, must have a similar capacity of adaptation to a changing
world.
277 U.S. 438, 472 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at
407; and Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926)) (citations omitted),
overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41
(1967). Since then, Marshall's statement has become closely associated with the idea of purposive
and dynamic constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The
Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 11 n.25 (1998) ("Marshall, of course, was
speaking not of all constitutional interpretation, but of the expansive interpretation of Congress's
enumerated power.... Nonetheless, these words from McCulloch gave living constitutionalism
its mantra.").
142. Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 606-07 (1938) (Stone, J., dissenting in part)
(citations omitted). Justice Stone recited the following examples of the Court's purposivism:
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In other words, whatever the proper approach to statutes, judges must
not read the specifics of the Constitution in a rule-bound way. Rather,
judges can and should read the document holistically, with an eye toward
effectuating the general purposes behind specifically worded clauses and
adapting those clauses to circumstances that were not foreseen or provided
for. On that account, one can at least plausibly justify the coexistence of the
Rehnquist Court's strict approach to precise statutes with its openly atextual
and purposive approach to the Eleventh Amendment's precise text.
B. Article V and Constitutional Compromise
My central claim here takes issue with the foregoing premises about
constitutional versus statutory adjudication. In particular, I contend that for
reasons tracing to the lawmaking processes prescribed by Article V, the
Court has, if anything, a more obvious duty to respect the boundaries set by
a constitutional rather than statutory text-at least when the text is clear and
precise in context. The argument is complex, so I will begin by sketching
my conclusion: I believe that a stricter approach to precise constitutional
texts rests on the relative importance of limitations on the lawmaking
structure prescribed by Article V. In the context of statutes, Article I,
Section 7's requirements of bicameralism and presentment give salience to
legislative compromise by establishing an effective supermajority
requirement for legislation. Because under this framework a political
minority can often block legislation, such a minority can also insist upon
compromise as the price of its assent. Article V deals with constitutional
amendments, not legislation. Its structure is designed to restrict change in a
manner far more stringent than Article I, Section 7. Interests represented by
one-third of the members of either house or one-quarter of the states can
block constitutional change. With constitutional amendments, the right of
political minorities to insist upon compromise as the price of assent is both
more explicit and more pronounced. (For completeness, I note that similar
The phrase "due process" in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments has long since been
expanded beyond its literal meaning of due procedure. See Davidson v. New Orleans,
96 U.S. 97; cf. Brandeis, J., concurring in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373.
The term "contract" in the contract clause is not confined literally to the contracts of the
law dictionary. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518. The prohibition
against their impairment has never been taken to be inexorable. Home Building & Loan
Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, and cases cited at 430 et seq. The injunction that no
person "shall be compelled in any Criminal Case to be a witness against himself' is not
literally applied. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 595. "From whatever source derived,"
as it is written in the Sixteenth Amendment, does not mean from whatever source
derived. Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245. See, also, Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275,
281, 282; Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610; Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson,
282 U.S. 499, 501; United States v. Le/kowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467.
Id. at 607.
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but not identical process considerations also apply to original provisions of
the Constitution, whose methods of proposal and ratification also assigned
disproportionate weight to political minorities-particularly the residents of
small states. 143 Given the relevant similarity between Articles V and VII, I
rely below on both the original provisions of the Constitution and its
amendments to illustrate the role of compromise in reading constitutional
texts.)
Precisely because political minorities do have an extraordinary right to
insist upon compromise in the framing of constitutional texts, it is
especially important to pay attention to the level of generality of the
relevant text-that is, the type of compromise reached. Sometimes the text
can be read to articulate policy judgments at a high level of generality,
using seemingly vague and open-ended language that conveys little about
how to resolve questions at the level of application. Except where necessary
for comparison, I reserve questions about the construction of such clauses
for another day. Of more obvious relevance to the Eleventh Amendment,
some clauses are relatively rule-like, expressing fairly precise judgments
about both the relevant ends and the acceptable means of their
accomplishment. With respect to the more rule-like clauses (or, indeed, the
rule-like aspects of broadly worded clauses), I contend that textual
precision should be understood to reflect the adopters' willingness or ability
to go so far and no farther in pursuit of the desired constitutional objective.
143. Under the rules of the Philadelphia Convention, each state had an equal vote, and its
delegates voted as a unit. See MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 57 (1913). This arrangement self-evidently gave small states' residents a
disproportionate voice in shaping the Convention's political compromises. And it almost surely
accounts for some of the Constitution's most important features. See, e.g., id. at 91-112
(discussing the "Great Compromise" giving states equal representation in the Senate). Moreover,
bargaining over the document's contents (or at least much of the bargaining) occurred in the
shadow of a ratification process still to be determined-one that ultimately called for a
supermajority of three-quarters of the states. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS:
POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 91, 102-08 (1996) (discussing the
evolution of various competing proposals for ratification); see also U.S. CONST. art. VII. Thus,
one might safely conclude that the process for adopting the original Constitution, although rather
improvised, also assigned political minorities (mainly small states' residents) a disproportionate
right to insist on compromise. Beyond this consideration, Akhil Amar suggests the two-tiered
nature of both the Article V and Article VII processes has given the Constitution's drafters an
incentive to deliberate and express themselves with care:
More generally, democratic proponents of a given constitutional provision are obliged
to give their ideas a crisp textual formulation and submit that text to a separate group of
democratic ratifiers. At the Founding, the Philadelphia Convention carefully crafted a
text ultimately approved by independently elected ratifying conventions. Thereafter,
congressional supermajorities carefully crafted amendments that required ratification
by a broad array of independently elected democratic bodies. This two-step procedure
promotes good deliberation. Proposers can never be assured of ratification and thus
face strong incentives to draft well so as to maximize their prospects. The gap between
proposers and ratifiers creates a healthy uncertainty, a kind of veil of ignorance.
Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term-Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine,
114 HARV. L. REv. 26, 39 (2000).
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If so, then invoking a clause's background purpose to convert a precise rule
into a broad, open-ended standard threatens to disturb the lines of
compromise that political minorities had the right to exact under Article V.
After brief elaboration of these points, I explain (in Section II.C) how the
foregoing principles apply to the Eleventh Amendment.
1. Background Consideration
My starting premise here is that lawmakers are able to communicate
meaningful directions to interpreters through the adoption of legal texts,
understood in context. I have elsewhere offered a detailed defense of that
premise. 144 In brief, as Wittgenstein demonstrated, communication is
intelligible only by virtue of a community's shared conventions for
understanding words in context.' 45 Language may lack "intrinsic" meaning;
nonetheless, someone conversant with the relevant linguistic community's
practices can assess an interpretation's correctness or incorrectness as
measured against those practices.1 46 This possibility, in turn, explains how
lawmakers can convey instructions to official interpreters and the public by
encoding words and phrases in enacted texts. As Jeremy Waldron has put it:
A legislator who votes for (or against) a provision like "No vehicle
shall be permitted to enter any state or municipal park" does so on
the assumption that-to put it crudely-what the words mean to
144. This discussion builds on Manning, supra note 103, at 2396-98.
145. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 134-142 (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., 2d ed. 1958) (1945) (emphasizing the significance of the way words are used in
linguistic interactions within a relevant community). Although more widely shared, this premise is
a cornerstone of modem textualism. See, e.g., Cont'l Can Co. v. Chi. Truck Drivers, Helpers &
Warehouse Workers Union (Indep.) Pension Fund, 916 F.2d 1154, 1157 (7th Cir. 1990)
(Easterbrook, J.) ("You don't have to be Ludwig Wittgenstein or Hans-Georg Gadamer to know
that successful communication depends on meanings shared by interpretive communities.").
146. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authority, in
LAW AND INTERPRETATION 203, 222 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995) ("Meaning is not radically
indeterminate; instead, meaning is public-fixed by public behaviour, beliefs, and understandings.
There is no reason to assume that such conventions cannot fix the meaning of terms
determinately."); Brian Langille, Revolution Without Foundation: The Grammar of Skepticism
and the Law, 33 MCGILL L.J. 451, 493 (1988) (noting that a linguistic community's "agreement
in judgments is a necessary precondition of language, the background 'given' which makes
language possible").
I note that a significant strand of critical legal scholarship contends that a baseline linguistic
indeterminacy makes rule following impossible. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, The Player and
the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 19, 21 (1984); Mark V. Tushnet,
Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 781, 822-23 (1983). Consideration of this broader question is beyond this Article's scope.
By starting from the premise that texts are sometimes determinate in context, I hold constant a
basic analytical assumption that the Court has brought to the cases under consideration here. Such
a starting premise, morcoever, has at least a plausible basis in practice. See, e.g., FREDERICK
SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED
DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 64-68 (1991) (arguing that rules may convey linguistic
determinacy in the context of an established language).
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him is identical to what they will mean to those to whom they are
addressed (in the event that the provision is passed) .... That such
assumptions pervade the legislative process shows how much law
depends on language, on the shared conventions that constitute a
language, and on the reciprocity of intentions that conventions
comprise. 1
47
Accordingly, even if one can say nothing meaningful about the actual
intentions or expectations of the numerous participants in the legislative
process or, indeed, the infinitely wider and more scattered collection of
constitutional ratifiers, one can properly attribute to legislators the
reasonable minimum intention "to say what one would ordinarily be
understood as saying, given the circumstances in which it is said.' 48 This
principle, it should be noted, does not direct interpreters to follow the literal
or dictionary meaning of a word or phrase. To the contrary, it demands
careful attention to the nuances and specialized connotations that speakers
of the relevant language attach to particular words and phrases in the
context in which they are being used.1 49 And because of the often technical
character of constitutional language, its interpreters must pay particular
attention to the linguistic practices of the legal community, which through
experience has fashioned many of its own terms of art and off-the-rack
interpretive conventions that (some believe) facilitate communication of the
law's often technical nuances. 150
147. Jeremy Waldron, Legislators' Intentions and Unintentional Legislation, in LAW AND
INTERPRETATION, supra note 146, at 329, 339.
148. Raz, supra note 132, at 268.
149. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 718 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that "the acid test of whether a word can reasonably bear a particular meaning is whether
you could use the word in that sense at a cocktail party without having people look at you
funny"); Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 241-42 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (narrowing
the broad meaning of the term "use" in a criminal statute in light of common-sense, contextual
understanding of the term).
150. See Manning, supra note 103, at 2456-76; Manning, supra note 11, at 108-15. As is true
of chemistry or the construction trades or any other specialized field, the law also comprises a
specialized linguistic subcommunity with established practices and conventions peculiar to it. See
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) (noting that "where Congress borrows
terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it
presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the
body of learning from which it was taken"); Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of
Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 537 (1947) ("Words of art bring their art with them.... [I]f a
word is obviously transplanted from another legal source, whether the common law or other
legislation, it brings the old soil with it."). Determining the public meaning of a legal text
therefore compels attention to the technical nuances of terms of art. By the same token,
determining the public meaning of a legal text may entail the application of specialized rules of
construction that, by settled practice, inform the meaning of such texts. See David L. Shapiro,
Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 927-41 (1992)
(examining various linguistic and syntactic canons of construction, as well as settled rules of
construction, such as the rule of lenity, that serve more substantive aims). Karl Llewellyn, of
course, famously questioned the predictability and utility of lawyers' canons. See, e.g., Karl N.
Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How
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For understandable reasons, one does not often associate this essentially
semantic framework with the task of constitutional adjudication. Although
constitutional texts of course fall along a continuum reflecting many shades
of precision,151 much scholarship views many (quite important) provisions
as vague or open-ended' 52 -more in the nature of standards than rules.
153
Although such clauses are not my focus here, it is worth noting that
conventional textual meaning alone may not take textualists very far in
applying phrases like "unreasonable searches and seizures," "cruel and
unusual punishments," "equal protection of the laws," or similar clauses.
154
Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950) (arguing that the canons of
construction, including the linguistic canons, are ultimately indeterminate because there are "two
opposing canons on almost every point"). While a full discussion of the canons is a matter for
another day, it is worth noting that influential recent scholarship has suggested that courts
have the capacity to make sense of such canons in context or to develop practices that will move
in that direction. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993
Term-Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 67 (1994); Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction and Judicial Preferences, 45 VAND. L.
REV. 647, 650-51 (1992).
151. See ELY, supra note 129, at 13 ("Constitutional provisions exist on a spectrum ranging
from the relatively specific to the extremely open-textured.").
152. See, e.g., id. at 14, 16-17 (noting that various clauses of the Constitution are "open-
ended" or "open-textured"); HARRY H. WELLINGTON, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION 48, 72, 77 (1991) (emphasizing that the
constitutional text is open-ended); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term-
Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 56, 63 (1997) (noting that a
number of "constitutional norms may be too vague to serve directly as effective rules of law").
153. Isaac Ehrlich and Richard Posner describe a "standard" as "a general criterion of social
choice," such as efficiency or reasonableness. Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 258 (1974). A "rule," in contrast,
"withdraws from the decision maker's consideration one or more of the circumstances that would
be relevant to decision." Id. A statute imposing liability for "negligence" is more standard-like. Id.
One specifying that a driver is liable for any collision while "driving within 100 feet of the
preceding car" is more rule-like. Id.; see also, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules and Standards: An
Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559-60 (1992) ("[A] rule may entail an advance
determination of what conduct is permissible, leaving only factual issues for the adjudicator.... A
standard may entail leaving both specification of what conduct is permissible and factual issues
for the adjudicator."); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The
Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58 (1992) ("A legal directive is
'rule'-like when it binds a decisionmaker to respond in a determinate way to the presence of
delimiting triggering facts .... A legal directive is 'standard'-like when it tends to collapse
decisionmaking back into the direct application of the background principle or policy to a fact
situation.").
154. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 129, at 13 ("Still other provisions, such as the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of 'cruel and unusual punishments,' seem even more insistently to call
for a reference to sources beyond the document itself and a 'framers' dictionary."'); Easterbrook,
supra note 129, at 360 (noting that the Fourth Amendment's "mention of reasonableness" calls for
"more abstraction" in its application); Michael J. Perry, The Legitimacy of Particular Conceptions
of Constitutional Interpretation, 77 VA. L. REV. 669, 675 (1991) ("Many of the most important
constitutional provisions ... are like the equal protection clause: there is not only no widely
shared understanding of the provisions; there are competing understandings, both intratemporally
and intertemporally.").
Of course, even the most open-ended clauses have some structure and boundaries. See ELY,
supra note 129, at 14. For example, the indeterminacy of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against "excessive fines" may vest interpreters with wide discretion, but the text ultimately
requires something that plausibly can be called a "fine," as that term was historically understood.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
The Yale. Law Journal
Certainly, in matters of statutory interpretation-the basis for comparison
here-modem textualists recognize the limits of what judges can glean
from a vague or ambiguous text.155 Accordingly, they would not hesitate to
resolve any textual indefiniteness, inter alia, by consulting a statute's
apparent background purpose (as derived from sources other than the
legislative history)' 56 or by making sense of a discrete clause in relation to
See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 275 (1989) ("We
think it clear, from both the language of the Excessive Fines Clause and the nature of our
constitutional framework, that the Eighth Amendment places limits on the steps a government
may take against an individual, whether it be keeping him in prison, imposing excessive monetary
sanctions, or using cruel and unusual punishments."); cf Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671
n.40 (1977) (holding that "punishment" for Eighth Amendment purposes refers to measures
inflicted "only after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally
associated with criminal prosecutions" and that the Due Process Clause addresses the imposition
of other forms of sanctions). Similarly, to invoke the Fourth Amendment's broadly worded
guarantee against "unreasonable searches and seizures," there must be some act that one could
plausibly call a "search" or "seizure." For example, the Court has divided over the question
whether an off-premises wiretap plausibly constitutes a "search" within the Amendment's
meaning. Compare Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-54 (1967) (holding that a wiretap
constitutes a "search" despite the absence of physical intrusion), with id. at 365 (Black, J.,
dissenting) ("A conversation overheard by eavesdropping, whether by plain snooping or
wiretapping, is not tangible and, under the normally accepted meanings of the words, can neither
be searched nor seized."). More recently, the Court has repeatedly confronted the question
whether hot pursuit constitutes a "seizure" for Fourth Amendment purposes. See, e.g., California
v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 n.2 (1991) (relying on "the common law" to determine the
meaning of "seizure" within the Fourth Amendment and concluding that some touching is
necessary to constitute a "seizure"); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596-97 (1989)
(holding that the term "seizure" cannot apply to an "unknowing act" that happens to stop a fleeing
felon). Whatever the correct disposition of such cases (a matter beyond this Article's scope), they
serve to illustrate that some degree of textual constraint exists even in the more standard-like
clauses.
155. In particular, when the statutory text is indefinite, textualists believe that the statute
necessarily vests the interpreter with a range of discretion. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361, 417 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that "no statute can be entirely
precise, and that some judgments, even some judgments involving policy considerations, must be
left to the officers executing the law and to the judges applying it"); Easterbrook, supra note 107,
at 16 ("[C]ourts implementing general statutes (such as the antitrust laws) become the
decisionmakers.").
156. See, e.g., Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998) (Scalia, J.) ("'[Tihe
title of a statute .... [is] of use only when [it] shed[s] light on some ambiguous word or phrase."'
(quoting Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Bait. & Ohio R.R., 331 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1947)) (first, third,
and fourth alterations in original)); Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 192 (1995)
(Scalia, J.) ("While the meaning of the text is by no means clear, this is in our view the only
reading that comports with the statutory purpose ...."); Nat'l Tax Credit Partners, L.P. v. Havlik,
20 F.3d 705, 707 (7th Cir. 1994) (Easterbrook, J.) ("Knowing the purpose behind a rule may help
a court decode an ambiguous text, but first there must be some ambiguity." (citations omitted));
Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511,
515 (noting that the traditional judicial method of resolving ambiguity "unquestionably involves
judicial consideration and evaluation of competing policies... to determine which one will best
effectuate the statutory purpose"). Modem textualists, of course, will not treat legislative history
as probative evidence of such purpose. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation
Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 684-89 (1997) (describing the modem textualist critique of
legislative history). But there are many other sources of determining a statute's background
aims-including the overall tenor of the statute, its relationship to other statutes, the temper of the
time of enactment, and the public events that inspired the legislation in the first place.
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the statute as a whole (or, indeed, to other parts of the U.S. Code). 5 7 They
would also emphasize that judges may properly apply a broadly worded
statute to circumstances that its drafters might not have foreseen or even
approved of.'58 While the evidence suggests that the leading judicial
textualists also apply at least some of these premises to broadly worded
constitutional texts,159 the question of how fully these methods translate to
constitutional interpretation must (with one exception) await another day.
160
157. See, e.g., City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 4 O
(2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending that "'[e]vidence of pre-emptive purpose [may be]
sought in the text and structure of the statute at issue"' (quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood,
507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993) (first alteration in original)) (emphasis omitted)); United States v.
Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 449 (1988) (Scalia, J.) (holding that the nonreviewability of adverse
personnel actions under the Civil Service Reform Act derives "not only from the statutory
language, but also from.., the structure of the statutory scheme").
158. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc. 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (Scalia, J.)
("[S]tatutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils,
and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators
by which we are governed."); Easterbrook, supra note 109, at 546 (arguing that when the statute
merely identifies "the goal" to be achieved by the interpreter, "the subsequent selection of rules
[by the interpreter] implements the actual legislative decision, even if the rules are not what the
legislature would have selected itself').
159. The leading judicial textualist, Justice Scalia, has suggested something along these lines,
at least in his academic writings. In particular, he has contended that the task of constitutional
adjudication merely involves application "of the usual principles" of construction "to an unusual
text." Scalia, supra note 84, at 37. Invoking McCulloch v. Maryland, he has explained that "[iln
textual interpretation, context is everything, and the context of the Constitution tells us not to
expect nit-picking detail, and to give words and phrases an expansive rather than narrow
interpretation-though not an interpretation that the language will not bear." Scalia, supra note
84, at 37. In other words, the Constitution uses so many broadly worded concepts for a reason,
and judges should pay careful attention to that textual cue. Along similar lines, as in the case of
statutory interpretation, Justice Scalia "rejects the drafter's intent as the criterion for interpretation
of the Constitution." Id. at 38. Although he does not elaborate on that position, the process
justifications for rejecting specific intent in the statutory context arguably apply with at least equal
force to constitutional texts. The process for adopting a constitutional provision requires
agreement on language that can attract a vastly wider level of support-two-thirds of each house
and three-fourths of the states. Relying on textual generalities (and thus papering over disputes
about specifics) may be necessary more often to secure that extraordinary degree of consensus.
160. I take the position here that textualists properly rely on structural arguments in
ascertaining the content of otherwise open-ended constitutional provisions. In particular, I rely on
structural inferences from Article I, Section 7 and Articles V and VII to determine the appropriate
content of "the judicial Power" to declare the law applicable to a case or controversy. See supra
notes 120-125 and accompanying text. Further, I suggest more generally that structural inference
reflects an appropriate method of "liquidating" (clarifying) the meaning of open-ended
constitutional texts. See infra Section III.B.
Because the use of structural inference ultimately involves deriving background purpose
from the text of the statute as a whole, one might ask whether that technique is consistent with
textualist skepticism about the recoverability and relevance of legislative intent or purpose. As I
have argued in previous writing, however, textualists do not deny that a text, read in context, can
convey purpose; rather, they are skeptical of the use of background intent or purpose to contradict
the clear import of an otherwise precise statutory text. See Manning, supra note 103, at 2434
n. 179. When textualists do not feel the pinch of a precise text, they think it appropriate for judges
to try to make related texts coherent with one another. Accordingly, textualist judges resolve
ambiguity in light of broader structural inferences "not because that precise accommodative
meaning is what the lawmakers must have had in mind... but because it is [the judiciary's] role
to make sense rather than nonsense of the corpus juris." W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey,
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For purposes of the Eleventh Amendment and its like, the more salient
questions involve constitutional texts that speak with both clarity and rule-
like precision.
Although less extensively discussed in the constitutional literature,
relatively clear and precise texts-many of them quite important-exist in
some abundance in the Constitution. To avoid potential confusion about
this claim, 61 let me be clear at the outset about its scope and limits: All
constitutional provisions will be indefinite in certain respects; all certainly
require interpretation. But the conventional meaning of many provisions of
the constitutional text will sometimes convey some messages quite clearly.
Equally important for purposes of the analysis here, many such provisions
are rule-like (or have rule-like aspects) in the sense that they convey more
definite and hard-edged policy judgments. That is, almost any reader
familiar with the linguistic and cultural conventions of the society that
adopted the text would recognize the precise judgment in question after
reading the text in context. I do not attempt to inventory the examples here.
But it is possible to make some preliminary observations about where one
might expect to find clearly delineated policy expressed in the document's
conventional meaning.
First, the everyday meaning of some clauses will simply be clear and
precise in context. Unsurprisingly, the bellwether example here involves the
Constitution's age requirements for various federal officeholders. 62 The
499 U.S. 83, 100-01 (1991); see also, e.g., id. at 100 ("Where a statutory term presented to us for
the first time is ambiguous, we construe it to contain that permissible meaning which fits most
logically and comfortably into the body of both previously and subsequently enacted law.");
Fausto, 484 U.S. at 453 (describing the "classic judicial task of reconciling many laws enacted
over time, and getting them to 'make sense' in combination").
This technique has obvious relevance to the appropriate construction of the often indefinite
terms that define our frame of government. Many aspects of the constitutional structure are open-
ended, and the document consciously defines the branches' respective powers in relation to one
another. Accordingly, interpretation of the vague terms of Vesting Clauses lends itself to analysis
based on structure and relationship. See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757-58
(1996) (ascribing the nondelegation doctrine to the process of bicameralism and presentment);
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 217-24 (1995) (relying on the strict separation of
legislative and judicial powers to infer the inviolable finality of court judgments as an attribute of
"the judicial Power"). When used properly, such analysis does not depend on background purpose
to contradict a precise text, but rather reads an ambiguous provision in light of other parts of the
same text. See Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 13 n.72 (1975) ("[T]he traditional method of 'interpreting'
textual provisions is hardly inconsistent with taking into account structural considerations. The
former are often simply the textual embodiment of the latter.").
161. Because of the deep influence of the old "plain meaning" school, the contention that
texts can convey clear meaning is sometimes equated with the now-discredited position that
statutes, when clear, simply do not require interpretation. See, e.g., United States v. Hartwell,
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385, 396 (1868) ("If the language be clear it is conclusive. There can be no
construction where there is nothing to construe.").
162. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 129, at 13 ("At one extreme-for example the requirement
that the President 'have attained to the Age of thirty five years'-the language is so clear that a
conscious reference to purpose seems unnecessary."); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist
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evident aim of such provisions is to ensure the requisite maturity in
presidents, senators, and representatives. The relevant constitutional
provisions seek to achieve this broader purpose by drawing precise and
ultimately arbitrary lines setting specific ages for particular offices. 16 3 As
Judge Posner notes, it surely requires linguistic and cultural competence to
understand what English speakers in this country mean, for example, by
requiring that any president "have attained to the Age of thirty five
Years." 164 Yet those with that requisite competence would widely
understand not only the semantic import of that phrase, but also the cultural
practice of using essentially arbitrary eligibility cutoffs to ensure
predictability and ease of application.' 65 However our society's conception
of the requisite maturity might change, the Constitution's age requirements
express a clear and specific policy judgment about eligibility for various
federal offices.
Second, although terms of art may, at times, import a framework of
common law reasoning, those technical terms may also convey some
determinate and limiting connotations that would have been transparent to
anyone familiar with the (legal) community's linguistic practices. 166 For
example, application of the Ex Post Facto Clause will often entail fine-
grained common law reasoning about the kinds of legal innovations that
Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1195 (1987)
("Where the text speaks clearly and unambiguously-for example, when it says that the President
must be at least thirty-five years old-its plain meaning is dispositive."); Monaghan, supra note
129, at 363 ("Limitation of the presidency to persons of age thirty-five or more is an easy
illustration of a particularized provision.").
163. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 ("No Person shall be a Representative who shall not
have attained to the Age of twenty five Years ...."); id. § 3, cl. 3 ("No Person shall be a Senator
who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years .... ); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 4 ("[N]either shall
any Person be eligible to th[e] Office [of the President] who shall not have attained to the Age of
thirty five Years .... ).
164. Id. art II, § 1, cl. 4. Judge Posner has argued:
The provision is profoundly unclear to a person who does not know English; and if it is
still in force in a thousand years, it may be as unclear as Anglo-Saxon or Old English is
to us. In India, where the official language is English but age is measured from
conception rather than birth, [the clause] would mean something different from what it
means to us. It would mean something different in a society that did not record the date
of birth. A text is only clear by virtue of linguistic and cultural competence.
Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the
Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 190-91 (1986).
165. See Posner, supra note 164, at 191 (arguing that the "age thirty-five provision" is clear,
in part, because "American lawyers recognize it as part of a family of rules that establish arbitrary
eligibility dates in preference to making eligibility turn on uncertain qualitative judgments").
166. Here, I am not talking about large generic concepts such as "the executive Power" or
"the judicial Power," for example. Although such concepts have common law antecedents, the
U.S. Constitution departs in important respects from the English constitutional structure.
Accordingly, while the common law understanding of those concepts supplies an important
starting point for analysis, it is unsafe to assume that the broad descriptions of governmental
power refer to all the details of the mother country's practice. See Manning, supra note 11, at 56.
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count as impermissible retroactivity. 167 Yet (at least if Blackstone is to be
believed), a reasonable person conversant with the relevant linguistic and
cultural conventions would surely have understood its technical meaning to
exclude retroactive civil statutes. 168 Similar principles apply to a common
law term like "Pardons., 169 Certainly, a reasonable person would have read
that presidential grant against the settled background of the common law
tradition. 170 For instance, given the settled common law practice, the
President's pardon power extends to contempt orders designed to punish
violations against the dignity of the court, but not those meant to remedy
noncompliance with a court order.171
Of course, in arguments that hinge upon borrowing the technical
meaning of a term from English common law tradition, one must always
ask whether American practice somehow rejected or altered that tradition
prior to the Constitution's adoption, or whether the practice is contradicted
by other clear elements of the constitutional structure. 172 Still, the need for
167. Justice Chase's influential opinion in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798)
(Chase, J.), purported to distill from the common law a series of factors that help ascertain
whether something constitutes an ex post facto law. There remains, however, considerable room
for judgment about the precise application of those common law criteria. For example, the Court
recently divided sharply over the question whether altering a criminal statute of limitations to the
detriment of the defendant constituted a forbidden ex post facto law. See Stogner v. California,
123 S. Ct. 2446 (2003).
168. See Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 396 (Paterson, J.) (relying on Blackstone to conclude that
"[t]he words, ex post facto, when applied to a law, have a technical meaning, and, in legal
phraseology, refer to crimes, pains, and penalties"); see also Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37,
41 (1990) (noting that "ex post facto law" was "a term of art with an established meaning at the
time of the framing of the Constitution"). Many have questioned the historical accuracy of
limiting the "ex post facto" prohibition to criminal laws. See, e.g., Satterlee v. Matthewson,
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380, 416 n.a & app. at 681-87 (1829) (Johnson, J.); 1 WILLIAM WINSLOW
CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 324-51
(1953).
169. See U.S. CONST. art. 1I, § 2, cl. 1 ("[The President] shall have Power to grant Reprieves
and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.").
170. See United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 160 (1833) ("As this power had been
exercised from time immemorial by the executive of that nation whose language is our language,
and to whose judicial institutions ours bear a close resemblance; we adopt their principles
respecting the operation and effect of a pardon, and look into their books for the rules prescribing
the manner in which it is to be used by the person who would avail himself of it.").
171. See Exparte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 111 (1925). Similarly, the Court has found that the
President's pardon power includes the traditional common law power to commute capital
sentences to life imprisonment. See Exparte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307, 310-11 (1856).
172. See, e.g., Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 248-49 (1936) ("[T]he range of a
constitutional provision phrased in terms of the common law sometimes may be fixed by recourse
to the applicable rules of that law.... [But] the common law rule invoked shall be one not
rejected by our ancestors as unsuited to their civil or political conditions."); Murray's Lessee v.
Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 277 (1856) (defining due process in
light of the "settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statu[t]e law of
England, before the emigration of our ancestors, and which are shown not to have been unsuited
to their civil and political condition by having been acted on by them after the settlement of this
country"). In addition, as Richard Fallon has noted, "the possibility that a constitutional term
might be either a term of art or an instance of more ordinary usage sometimes will undermine the
claim to... authority of arguments from text." Fallon, supra note 162, at 1253. Like any textual
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such a preliminary inquiry does not foreclose the possibility of identifying
common law terms whose salient features did remain fixed and intact (or
ascertainable as altered) when they were incorporated into the document.
Accordingly, because the Constitution (particularly the portion adopted in
the eighteenth century) contains so much "legalese," 173 one might expect to
find some elements of determinacy in the technical connotations of its
many terms of art.
174
A third set of provisions conveys crispness and detail through the
elaborate prescription of procedural requirements for the exercise of
granted powers. For reasons discussed below, the specificity of articulation
of many such procedures may convey a negative implication, denying
Congress power to provide for the exercise of the same powers through
different means.1 75 For example, Article I, Section 7 carefully spells out the
procedures of bicameralism and presentment for the enactment of
legislation;1 76 hence, permitting Congress to adopt legislation through other
conclusion, however, identifying a term as one of ordinary or technical meaning may become
clear from context.
173. See, e.g., United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 134 (1980) ("The common law is
important in the present context, for our Double Jeopardy Clause was drafted with the common-
law protections in mind."); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 461-62
(1978) (suggesting that "the Framers used the words 'treaty,' 'compact,' and 'agreement' as terms
of art, for which no explanation was required"); Bait. & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S.
654, 657 (1935) ("The right of trial by jury thus preserved is the right which existed under the
English common law when the [Seventh] Amendment was adopted."); Smith v. Alabama,
124 U.S. 465, 478 (1888) ("The interpretation of the Constitution of the United States is
necessarily influenced by the fact that its provisions are framed in the language of the English
common law, and are to be read in the light of its history."); Exparte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 422
(1885) ("The scope and effect of [the Grand Jury Clause], as of many other provisions of the
Constitution, are best ascertained by bearing in mind what the law was before."); Laurence H.
Tribe, Defining "High Crimes and Misdemeanors": Basic Principles, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
712, 718 (1999) (noting that "like treason and bribery, high crimes and misdemeanors" are "terms
of art" for purposes of the Impeachments Clause).
174. I recognize, of course, that as a descriptive matter the Court has frequently departed
from the common law understanding of technical legal terms. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970) (deviating from the common law understanding of property).
175. See infra notes 286-292 and accompanying text.
176. Article I, Section 7 prescribes elaborate criteria for passing a bill. For example, Article I,
Section 7, Clause 2 provides that a bill that has passed both Houses must "be presented to the
President" for signature or veto, that he or she must return a vetoed bill "with his [or her]
Objections to that House in which it shall have originated," and that a veto may be overridden
only by a "two thirds" vote of each house. In the event of an attempted override, moreover, "the
Votes of both Houses shall be determined by Yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting
for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively." Clause 2 also
specifies how many days the President has to consider a bill ("ten Days (Sundays excepted)"), the
effect of his or her not signing or returning it within the specified time ("the Same shall be a
Law"), and the consequences that follow if a legislative adjournment prevents the President from
returning a vetoed bill to Congress during the ten-day period allocated for his or her consideration
("it shall not be a Law"). In an apparent attempt to prevent evasion of bicameralism and
presentment, Clause 3 then provides that the procedures for enacting a bill apply with equal force
to "[elvery Order, Resolution, or Vote, to Which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of
Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment)."
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means might constitute an impermissible end run around that process.1 77
Although considerable academic disagreement now attends the question,
the Court has at times suggested a similar view of the Article V process for
amending the Constitution. 178 Certainly, the Court has found exclusivity in
the Constitution's carefully drawn appointments process. 1 79 And at least as
an original matter, the advice and consent requirements of the Treaty
Clause might have warranted similar treatment.180 Indeed, one can point to
quite a number of carefully framed procedural provisions specifying the
manner in which the federal branches must exercise their assigned
powers,181 not to mention those allocating authority between the federal and
177. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (invalidating the legislative veto).
178. See, e.g., Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428 (1956) ("Nothing new can be put
into the Constitution except through the amendatory process. Nothing old can be taken out
without the same process."); Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 348 (1856) (noting that
the Constitution "is supreme over the people of the United States, aggregately and in their
separate sovereignties, because they have excluded themselves from any direct or immediate
agency in making amendments to it, and have directed that amendments should be made
representatively for them"). For discussion of the academic debate, see infra note 207.
179. The Appointments Clause thus provides:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme
Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may
by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1, 132-34 (1976) (per curiam)
(holding that Congress lacks the authority to prescribe a method of appointing "Officers of the
United States" that does not comply with the specific strictures of the Appointments Clause).
180. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall have [the] Power, by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur .... ). In this arena, the force of precedent cuts in decidedly the other direction.
Several Supreme Court decisions have approved the validity of certain (binding) executive
agreements and protocols, even though they had not been submitted to the Senate for ratification.
See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 223 (1942) (recognizing the binding effect of an
international compact); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330-31 (1937) ("[An
international compact, as this was, is not always a treaty which requires the participation of the
Senate. There are many such compacts, of which a protocol, a modus vivendi, a postal
convention, and agreements like that now under consideration are illustrations."). In addition, a
substantial scholarly debate has grown up around the legitimacy of so-called "congressional-
executive agreements"--international accords negotiated by the President and approved by simple
legislation rather than by the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate. Compare, e.g., Bruce
Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REv. 799 (1995)
(defending the practice), with Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections
on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1221, 1272-75 (1995)
(arguing that such a practice contradicts the text and structure of the Treaty Clause).
181. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cls. 6-7 (Impeachment Clauses); id. § 4, cl. 1 (granting
authority to prescribe the "Times, Places, and Manner" of holding elections); id. § 5, cl. 1
(defining the authority of each house to judge elections and setting forth rules for "a Quorum to do
Business"); id. cl. 2 (authorizing each house to prescribe "Rules of its Proceedings" and to punish
or expel members); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (specifying the manner of succession to the presidency and
authorizing Congress to "provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both
of the President and Vice President"), amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XXV; id. § 2, cl. 3
(providing for recess appointments); id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (prescribing the heads ofjurisdiction for
federal courts); id. cl. 2 (defining and allocating the Supreme Court's original and appellate
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state governments.1 82 None of this is to suggest that the procedures in
question are pellucid; doubtless each leaves open difficult questions of
interpretation in some, perhaps important, respects. 183 Rather, my point is
simply that, by virtue of their precision, many of the processes
contemplated by the Constitution do take on the essential quality of rules.
2. Reading Precise Constitutional Texts
The premises of statutory textualism now embraced by the Rehnquist
Court suggest that contrary to its Eleventh Amendment case law, the Court
should, if anything, give stricter adherence to the clear lines drawn by
precise constitutional texts. I have previously argued that, properly
understood, modem textualism builds on the related premises (1) that the
lines drawn by clear and precise texts frequently reflect (unknowable)
legislative compromise, and (2) that the carefully drawn lawmaking process
prescribed by the Constitution makes it imperative for judges to respect
such compromise. 184 Because both aspects of modem statutory textualism
bear crucially on the proper method of reading precise constitutional texts,
each point merits brief elaboration.
The first premise-that legislative compromise plays a crucial but often
undetectable role in the framing of statutes-has been an important
foundation of the Court's recent shift toward statutory textualism. 185 Indeed,
jurisdiction); id. cl. 3 (providing for jury trials and prescribing venue for "[tlhe Trial of all Crimes,
except in Cases of Impeachment").
182. See, e.g., id. art. I, § 8, cl. 16 (defining the relative authority of Congress and the States
with regard to militias); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (providing for each state's appointment of presidential
electors "in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct"); id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2 (defining
states' obligations concerning extradition).
183. For example, a difficult threshold question under Article I, Section 7 is whether certain
types of action qualify as exercises of legislative power subject to the requirements of
bicameralism and presentment. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952-55 (1983) (concluding that
a one-house veto of administrative action is legislation). Similarly, before applying the
Appointments Clause, it is necessary to determine whether a federal official is an "Officer of the
United States" (within the meaning of the Clause) or a mere employee. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at
126 n. 162 (per curiam) ("Employees are lesser functionaries subordinate to officers of the United
States, whereas the [Federal Election] Commissioners, appointed for a statutory term, are not
subject to the control or direction of any other executive, judicial, or legislative authority."
(citations omitted)).
184. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 103, at 2408-19, 2437-38; Manning, supra note 11, at
70-78.
185. See, e.g., Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 93 (2002) (suggesting
that "any key term in an important piece of legislation" will be "the result of compromise");
Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 461 (2002) (describing the enactment of pension
reform legislation for coal miners as "a typical story of legislative battle among interest groups,
Congress, and the President"); Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 10 (2000) (refusing to consider
various "policy arguments" while embracing what the Court viewed as "the only permissible
interpretation of the text-which may, for all we know, have slighted policy concerns on one or
the other side of the issue as part of the legislative compromise that enabled the law to be
enacted"); Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 286 (1994) (noting that "compromises
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modem textualists insist that compromise is a pervasive fact of any
lawmaking process.8 6 To be sure, this textualist starting point is a
generalization, not an incontrovertible empirical fact. 87 But it is, I believe,
a highly plausible premise, and one grounded in experience. Given the
influence of public choice scholarship, it is common enough to think of
"compromise" pejoratively as "unprincipled compromise"-that is, as a set
of deals struck by economically self-interested interest groups. 88 While
such conditions may describe some legislation (and, indeed, some
constitutional texts), a more general (and less cynical) understanding of
compromise has greater relevance here. In particular, the leading
philosophical textualist, Jeremy Waldron, has argued-correctly, I
believe-that compromise is routinely to be expected whenever enacted
texts reflect "the product of a multimember assembly, comprising a large
number of persons of quite radically differing aims, interests, and
necessary to [statutes'] enactment may require adopting means other than those that would most
effectively pursue the main goal"); Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin.
Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 374 (1986) (emphasizing that because legislators may differ about "the
means" of effectuating a vague but widely shared goal, "the final language of the legislation may
reflect hard-fought compromises"). The Court recently made the same general point about state
laws. See Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass'n of Cent. Iowa, 123 S. Ct. 2156, 2159 (2003) (noting that the
state law under review, "like most laws, might predominately serve one general
objective.., while containing subsidiary provisions that seek to achieve other desirable (perhaps
even contrary) ends as well, thereby producing a law that balances objectives but still serves the
general objective when seen as a whole").
186. Judge Easterbrook is perhaps the leading proponent of this view. See, e.g., Easterbrook,
supra note 36, at 429 (arguing that "legislation is compromise-that laws are not enacted section
by section, but as a package"); Easterbrook, supra note 109, at 540 ("Almost all statutes are
compromises .... ); Easterbrook, supra note 111, at 68 ("Legislation is compromise.
Compromises have no spirit; they just are. ... If [the outcome] is unprincipled, it is the way of
compromise. Law is a vector rather than an arrow.").
187. Of course, some rather concrete evidence supports the general notion that the
Constitution involved compromise. In particular, the deliberations of the Philadelphia Convention
reveal a series of important compromises that seemed to permit agreement on a final document.
See FARRAND, supra, note 143, at 201 (describing the original Constitution as a "bundle of
compromises"); see also Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 439 (1998) (referring to "the
great debates and compromises that produced the Constitution"). As Farrand thus explained:
The document which the convention presented to congress and to the country as
the proposed new constitution for the United States was a surprise to everybody. No
one could have foreseen the processes by which it had been constructed, and no one
could have foretold the compromises by which the differences of opinion had been
reconciled, and accordingly no one could have forecast the result.... Out of what was
almost a hodge-podge of resolutions they had made a presentable document, but it was
not a logical piece of work. No document originating as this had and developed as this
had could be logical or even consistent.
FARRAND, supra note 143, at.200-01. I note this fact not to suggest that the interpreters should use
the Convention's deliberations as an authoritative source for identifying the scope of specific
"compromises," but rather to support the general point that compromise played a role in the
document's adoption. However rich the records of the Convention may be, textualists believe that
the final text, when clear, represents the only reliable indicator of the compromise actually
adopted.
188. For an excellent discussion of interest group theory and its limitations, see, for example,
FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 110, at 12-37.
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backgrounds."' 89 Certainly, if one accepts Professor Waldron's account as
an accurate depiction of the workings of Congress, it should apply a fortiori
to the constitutional amendment process, in which drafters must try to
anticipate and accommodate the concerns of a supermajority of legislators
in each house and the ratifiers in an even larger supermajority of the fifty
states. For that reason, it seems quite likely that the adoption of
constitutional texts, like the enactment of statutes, entails bargaining and
compromise over the reach and structure of the policy under
consideration.'
90
Equally important, the Court's new textualism presupposes that the
adopted text represents the most, if not the only, reliable indicator of the
resulting compromise. In previous writing, I have considered this position
and its limitations in great detail.' 91 For now, it suffices to note that because
the legislative process is complex, path-dependent, and often opaque,
textualists believe that it is difficult if not impossible for judges to go
behind a statute to determine why the final text took the form that it did.192
Legislation must pass through many diverse, and frequently nontransparent,
veto gates; its sponsors must fight for time on the floor; and its final shape
will depend, often unknowably, on the sequence of alternatives presented
and the effective exercise of strategic voting. 93 No matter how extensive
the legislative record may be, interpreters cannot know whether and to what
extent crucial decisions about the bill's scope or contours took place behind
the scenes. 194 Accordingly, textualists believe that the safest course, at least
189. WALDRON, supra note 1, at 125. Accordingly, one might expect any statute's "specific
provisions" to be "the result of compromise and line-item voting." Id.
190. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 129, at 366 ("The Constitution is a series of
compromises .... Prudence rather than unifying principle shaped the initial document and all of
its amendments."); Easterbrook, supra note 128, at 1125 (arguing that "the Framers did not share
a single vision but reached a complex compromise"); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser
Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 861 (1989) (describing the Constitution as an imperfect "political
compromise"). This conception of compromise is shared by some nontextualists. See, e.g.,
Monaghan, supra note 129, at 392 ("Like important statutes, the constitution emerged as a result
of compromises struck after hard bargaining.").
This conclusion holds, moreover, whether or not the text represents, at one extreme, a
closely divided legislative vote over a matter of economic self-interest or, at the other, a broad
social consensus over a question of high constitutional principle. Even when it comes to widely
shared principles like equal treatment or scruples against cruel punishment, participants in the
lawmaking process will inevitably differ with respect to the structure and boundaries of the
principle being adopted and, perhaps most important, with respect to the way that principle should
apply to concrete cases.
191. See Manning, supra note 103, at 2408-19. The discussion that follows builds upon my
earlier analysis.
192. See supra notes 108-111 and accompanying text.
193. See Manning, supra note 103, at 2414-17.
194. See id. at 2411 ("Some compromises ... are the product of 'back-room deals,' which are
difficult if not impossible to detect from the public record.").
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when a statute is clear, is to take Congress at its word-a premise, as noted,
that is increasingly reflected in the Court's decisions.'95
Although the process of adopting a constitutional amendment is less
onerous in one respect (joint resolutions proposing such an amendment are
not subject to presidential veto), 196 there is little reason to believe that the
shape of such amendments depends any less on the complexities of the
legislative process. Joint resolutions proposing constitutional amendments,
much like ordinary legislation, must clear committee, face amendment,
fight for floor time, and the like. 197 If anything, the bargaining that goes into
framing a viable constitutional amendment is complicated by the need to
secure extraordinary levels of consent that statutes do not require. In
reading an amendment, one cannot ignore the possibility that its language
was crafted as it was-however broadly or narrowly-because someone or
some set of people made the calculation, perhaps not on the public record,
that the particular formulation would most likely ensure the requisite
supermajorities in Congress and the larger supermajority of ratifying states.
Article V, in other words, sets up a carefully designed and elaborate process
for filtering constitutional impulses into constitutional law, and the text is
the one and only thing that has come through that process. Although not a
textualist himself, John Ely captured the point well when he observed that
the very point of having a final "vote on an authoritative text is to generate
a record of just what there was sufficient agreement on to gain [the
requisite] consent.,
198
A second, and more normative, element of the Court's recent statutory
jurisprudence relies on the foregoing premises about compromise to insist
upon strict enforcement of a precise statute, even when the conventional
meaning of the text, as applied, seems over- or underinclusive in relation to
the law's background purposes. However awkward the results might
appear, "[t]he deals brokered" in the legislative process are not for courts
"to judge or second-guess. " 199 To see why the same premise applies a
fortiori to precise constitutional texts, it is necessary to say a few words
195. See supra notes 113-117 and accompanying text.
196. This practice was entrenched by the Court's summary disposition in Hollingsworth v.
Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798), which applied the Eleventh Amendment despite the
Attorney General's contention that it was invalid because not presented to the President. See
Consumer Energy Council v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d 425, 460 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (discussing Hollingsworth and its implications), aff'd sub nom. Process Gas Consumers
Group v. Consumer Energy Council, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983).
197. See WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS
110, 131, 201-02, 234, 237 (4th ed. 1996) (collecting examples of procedural maneuvers that
affected the course of deliberations on constitutional amendments). For example, to prevent
opponents from offering controversial floor amendments, Speaker Tip O'Neill brought the
proposed Equal Rights Amendment to the House floor in 1983 under suspension of the House
Rules, a procedure that "limited debate and prevented amendments." See id. at 131.
198. ELY, supra note 129, at 17.
199. Bamhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 461 (2002).
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about what I regard as the most persuasive justification for respecting
statutory compromise. The Court's recent decisions seem to assume that
respect for compromise straightforwardly implements the idea of legislative
supremacy. Its opinions, however, never explain why courts, as faithful
agents of the legislature; should pay attention to the details of a specific
compromise rather than the broad policy contours underlying it.200 In
previous writing, I have offered a normative justification for respecting the
details of a legislative compromise-a justification ultimately rooted in the
constitutional aims of bicameralism and presentment. 20  By dividing
legislative power among three institutions answering to differently
composed constituencies, the very design of bicameralism and presentment
evinces an objective to check the influence of factions. 20 2 Political science
has now clarified one way in which bicameralism and presentment achieve
that aim: The division of legislative power among three bodies answering to
different constituencies effectively installs a supermajority requirement for
enacting statutes.
20 3
On that account, any faction will find it more difficult to capture the
legislative machinery because political minorities have extraordinary power
to block legislation or, more important for present purposes, to insist upon
compromise as the price of assent.2 °4 Given the central role that
compromise thus plays in the design of the legislative process, judges
should eschew rules of interpretation that shift the level of generality
conveyed by the text, lest they disturb a (perhaps unrecorded) compromise
that may have been essential to the legislation's enactment.2 °5
200. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 319, 322-30
(1989) (presenting an alternative conception of "legislative supremacy" that focuses not on
statutory detail but rather on judicial authority to adapt a statute's background goals to new
circumstances over time).
201. See Manning, supra note 103, at 2437-40; Manning, supra note 11, at 72-78.
202. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 11, at 72-73. I use "faction" here in the sense in which
Madison used that term. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 778 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) (defining a faction as "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or
minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of
interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the
community"). The restraining influence of bicameralism and presentment upon the power of
factions did not go unnoticed during the Founding. See WOOD, supra note 47, at 559-61.
203. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 233-48
(1962). By dividing decisionmaking authority, bicameralism and presentment may also help
counteract the tendency of group deliberation to result in polarization in the directions of the more
extreme points in the group's predeliberation views. See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble?
Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 110-11 (2000).
204. See Manning, supra note 11, at 74-78. In particular, the distinctly American version of
bicameralism and presentment gives specific protection to the minority consisting of small state
residents by providing their states with equal representation in the Senate. See U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 2. For a discussion of this feature's implications for lawmaking, see Bradford R. Clark,
Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REv. 1321, 1391-93 (2001).
205. See Manning, supra note 11, at 77-78.
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If one accepts that premise, then the need to respect unrecorded
compromises reflected in constitutional text applies, if anything, with even
greater force. Consider the process of constitutional amendment prescribed
by Article V:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem
it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or on
the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several
States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which,
in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of
this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths
of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as
the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the
Congress ....
The deliberately cumbersome amendment process, with its steep and
multitiered supermajority requirements, quite clearly establishes a set of
safeguards for political minorities much stronger than the legislative
process created by Article I, Section 7. I do not base this claim on anything
in the rather thin historical record surrounding Article V's adoption. Rather,
I rest entirely on the structural import of the Article, which in this respect
could hardly be more explicit.20 6 To establish a new constitutional power or
recognize a new right or immunity through the amendment process, one
must typically secure the assent of two-thirds of each house of Congress
and three-fourths of the states.207 (That is, at least, the only Article V
process thus far employed.) One could view these high hurdles as a means
to safeguard hard-fought constitutional arrangements against the influence
of momentary passion-in Madison's words, to "guard[] ... against that
extreme facility, which would render the Constitution too mutable. 2 °8 In
206. For further discussion of structural inferences from the constitutional text, see supra
notes 125, 160 and accompanying text.
207. U.S. CONST. art. V. Scholars disagree about the exclusivity of Article V as a method of
amending or otherwise changing the Constitution. Compare Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the
Governed. Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994) (arguing
that a simple majority of the national polity has the power to amend the Constitution outside the
confines of Article V), and 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998)
(approvingly elaborating historical examples of American constitutional amendment outside the
confines prescribed by the Constitution), with Clark, supra note 204, at 1332-34 (arguing that the
constitutional structure suggests that putative constitutional amendments can be considered "the
supreme Law of the Land" under the Supremacy Clause only if adopted pursuant to Article V),
and Henry P. Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional
Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121 (1996) (contending that the nonexclusive theories of
amendment slight the protections that Article V affords to the states). The intriguing question of
Article V exclusivity is beyond the scope of this Article. The present analysis focuses instead on
the interpretive consequences that arise when American society explicitly invokes the processes of
Article V to create a canonical and precise constitutional text.
208. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 202, at 278 (James Madison).
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particular, by requiring the assent of three-fourths of the states, Article V
obviously affords the states-particularly the smaller ones-protection
against easy alterations in the terms of the union.20 9 But it is an often
overlooked reality that Article V does more than reinforce political inertia
or protect states. In addition to its state-centered supermajority requirements
(which protect political minorities in their own way),210 Article V also
explicitly grants a small minority of national political society-those
represented by only one-third of the House of Representatives or of the
Senate-the right to block constitutional change. 211 By giving several sets
of (partially overlapping) political minorities the power to block
constitutional change, Article V of course also confers upon them
extraordinary power to insist upon compromise as the price of assent.212
If protecting the rights of political minorities to exact a compromise is
so central to Article V's design, how does that affect the norms of
interpretation? Inferences from the Article V amendment process suggest
that judges should adhere strictly to clear and rule-like constitutional texts.
If the conventional meaning of a constitutional provision, in context,
unmistakably conveys a sharp-edged policy judgment to a reasonable
person conversant with the community's practices, it is of doubtful
legitimacy to adjust that clear meaning in order to make the text more
congruent with its apparent purposes. The careful lines drawn by a precise
209. See Monaghan, supra note 207, at 129-30.
210. See id. at 156 (recounting Founding-era observations that Article V would give one-
quarter of the states authority to block constitutional change without regard to their population and
would thus permit small states to band together to prevent amendments).
211. Indeed, a prominent strain of political theory has criticized the amendment process
precisely because it gives political minorities such extraordinary blocking power-contrary, it is
said, to the premises of majority rule. See id. at 171-73 (collecting and discussing sources);
see also, e.g., J. ALLEN SMITH, THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 46 (1907) (arguing that
the amendment process contradicts "the general belief that in this country the majority rules" and
noting that, as of 1900, "one forty-fourth of the population distributed so as to constitute a
majority in the twelve smallest states could defeat any proposed amendment").
212. See Monaghan, supra note 207, at 125-26. In particular, a supermajority requirement
should shift the leverage point away from the median voter and toward the minority position.
Consider the following description of the difference in strategic bargaining in a supermajority
setting:
Where supermajorities are required .... the bill before Congress may need to be
amended away from the median in order to gain the required supermajority. Such a
situation gives rise to sophisticated voting on two fronts. First, the majority for change
(including the median member) must occasionally vote against its immediate interests
by "weakening" a bill. This will provide an outcome that is preferred to the status quo
and can gain the support of a supermajority, but which is less preferred than the median
outcome would have been.... Second, as a bargaining tool, members of the minority
who are pivotal to forming a supermajority may vote sophisticatedly. This minority
group could vote in favor of the status quo over a compromise position proposed by the
majority in order to secure an even better deal for themselves. When they prefer the
original compromise position to the status quo, such a vote for the status quo is a
sophisticated vote.
Craig Volden, Sophisticated Voting in Supermajoritarian Settings, 60 J. POL. 149, 151 (1998).
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constitutional provision seemingly reflect a particular type of
compromise-an expressed willingness to go so far and no farther in
pursuit of a goal. Altering those lines to pursue the goal more effectively
threatens to disturb the compromise and dilute the important and explicit
protection that Article V's multitiered supermajority requirements confer
upon political minorities. To sharpen and elaborate on this point, I return
now to the Eleventh Amendment.
C. Article V and the Eleventh Amendment
The previously discussed structural premises call into question the
Court's present approach to the Eleventh Amendment. The central theme of
Hans and Seminole Tribe is this: Given the strong and immediate reaction
against Chisholm and the widespread subscription of eighteenth-century
Americans to state sovereign immunity, it is unthinkable that the
Amendment's framers or ratifiers would have intended it to be applied as
written. Had they imagined that its purpose did not include the elimination
of suits arising under federal law, the Amendment would not have been
adopted.
For present purposes, I assume that the Court in Hans and Seminole
Tribe accurately discerned the eighteenth-century social consensus in favor
of rather comprehensive state sovereign immunity. Even if one accepts in
theory the plausibility of identifying a lawmaker's intention at odds with a
provision's conventional meaning, the mere existence of a social or
political consensus contrary to the text cannot carry the heavy burden
required to justify deviating from such a text, especially in constitutional
law. Perhaps a majority, even a vast majority, of eighteenth-century
Americans, if asked, would have strongly favored state sovereign immunity
from federal judicial process in federal question actions, suits in admiralty,
suits by foreign states, and so forth. Yet by unmistakable design, the Article
V process does not seamlessly translate social sentiment, even widespread
social sentiment, into constitutional law. At a minimum, before ascribing a
broader legally effective intention to the carefully drawn language of the
Eleventh Amendment, the Court must ask whether it is conceivable that
one-third of either house (or, less likely, one-quarter of the state
legislatures) might have preferred the narrower immunity embedded in the
text.2" 3
213. Along these lines, the Court recently observed that "[t]he events leading to the adoption
of the Eleventh Amendment... make clear that the individuals who believed the Constitution
stripped the States of their immunity from suit were at most a small minority." Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706, 726 (1999). The crucial point here is that the amendment process prescribed by
Article V makes it possible for even a "small minority" to block or qualify proposals to amend the
Constitution in ways not to their liking. The Court has not purported to claim that those who
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The more basic question, however, is whether it is conceivable that
process considerations flowing from Article V's structure may have given
the Amendment's supporters strategic reasons for putting forward such a
precise amendment. Perhaps the political forces responsible for shaping the
Amendment's text believed, rightly or not, that a more encompassing
amendment might have passed less surely or been ratified more slowly. Or
perhaps they feared that if the proposed amendment were broadened much
beyond the mischief that instigated the process (suits against states by out-
of-staters), the process would have bogged down in costly bargaining about
just how far such extensions should go. It is also possible that the Congress
that proposed the Amendment was more nationalist than society at large
and that those who controlled the agenda quietly put forward the least
radical amendment they felt they could get away with.214 Especially given
the sparse record accompanying the Amendment's proposal or adoption, it
is hard to rule out the possibility that the Amendment's precise limitations
reflect a byproduct of the Article V process rather than inadvertently
narrow drafting or imperfect foresight.
Indeed, given the Article V interest in protecting the fruits of a
(potentially unrecorded) compromise, those who would deviate from the
clear text of an amendment should at least carry the burden of negating any
plausible grounds for its having been worded as written. At a minimum,
therefore, the Court should enforce an amendment as written if one could
imagine rational reasons, pragmatic or political, for a precisely drawn text
like the Eleventh Amendment to have taken the shape that it did.
While I do not delve here into the rich debate about the original
meaning of the Eleventh Amendment, I note that others have identified
circumstances that, if accurate, supply plausible grounds for imagining that
the Amendment's text took the shape it did for reasons other than poor
drafting or imperfect foresight. Perhaps, as Judge Gibbons has argued,
some Federalists felt concerned that the elimination of federal question
jurisdiction against the states would have adverse diplomatic repercussions,
given Great Britain's apparent dissatisfaction over states' noncompliance
with the Treaty of Paris.215 Or given the widespread discontentment over
the fact that many state legislatures had in recent years suspended debt
favored a narrower immunity were a sufficiently small minority to be irrelevant to the adoption of
the Eleventh Amendment. Nor does it seem as if the Court could plausibly reach such a
conclusion, given the paucity of the records surrounding the Amendment's adoption.
214. At least some recent historical scholarship suggests that the early Congresses had a
disproportionately nationalist tilt. See THORNTON ANDERSON, CREATING THE CONSTITUTION
174-83 (1993). Perhaps the narrow framing of the Amendment accounts for the broad support it
received in Congress. See CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY 71 (1972) ("The roster of those favoring the Amendment includes the names of ardent
nationalists, as well as states' rights men.").
215. See Gibbons, supra note 20, at 1939-41.
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collections, passed ex post facto laws, printed paper money, and the like,216
perhaps some thought it wiser not to foreclose precipitously any future
possibility of invoking federal jurisdiction to enforce Article I, Section 10's
explicit prohibitions against such abuses.21 7 Or perhaps some of the
Amendment's drafters merely feared that these or other concerns might
surface if the Amendment were too broadly worded. I offer no opinion
about these or the many other historical accounts of the Amendment's
narrow drafting. Nor do I think it possible ever to know the true reason, if
one exists, for the final shape of the Amendment's text. Rather, I mention
the foregoing possibilities merely to suggest that the Hans and the Seminole
Tribe Courts simply overlooked the possibility that a political minority
sufficient to shape the Amendment may have preferred the Eleventh
Amendment as written or, at least, that the Amendment's drafters may
plausibly have thought as much. Absent evidence negating any conceivable
basis for such a conclusion, the Court in both cases should have enforced
the Eleventh Amendment as written.
III. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AS A LIMIT ON
STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY "
A distinct feature of the Eleventh Amendment debate calls attention to
another important but frequently overlooked interpretive question involving
constitutional precision: When does one appropriately read a negative
implication into the Constitution's detailed specification of a newly granted
power or its careful delineation of exceptions to such a grant? In particular,
a second line of the Court's case law asks not whether the Eleventh
Amendment establishes state sovereign immunity, but rather whether it
stands as an affirmative impediment to the derivation of such immunity
from other constitutional sources. These decisions hold that despite the
Amendment's particularity, its adoption does not preclude deriving
additional categories of state sovereign immunity from "the judicial Power"
216. See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 47, at 404; William Seal Carpenter, The Separation of
Powers in the Eighteenth Century, 22 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 32, 33-34 (1928); Edward S. Corwin,
The Progress of Constitutional Theory Between the Declaration of Independence and the Meeting
of the Philadelphia Convention, 30 AM. HIST. REv. 511, 519 (1925).
217. 1 refer here to the Legal Tender Clause, the Ex Post Facto Clause, and the Contract
Clause, all of which apply in terms against the states. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. It is worth
noting that in his argument in Chisholm v. Georgia, Attorney General Randolph cited this concern
as one of the central reasons for not reading state sovereign immunity into Article III:
What is to be done, if in consequence of a bill of attainder, or an ex post facto law, the
estate of a citizen shall be confiscated, and deposited in the treasury of a State? What, if
a State should adulterate or coin money below the Congressional standard, emit bills of
credit, or enact unconstitutional tenders, for the purpose of extinguishing its own debts?
What if a State should impair her own contracts? These evils, and others which might
be enumerated like them, cannot be corrected without a suit against the State.
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 422 (1793).
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or the constitutional structure as a whole.2 18 By offering a subtler and more
plausible analysis of the Amendment's role in state sovereign immunity
law, these cases present a more difficult interpretive question. Accordingly,
my claims here are more tentative. I suggest that in the Amendment's
absence, the Court might legitimately have generated a rather elaborate
doctrine of state sovereign immunity based on general authority derived
from Article III or the constitutional structure as a whole.2 19 Under well-
known (but sometimes controversial) principles of negative implication,
however, the Amendment's adoption may have exhaustively specified the
available classes of state sovereign immunity in federal court and thereby
displaced any residual authority to develop further sovereign immunity
principles.22 °
More specifically, because Article III did not speak explicitly to the
question of sovereign immunity, I expect that, in the Amendment's
absence, questions about state sovereign immunity would have been
resolved in the same way that this nation settled other open questions about
constitutional structure. By practice, the branches charged with
implementing "the judicial Power" would have settled its meaning in
common law fashion, perhaps consulting traditional practices associated
with that concept and inferences available from the overall constitutional
structure. Through that process, our constitutional tradition would have
come to rest around whichever practices and decisions about state sovereign
immunity withstood the test of time. If Chisholm was mistaken, there was
certainly time to reexamine its premises, just as early Americans ultimately
did with many of their other first impressions of "the judicial Power.,
2 1
By adopting the Eleventh Amendment in response to Chisholm,
however, eighteenth-century Americans explicitly confronted the question
that Article III had left in the shadows. By limiting the available jurisdiction
of the federal courts, the Eleventh Amendment seems to have supplied a
specific solution to the problem of state sovereign immunity from federal
judicial action. A venerable maxim of construction holds that when a
specific and a general provision address the same subject, the specific
governs the general.222 This "specificity canon" seeks to ensure that when
the legislature has focused specifically on a matter and struck a precise
policy balance, the resulting balance is not disturbed by an agency's or
218. See infra Section III.A (discussing cases).
219. See infra Section III.B (describing the tradition of practical interpretation of vague
constitutional clauses).
220. See infra Section III.C (elaborating on principles of negative implication and applying
them to the Eleventh Amendment).
221. See infra text accompanying notes 252-254; see also infra notes 257-260 (giving
concrete examples of this phenomenon).
222. See infra notes 270-282 and accompanying text (discussing the specificity canon and its
justification).
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court's exercise of more general authority to reach the same subject. This
tradition points to the following conclusion: If the Amendment's carefully
drawn text reflects an implicit judgment that the contemplated limits on
state amenability to suit should go so far and no farther, then the balance
struck by the Amendment might properly displace whatever general
authority the Court had possessed to develop a jurisprudence of state
sovereign immunity against federal jurisdiction under "the judicial Power"
of Article III.
Certainly, invoking the specificity canon to resolve this textual question
raises its own set of questions. All canons of course are controversial. As a
specialized version. of the negative implication canon (expressio unius est
exclusio alterius), the specificity canon is perhaps especially so. 223 The
canon rests on the familiar idea that the enumeration of specific matters in a
statute logically implies the exclusion of others.224 Traditionally, the Court
treated the canon as a means to identify specific legislative intent.225 But it
is equally comprehensible in textualist terms; a negative implication may
represent "the most natural reading" of a circumscribed statutory text.226
Under either conception, the expressio unius principle has the same
justification and poses the same difficulty: Like all linguistic canons, this
one is what Holmes once called an "axiom of experience 227--a shorthand
way of describing tendencies in the use of a language. For that reason, its
application is far from automatic. When people specify a list of items or a
particular method of doing something, the specification sometimes suggests
exclusivity, but not always. For example, in certain circumstances, a textual
specification of certain items may connote only that the lawmaker has
chosen to take one step at a time and has yet to address the omitted matters
one way or the other.228
This fact, however, does not drain the expressio unius canon of all
resolving significance. Like any other textual cue, the canon draws meaning
223. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215,
1250 (2001) ("Law professors consider [the expressio unius] canon unreliable or even bogus.");
Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REv. 405, 455
(1989) (describing the expressio unius canon as "controversial").
224. See United Dominion Indus., Inc. v. United States, 532 U.S. 822, 836 (2001) ("The logic
that invests the omission with significance is familiar: the mention of some implies the exclusion
of others not mentioned.").
225. See, e.g., SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350 (1943) (describing the
expressio unius principle as one of the maxims used "to aid in deciphering legislative intent");
United States v. Barnes, 222 U.S. 513, 519 (1912) ("The maxim.., expresses a rule of
construction, not of substantive law, and serves only as an aid in discovering the legislative intent
when that is not otherwise manifest.").
226. TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 28 (2001).
227. Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928) (Holmes, J.).
228. See In re Am. Reserve Corp., 840 F.2d 487, 492 (7th Cir. 1988) (Easterbrook, J.) ("The
legislature does not tie up every knot in every statutory subsection. A list of four ways may imply
only that Congress has yet to consider whether there should be others.").
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from context. In textualist terms, when a statutory or constitutional text
enumerates a list or prescribes a particular way of doing something, the
expressio unius canon directs interpreters to ask whether a reasonable
person reading the words in context would have understood the
specification to be exclusive.2 29 I have more to say about the particulars of
such an inquiry below. 230 For now, it suffices to emphasize that the
expressio unius canon, properly applied, is not advanced as a mechanical or
acontextual solution to any interpretive problem.2 3' Rather, consistent with
the previously identified goals of Article V, the canon alerts interpreters to
consider whether a carefully drawn text is indicative of a compromise that
went so far and no farther. Whether the Eleventh Amendment, in particular,
warrants such a reading is the question to which this Article now turns.
A. The Eleventh Amendment as Irrelevant
At times, the Court has invoked the Eleventh Amendment solely to
make clear that the Amendment's carefully drawn limitations on federal
jurisdiction did not, by negative implication, preclude the Court's
recognition of more extensive state sovereign immunity under other sources
of constitutional authority. Perhaps the leading case of this type is Monaco
v. Mississippi,232 which held that despite the Amendment's limited terms,
states enjoyed sovereign immunity from suits authorized by Article III's
grant of jurisdiction over controversies "between a State ... and foreign
States." A private party had given Monaco some bonds issued and then
repudiated by Mississippi, and Monaco brought a common law action to
recover on those bonds. What makes this case particularly interesting is that
the full text of the relevant portion of Article I1, Section 2, Clause 1-the
ninth (and last) head of jurisdiction articulated in that Clause-authorizes
federal jurisdiction over controversies "between a State ... and foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects." The Eleventh Amendment, in relevant part,
withdraws federal jurisdiction from suits against a state "by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State." Accordingly, with surgical precision, the
Amendment deals with the ninth head of jurisdiction by restricting suits
229. As one commentator has put it, the canon "'properly applies only when in the natural
association of ideas in the mind of the reader that which is expressed is so set over by way of
strong contrast with that which is omitted that the contrast enforces the affirmative inference."'
EARL T. CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 337 (1940) (quoting State ex rel. Curtis
v. De Corps, 16 N.E.2d 459, 462 (Ohio 1938)); see also infra note 285 and accompanying text.
230. See infra Section III.C.
231. See HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND
INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS § 72, at 219 (2d ed. 1911) ("[Negative implication] is based upon
the rules of logic and the natural workings of the human mind. But it is not to be taken as
establishing a Procrustean standard to which all statutory language must be made to conform.").
232. 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
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against a state by foreign citizens or subjects while leaving untouched suits
between a state and foreign states.
Unsurprisingly, the Principality of Monaco emphasized this very
fact.233 Despite the apparent negative implication, the Court held that
neither the literal sweep of the words of Clause One of § 2 of
Article III, nor the absence of restriction in the letter of the
Eleventh Amendment, permits the conclusion that in all
controversies of the sort described by Clause One, and omitted
from the words of the Eleventh Amendment, a State may be sued
without her consent.234
Rather, the Court would not "assume that the letter of the Eleventh
Amendment exhausts the restrictions upon suits against non-consenting
States. 235 Against this backdrop, the Court analogized Mississippi's
assertion of sovereign immunity to other unenumerated postulates that
conditioned "the judicial Power":
There is the essential postulate that the controversies, as
contemplated, shall be found to be of a justiciable character. There
is also the postulate that States of the Union, still possessing
attributes of sovereignty, shall be immune from suits, without their
consent, save where there has been "a surrender of this immunity in
the plan of the convention.
' 236
With that observation, the Court gently shifted the question of state
sovereign immunity from. the Eleventh Amendment to a more plausible
home in Article III. Accordingly, the Court was then to examine each head
of jurisdiction in Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 to determine "its
characteristic aspect, from the standpoint of the effect, upon sovereign
immunity from suits, which has been produced by the constitutional
scheme. 237 Under this conception, by superseding Chisholm v. Georgia,
the Eleventh Amendment simply gave the Court a fresh start in deriving the
appropriate postulates of immunity in common law fashion from the
original plan of the Convention.238
Recently, the Court elaborated upon and refined Monaco's defensive
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. In Alden v. Maine, the Court
233. Id. at 320-21 (discussing the plaintiffs contention that the Amendment expressly
restricts the exercise of federal jurisdiction under Article III, Section 2, Clause 1, but "contains no
reference to a suit brought by a foreign State").
234. Id. at 321.
235. Id. at 322.
236. Id. at 322-23 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81, supra note 202, at 487 (Alexander
Hamilton)) (footnote omitted).
237. Id. at 328.
238. Id.
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held that states enjoy immunity from suit in their own courts and that
Congress lacks Article I authority to abrogate such immunity.
239
Acknowledging the "truism" that the Eleventh Amendment is "inapplicable
in state courts, 24° the Court emphasized that the Amendment, properly
understood, did not establish the constitutional doctrine of state sovereign
immunity. Instead, it was merely a narrow response to the specific problem
of immunity that Chisholm had made salient at the time:
The text reflects the historical context and the congressional
objective in endorsing the Amendment for ratification. Congress
chose not to enact language codifying the traditional understanding
of sovereign immunity but rather to address the specific provisions
of the Constitution that had raised concerns during the ratification
debates and formed the basis of the Chisholm decision. Given the
outraged reaction to Chisholm, as well as Congress' repeated
refusal to otherwise qualify the text of the Amendment, it is
doubtful that if Congress meant to write a new immunity into the
Constitution it would have limited that immunity to the narrow text
of the Eleventh Amendment .... 241
The Amendment, moreover, presented no occasion to address state
sovereign immunity in state courts because "nothing in
Chisholm... suggested that States were not immune from suits in their
own courts. 242 Thus, while conceding that it sometimes referred to state
sovereign immunity as "Eleventh Amendment immunity," the Court made
clear that "the sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from, nor is
limited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment., 243 State sovereign
immunity instead represents a general attribute of "the structure of the
original Constitution itself.,244 While the precise question of state sovereign
immunity in state courts is beyond the scope of this Article, both Alden and
Monaco, I believe, too readily found that the Eleventh Amendment's
239. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
240. Id. at 735-36.
241. Id. at 723 (citation omitted).
242. Id. at 742.
243. Id. at 713.
244. Id. at 728. In particular, the Court claimed, the states retained critical attributes of
sovereignty when they assented to the Constitution. See id. at 713-15. Thus, the Court explained
that "[v]arious textual provisions of the Constitution assume the States' continued existence and
active participation in the fundamental processes of governance." Id. at 713. Moreover, the Tenth
Amendment removed "[a]ny doubt regarding the constitutional role of the States as sovereign
entities." Id. According to the Court, the states would not have adopted the document at all "if it
had been understood to strip the States of immunity from suit in their own courts." Id. at 743.
Building on Alden's reasoning, the Court recently extended the principle of state sovereign
immunity to proceedings against states brought before federal administrative agencies, which
perform adjudicative functions but do not exercise "the judicial Power" in an Article III sense. See
Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 753 (2002).
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carefully worded restrictions on federal jurisdiction left the Court free to
develop further immunities under the general authority of "the judicial
Power" or the constitutional structure as a whole. I consider this point in
greater detail below.
245
B. Liquidating Article III
To evaluate the question whether the Eleventh Amendment precludes
the Court's recognition of further state immunities from federal jurisdiction,
it is helpful to consider what authority the Court might have enjoyed in the
Eleventh Amendment's absence. I start from the assumption that Article III
did not definitively resolve questions about state sovereign immunity.246
The Constitution left many such questions for future resolution.247 With
open-ended concepts such as "the judicial Power," much remained subject
to reasonable debate. While the most obvious model for understanding the
idea of judicial power assuredly came from English tradition, our
Constitution sometimes departed in important respects from the common
law model.248 Nor did experience with state governments prior to the
Philadelphia Convention necessarily provide definitive guidance, for much
of the constitutional design reflected a growing sense of dissatisfaction with
the composition and corresponding behavior of early state governments,
including their judiciaries.249
Accordingly, while the Constitution was far from radically
indeterminate in all respects, Madison was surely correct when he
observed:
Experience has instructed us that no skill in the science of
government has yet been able to discriminate and define, with
sufficient clarity, its three great provinces-the legislative,
executive, and judiciary; or even the privileges and powers of the
245. See infra Section III.C.
246. See supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text (suggesting grounds for uncertainty about
whether sovereign immunity survived the adoption of Article III). Based on the swift and decisive
adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, the Court has recently suggested that the Founding
generation did not find the question of state sovereign immunity particularly debatable. See
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 69 (1996) (noting that any suggestion that "Chisholm was
'reasonable,' certainly would have struck the Framers of the Eleventh Amendment as quite odd"
(citation omitted)). While the opinions in Chisholm may have badly misread the country's mood,
it does not follow that they badly misread the conventional legal materials that went into their
judgment about open-ended terms like "the judicial Power." Indeed, assuming arguendo that the
four Justices in the majority were in some meaningful sense "wrong" about the best reading of
Article III, even Justice Iredell's influential dissent acknowledged both the difficulty and novelty
of questions concerning the application of sovereign immunity to our new system of government.
See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dali.) 419, 449-50 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting).
247. Much of the discussion that follows is based on Manning, supra note 47, at 1672-80.
248. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 47.
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different legislative branches. Questions daily occur in the course
of practice which prove the obscurity which reigns in these
subjects, and which puzzle the greatest adepts in political
science.25°
The necessary clarifications would come only with the passage of time
and accretion of experience. In that vein, referring in part to the very
problem of "delineating the several objects and limits of... different
tribunals of justice," Madison added: "All new laws, though penned with
the greatest technical skill and passed on the fullest and most mature
deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until
their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular
,,251
discussions and adjudications.
Madison's remarks nicely anticipated the method by which many
aspects of "the judicial Power" ultimately became settled.252 Indeed, the
practical liquidation of meaning had particular force in determining how
and to what extent English judicial traditions survived the premises of our
distinctive constitutional structure.253 The process often involved twists and
turns in practice that did not come immediately to rest.254 But the end result
was that open questions about "the judicial Power" came to be settled by
practical exposition of the proper role of the courts in our constitutional
system.
Although typically defended in other terms, it is worth noting that at
least on preliminary analysis, this practice is consistent with the premises of
constitutional textualism described above. Invoking Madison's technique of
practical liquidation depends on an antecedent finding of textual
indeterminacy; it does not purport to substitute institutional practice for a
clear textual command.255 The process of liquidating meaning, moreover,
frequently represents an effort to make sense of indefinite or obscure
provisions in light of the constitutional structure as a whole-a technique to
256
which textualists subscribe without hesitation in cases of indeterminacy.
Finally, building upon early practical interpretations of the document may,
in fact, enhance the accuracy of later textual readings by capturing
250. THE FEDERALIST No. 37, supra note 202, at 228 (James Madison).
251. Id. at 229.
252. See, e.g., Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803) ("[lIt is sufficient to
observe, that practice and acquiescence under [the custom of Justices riding circuit] for a period of
several years, commencing with the organization of the judicial system, affords an irresistible
answer, and has indeed fixed the construction.").
253. See Manning, supra note 47, at 1673.
254. See id. at 1673-80 (discussing examples).
255. See Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283, 311 (1901) (emphasizing "that practical
construction is relied upon only in cases of doubt").
256. See supra note 160.
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linguistic and cultural nuances that might otherwise have been lost to future
readers.257
The Madisonian approach to liquidating meaning nicely captures the
way Article III disputes came to rest in areas as disparate as federal
common law crimes, 258 the permissibility of advisory opinions, 259 and (as I
257. See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Pena, 44 F.3d 437, 445 (7th Cir. 1994)
(Easterbrook, J., concurring) ("Alterations in the legal and cultural landscape may make the
[original] meaning hard to recover."). Along these lines, the Court frequently gives weight to early
legislative constructions of the Constitution precisely because early legislators "must have had a
keen appreciation of the influences which had shaped the Constitution and the restrictions which it
embodied, since all questions which related to the Constitution and its adoption must have been, at
that early date, vividly impressed on their minds." Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 56 (1900);
see also, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 174-76 (1926) (relying on early practical
construction of the Constitution); Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 297 (1888) (same),
overruled in part by Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935); The Laura,
114 U.S. 411,416 (1885) (same); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 420 (1821) (same);
Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 309 (same).
258. In the 1790s, many circuit courts simply assumed that they had inherited common law
powers to fill the void left by a sparse federal criminal code. See, e.g., Williams' Case, 29 F. Cas.
1330 (C.C.D. Conn. 1799) (No. 17,708) (punishing expatriate hostilities against the United
States); Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360) (punishing a violation of
U.S. neutrality); United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1147 (C.C.D. Mass. 1792) (No. 16,323)
(punishing the counterfeiting of U.S. bank notes). But see United States v. Worrall, 28 F. Cas.
774, 779 (C.C.D. Pa. 1798) (No. 16,766) (Chase, Circuit Justice) (rejecting federal common law
crimes as inappropriate to our system of government). The question, however, did not quickly
come to rest. When the Federalist Congress passed the Sedition Act in 1798, Act of July 14, 1798,
ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (expired 1801), its supporters defended the bill against Jeffersonian opponents
by arguing that seditious libel was already a federal common law crime. See Stewart Jay, Origins
of Federal Common Law: Part One, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1075-83 (1985); Gary D. Rowe,
Note, The Sound of Silence: United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, The Jeffersonian Ascendancy,
and the Abolition of Federal Common Law Crimes, 101 YALE L.J. 919, 936-39 (1992).
In the protracted debate that followed the Act's passage, the Jeffersonians repeatedly
contended that judicial power to recognize federal common law crimes undermined important
premises of the broader constitutional structure. See Jay, supra, at 1090-91; see also Madison's
Report on the Virginia Resolutions (1799-1800), in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 546, 565-66 (photo. reprint
1987) (Jonathan Elliot ed., New York, Burt Franklin 1888) (arguing that federal common law
crimes violate crucial premises of the separation of powers and federalism). After the
Jeffersonians swept to office in 1800, their position gained ascendancy through various legislative
and executive actions, including Jefferson's decision to halt the prosecution of common law
crimes. See, e.g., Jay, supra, at 1083-111; Rowe, supra, at 939-41; see also Kathryn Preyer,
Jurisdiction To Punish: Federal Authority, Federalism, and the Common Law of Crimes in the
Early Republic, 4 LAW & HIST. REV. 223, 237-38 (1986). In United States v. Hudson & Goodwin,
the Court rejected a federal common law of crimes, reasoning in part that "the general
acquiescence of legal men shews the prevalence of opinion in favor of the negative of the
proposition." 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 32 (1812).
259. Early federal judges frequently issued advisory opinions. See WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE
SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER
ELLSWORTH 178-79 (1995). In 1793, however, the Justices of the Supreme Court relied on the
separation of powers in declining to give advice requested by Secretary of State Jefferson on a
number of legal questions concerning the hostilities between England and France. See Letter from
the Justices to George Washington (Aug. 8, 1793), in RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART AND
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 93 (4th ed. 1996). Although the
question did not come to rest immediately, it later became settled that advisory opinions did not
fall within federal judges' limited Article III authority to decide "cases" or "controversies." See
DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS,
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have argued in previous work) the proper conception of the federal
260
judiciary's law-declaration power in matters of statutory interpretation.
The Court's state sovereign immunity case law fits a similar pattern.
Despite the Eleventh Amendment's adoption, the Court has rarely behaved
as if the question of immunity turns upon the meaning of a canonical text.
Instead, it has engaged in a gradual common law elaboration of the ways in
which state sovereign immunity fits or does not fit, in different contexts,
with our structure of government. Starting from the premise that state
sovereign immunity presumptively survived Article III's adoption, the
Court has asked whether there is some reason to believe that a particular
form of that immunity was surrendered "in the plan of the convention.,
261
In the Court's view, "the plan of the convention" allowed two types of
domestic sovereigns-a sister state or the United States itself-to sue a
state in federal court. The basis for suits by sister states is straightforward:
Because a tribunal for resolving disputes between states was thought
"essential to the peace of the Union," federal jurisdiction over the states as
defendants "was... established 'by their own consent and delegated
authority' as a necessary feature of the formation of a more perfect
Union., 262 Jurisdiction over suits by the United States, in turn, reflects the
idea that the federal government was "established for the common and
equal benefit of the people of all the States. '263 Because each government
(federal and state) is "'sovereign, with respect to the objects committed to
1789-1888, at 12-13 (1985). Because English judges had themselves issued advisory opinions, the
ultimate rejection of advisory opinions apparently rested on the policies implicit in Article III, not
on historical pedigree. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968); Felix Frankfurter, Advisory
Opinions, in 1 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 475, 476 (Edwin R.A. Seligman ed.,
1930).
260. I have argued that, in matters of statutory interpretation, early federal courts sometimes
invoked the English judicial practice of equitable interpretation-a practice giving judges broad
authority to extend statutes according to their ratio legis and to recognize exceptions for harsh
results that did not serve the statutory purpose. See Manning, supra note 11, at 86-89. Starting
from premises about the proper understanding of the judicial power in our system of separated
powers, the Marshall Court subsequently settled instead around what we would now call the
"faithful agent" theory of statutory interpretation. See Manning, supra note 47, at 1677-80;
Manning, supra note 11, at 89-102. Under that conception, the federal judge's duty is to discern
and enforce as accurately as possible the precise instructions issued by the legislature. For a
different reading of the early history of the federal judiciary's law-declaration power, see William
N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the "'Judicial Power" in Statutory
Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 1058-87 (2001) (arguing that the Court's
early approaches to statutory interpretation were more consistent with the equitable traditions of
their English and state antecedents).
261. Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 323 (1934) (internal quotation marks omitted).
262. Id. at 328-29 (quoting Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 720
(1838)). Of course, the textual basis for such jurisdiction is quite compelling. Article III extends
the judicial power to suits "between two or more States." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
Nonetheless, in the aftermath of Hans, the Court only narrowly rejected the contention that federal
jurisdiction over suits between two states was subject to an implied exception for claims of money
damages. See South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 318-22 (1904).
263. United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 646 (1892).
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it, and neither [is] sovereign with respect to the objects committed to the
other,"' allowing the federal government to sue a state in federal court
"does no violence to the inherent nature of sovereignty.' 264 And "consent
[to such litigation] was given by [each state] when admitted into the Union
upon an equal footing in all respects with the other States. 265
Conversely, the plan of the Convention left state immunity intact with
respect to suits by foreign nations and tribal sovereigns. With respect to
foreign nations, the Monaco Court thus explained:
The foreign State lies outside the structure of the Union. The
waiver or consent, on the part of a State, which inheres in the
acceptance of the constitutional plan, runs to the other States who
have likewise accepted that plan, and to the United States as the
sovereign which the Constitution creates. We perceive no ground
upon which it can be said that any waiver or consent by a State of
the Union has run in favor of a foreign State. 66
Similarly, the Court has discerned "no compelling evidence" that "the
States waived their immunity against Indian tribes when they adopted the
Constitution. 267 Whereas states implicitly waived immunity against sister
states by "mutuality of... concession" in the Constitutional Convention, no
such mutuality was possible between states and tribes because the tribes
"were not even parties" to the Convention.268 Accordingly, just as the tribes
enjoy immunity against suits by states, so too do the states enjoy immunity
against suits by tribal sovereigns.
I am not concerned here with the correctness of any particular
determination in this line of cases. My point here is that the method
employed by the Court would have represented a plausible way of
"liquidating" the meaning of "the judicial Power" of Article III had
Chisholm and the Eleventh Amendment not intervened. Whether or not the
structural inferences in particular cases were justifiable, one can hardly
object to the general approach of reading an open-textured provision like
"the judicial Power" in light of the broader premises of the constitutional
structure. Chisholm, however, altered the legal environment. It caused
American society to focus explicitly on the question that Article III had left
unanswered: What kind(s) of immunity should the states enjoy from suit in
federal courts? Accordingly, it is necessary to ask whether one should read
the Amendment's specific resolution of that question to displace whatever
264. Id. (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 410 (1819)).
265. Id.
266. Monaco, 292 U.S. at 330.
267. Blatchford v. Native Vill. ofNoatak, 501 U.S. 775, 781 (1991).
268. Id. at 782.
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general authority the Court previously may have had to address the same
question in common law fashion.
C. The Specific and the General
One might surely view the Eleventh Amendment's adoption as leaving
untouched whatever power the Court originally possessed to determine
open questions of sovereign immunity against federal jurisdiction under
Article III. On that view, the Amendment's specification of particular
jurisdictional limitations merely sought to ensure a minimally acceptable
degree of state sovereign immunity in federal court. In areas covered by the
new restrictions, the Court could no longer construe "the judicial Power" to
provide less immunity than the Amendment prescribes; at the same time,
nothing in the Amendment explicitly displaces the Court's residual
authority to read into "the judicial Power" an immunity wider than the
Amendment itself prescribes. This premise offers the most persuasive
justification for Hans and its progeny.269
Nonetheless, it is also possible to understand the relationship between
the Eleventh Amendnent and "the judicial Power" differently. Specifically,
one might examine that relationship in light of the considerations
underlying the venerable maxim of statutory construction "that the specific
governs the general., 270 The idea is easily stated: "However inclusive may
be the general language of a statute ..... '[s]pecific terms prevail over the
general in the same or another statute which otherwise might be
controlling.' ' 271 For example, the federal government's ability to enforce a
tax lien rests exclusively on the specific provisions of the Federal Tax Lien
269. Indeed, on this account, one might even conclude that the pro-immunity policy
embodied in the Eleventh Amendment properly informed the subsequent common law
decisionmaking undertaken pursuant to the Court's general authority to.elaborate "the judicial
Power." Cf Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383 (1908) (arguing
that courts should use statutory policies as a source of reasoning in common law decisionmaking);
Peter L. Strauss, On Resegregating the Worlds of Statute and Common Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV.
429 (same).
270. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992); see also, e.g., Gozlon-
Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 407 (1991) ("A specific provision controls one of more
general application."); Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976) ("'Where
there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a
general one, regardless of the priority of enactment."' (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535,
550-51 (1974))).
271. Clifford F. MacEvoy Co. v. United States ex rel. Calvin Tompkins Co., 322 U.S. 102,
107 (1944) (quoting D. Ginsberg & Sons, Inc. v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208 (1932)). The canon is
also accurately described as follows: "[T]he general and specific in legal doctrine may mingle
without antagonism, the specific being construed simply to impose restrictions and limitations on
the general; so that general and specific provisions in the laws, both written and unwritten, may
stand together, the latter qualifying and limiting the former." JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP,
COMMENTARIES ON THE WRITTEN LAWS AND THEIR INTERPRETATION § 112A, at 106-07
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1882).
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Act of 1966, rather than the otherwise applicable provisions of a distinct
statute more generally prescribing the government's debt collection
priority. In contrast with the related doctrine of implied repeals, which
provides that a later statute impliedly repeals an earlier one only to the
extent of any irreconcilable conflict,273 the specificity canon governs
regardless of the order in which Congress enacted the specific and general
statutes.274
The specificity canon is part of the larger family of interpretive rules
that seek to promote coherent readings of related statutory provisions.275 In
particular, it represents a version of the canon expressio unius est exclusio
alterius276 -and a rather strong version at that. As relevant here, it
presupposes that when a statute prescribes either a carefully drawn method
of exercising a given power or a well-delineated set of restrictions on such
power, an interpreter may read that specification to displace more general
sources of potential authority to prescribe different methods or restrictions
upon the same subject. So understood, the canon may reach not only an
exercise of general authority that directly contradicts a specific statute, but
also one that alters the apparent balance struck by the more specific
enactment.277
Although rarely explained, the specificity canon seeks to prevent a
"narrow, precise, and specific" statute from being "submerged" by judicial
or agency elaboration of a distinct statute covering "a more generalized
272. See United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 532 (1998). Similarly, although
federal employees had long enjoyed a cause of action for adverse personnel decisions under the
general authority of the Back Pay Act, the Court found this authority to have been superseded by
the specific remedial scheme that the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 prescribed for such
actions. See United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453 (1988).
273. See, e.g., Mancari, 417 U.S. at 550 ("In the absence of some affirmative showing of an
intention to repeal, the only permissible justification for a repeal by implication is when the earlier
and later statutes are irreconcilable."); Georgia v. Pa. R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 457 (1945) ("Only a
clear repugnancy between the old law and the new results in the former giving way ... ").
274. See Bulova Watch Co. v. United States, 365 U.S. 753, 758 (1961) ("[Ilt is familiar law
that a specific statute controls over a general one 'without regard to priority of enactment."'
(quoting Townshend v. Little, 109 U.S. 504, 512 (1883))).
275. For example, the specificity canon is closely related to the maxim ejusdem generis,
which provides that "when a general term follows a specific one, the general term should be
understood as a reference to subjects akin to the one with specific enumeration." Norfolk & W.
Ry. Co. v. Am. Train Dispatchers' Ass'n, 499 U.S. 117, 129 (1991); see also, e.g., Cleveland v.
United States, 329 U.S. 14, 18 (1946) ("Under the ejusdem generis rule of construction the
general words are confined to the class and may not be used to enlarge it."); Gooch v. United
States, 297 U.S. 124, 128 (1936) (noting that the canon of ejusdem generis ordinarily "limits
general terms which follow specific ones to matters similar to those specified").
276. See supra notes 223-229 and accompanying text.
277. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979) ("[I]t
is an elemental canon of statutory construction that where a statute expressly provides a particular
remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it."); Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978) (noting that when a statute "speak[s] directly to a
question" of maritime law, the Court cannot use its authority under the admiralty jurisdiction to
"'supplement' Congress' answer so thoroughly that the [statute] becomes meaningless").
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spectrum. '' 278 The reasons behind it seem ultimately related to preserving
the safeguards built into the legislative process. In contrast with a general
statute, a specific statute may reflect Congress's "detailed judgment" about
the proper means to "accommodate" competing policy concerns on a
particular subject.279 When the legislature enacts a statute dealing with a
discrete problem, the bargaining among relevant interest groups focuses on
the contours of that problem. 280 The lines drawn by the resulting statute
may embody whatever specific balance the arrayed political forces could
strike, acting within the constraints of bicameralism and presentment.28' If a
court or an agency were to invoke more generalized statutory authority to
displace the resulting balance, it would eviscerate the protections prescribed
by a carefully designed lawmaking process.282
Again, the process concerns associated with the specificity canon seem
to apply with greater force when it comes to constitutional, as opposed to
statutory, texts. Given the heightened consensus requirements imposed by
Article V, when an amendment speaks with exceptional specificity,
interpreters must be sensitive to the possibility that the drafters were willing
to go or realistically could go only so far and no farther with their policy.
When such compromise is evident, respect for the minority veto indicates
that those implementing the amendment should hew closely to the lines
278. Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976).
279. United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 532 (1998); see also Easterbrook,
supra note 109, at 547 ("A legislature that tries to approach the line where costs begin to exceed
benefits is bound to leave a trail of detailed provisions, which... would preclude judges from
attempting to fill gaps.").
280. See THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE
INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 98 (New
York, Baker, Voorhis & Co. 2d ed. 1874) (noting that the specificity canon seeks to preserve the
fruits of a process in which "the mind of the legislator has been turned to the details of a subject,
and he has acted upon it").
281. For example, the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596,
§ 6(b), 84 Stat. 1590, 1593-96 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (2000)), grants the
Secretary of Labor general authority to prescribe regulations setting maximum allowable levels of
toxic substances in the workplace. If Congress were also to adopt a more specific statute setting
the maximum level for a particular toxin such as benzene, that specific statute might displace
whatever general authority the agency would otherwise have had over that substance. See John F.
Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 223, 272.
Accordingly, if the hypothetical benzene statute set allowable levels at "no more than 10 parts per
million," the agency arguably could not invoke the more general statute to adopt a regulation
allowing "no more than 5 parts per million." "Although such a regulation might be viewed as
supplementing, rather than contradicting, the specific statutory requirements, it might also be seen
as unsettling the precise balance struck in a legislative process that presumably involved
bargaining between labor and manufacturing interests." Id.
282. See, e.g., Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 872 (1989) (noting that while the
Federal Magistrates Act grants district courts broad authority "to assign to magistrates unspecified
Iadditional duties,"' the statute's "carefully designed grant of authority to conduct trials of civil
matters and minor criminal cases should be construed as an implicit withholding of authority to
preside at a felony trial"); Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494 (1987) ("[W]e do not
believe that Congress intended to undermine this carefully drawn statute through a general saving
clause ... ").
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actually drawn, lest they disturb some unrecorded concession insisted upon
by the minority or offered preemptively by the majority as part of the price
of assent. In short, when the amendment process addresses a specific
question and resolves it in a precise way, greater cause exists for
interpreters to worry about invoking general sources of constitutional
authority to submerge the carefully drawn lines of a more specific
compromise.
As a threshold matter, of course, one must be able to identify when a
specific text is properly read as a compromise to go so far and no farther,
and this determination will not always be straightforward. Lawmakers
engage in specification for many reasons; it does not always connote an
implied exclusion of omitted cases.283 Reading a negative implication even
from a carefully specified text is, as Hamilton recognized, a matter of
"common sense." 284 As with any form of textual interpretation, the inquiry
is inevitably contextual. As the Court has suggested, resolution of such
inquiries turns on whether a reasonable person would have had cause to
read the specification of one thing as exclusive of any others in the
circumstances in which the statement was uttered.285
Certainly, shared experience over time helps to identify recurring
situations in which a member of the linguistic community would
presumptively read certain forms of specification as exclusive. For
283. See Sunstein, supra note 223, at 455 ("The failure to refer explicitly to the [item] in
question may reflect inadvertence, inability to reach consensus, or a decision to delegate the
decision to the courts, rather than an implicit negative legislative decision on the subject."). For
example, a statutory specification might seek to clarify a matter in genuine doubt or address an
immediate problem, leaving the unspecified matters for future resolution. Thus, two substantive
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 contain explicit clauses providing for prospective
application. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 258-59, 261 (1994). Although the
Act's many other provisions lack similar clauses, the Court refused to find a negative implication
in the disparate inclusion and omission. Noting that its own decisions had been somewhat
ambiguous about the background rules of statutory retroactivity, the specification of prospectivity
in two provisions might have meant only that Congress desired certainty in the areas covered by
those provisions. See id. at 261. The omission of similar clauses in other provisions did not
necessarily mean that Congress preferred retroactive application, but rather might have suggested
that Congress was content to take its chances with the Court's uncertain framework in those
contexts. See id.
284. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, supra note 202, at 496 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis
omitted).
285. Although not expressed in quite these terms, the substance of the Court's recent
guidance suggests that the inquiry turns on whether a reasonable person would have been justified
in inferring exclusivity from reading the text in context. See, e.g., Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co.,
537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003) ("As we have held repeatedly, the canon expressio unius est exclusio
alterius does not apply to every statutory listing or grouping; it has force only when the items
expressed are members of an 'associated group or series,' justifying the inference that items not
mentioned were excluded by deliberate choice, not inadvertence." (quoting United States v. Vonn,
535 U.S. 55, 65 (2002)); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 81 (2002) ("The canon
depends on identifying a series of two or more terms or things that should be understood to go
hand in hand, which is abridged in circumstances supporting a sensible inference that the term left
out must have been meant to be excluded.").
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example, when an adopted text establishes a new power and takes care to
specify the mode of its exercise, our tradition is to treat such a specification
as presumptively exclusive.286 Otherwise, why would a lawmaking body
take the trouble to spell out often elaborate procedures for exercising a
grant of power if alternative procedures would do just as well?
287
Unsurprisingly, this general convention has deep roots in our constitutional
tradition 288-a consideration that itself lends weight to the convention's
legitimacy. 289 Accordingly, although Congress has broad and general
authority to compose the institutions of government pursuant to the
Necessary and Proper Clause,290 it cannot give itself authority to pass laws
in a manner that deviates from Article I, Section 7's specific requirements
of bicameralism and presentment.291 Again, despite its general powers
under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress also cannot prescribe a
method of appointing "Officers of the United States" different from the
286. See, e.g., United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 321 (1976) ("Where Congress has
addressed the subject as it has here, and authorized expenditures where a condition is met, the
clear implication is that where the condition is not met, the expenditure is not authorized."); Nat'l
R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974) ("Since the Act
creates a public cause of action for the enforcement of its provisions and a private cause of action
only under very limited circumstances, this maxim would clearly compel the conclusion that the
remedies created in § 307(a) are the exclusive means to enforce the duties and obligations
imposed by the Act."); Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289 (1929) ("When
a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes the negative of any other
mode."). As Henry Campbell Black thus wrote:
Particularly when a statute gives a new right or a new power, and provides a specific,
full, and adequate mode of executing that power or enforcing the right given, the fact
that a special mode is prescribed will be regarded as excluding, by implication, the right
to resort to any other mode of executing the power or of enforcing the right.
BLACK, supra note 231, § 72, at 221.
287. For a particularly cogent explanation of this idea, see Tribe, supra note 180, at 1241-43.
288. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) ("Affirmative words are
often, in their operation, negative of other objects than those affirmed; and in this case, a negative
or exclusive sense must be given to them or they have no operation at all."); 1 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 448, at 434 (Boston, Hilliard,
Gray & Co. 1833) ("There can be no doubt, that an affirmative grant of powers in many cases will
imply an exclusion of all others.").
289. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 150, at 67 ("[T]he canons may be understood as
conventions, similar to driving a car on the right-hand side of the road; often it is not as important
to choose the best convention as it is to choose one convention, and stick to it. This point is most
applicable to the canons relating to grammar, word choice, and inference from different
syntactical configurations.").
290. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (granting Congress the power "[t]o make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department
or Officer thereof'); see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) ("Let
the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the
letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.").
291. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2-3; see also supra notes 176-177 and accompanying text.
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specific methods laid out in the carefully drawn terms of the Appointments
Clause.292
Another traditional application of the expressio unius canon directly
implicates the Eleventh Amendment. Typically, when a legal instrument
enumerates a list of exceptions to a power or prohibition found in the same
instrument, the convention is to treat the list as presumptively exclusive.293
This convention reflects the same intuition that underlies the ancient
aphorism that "the exception proves the rule., 294 The Eleventh Amendment
illustrates both the relevance and the limitations of that presumption (and,
by extension, of the expressio unius canon more generally). Because the
Amendment explicitly qualifies the availability of federal jurisdiction under
Article III, Section 2, Clause 1,295 one might, as an initial matter, draw a
negative implication from the Amendment's obvious selectivity about what
it modified and what it left untouched.296 Three of the heads of jurisdiction
292. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also supra note 179 and accompanying text. Along
similar lines, the enumeration of qualifications may convey exclusivity. Apparently, established
convention holds that the enumeration of particular qualifications for holding office impliedly
precludes the addition of others. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 793 n.9
(1995) (discussing the background convention and its pedigree). For example, the Constitution
enumerates a list of qualifications for service as a U.S. Representative. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2,
cl. 2 ("No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five
Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be
an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen."). Based on the specificity canon, the
Court has held that Congress cannot add to those qualifications pursuant to its general authority to
"be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members." Id. § 5, cl. 1;
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 522 (1969) (holding that the qualifications prescribed by the
Qualifications Clause are exclusive).
293. See, e.g., United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 352 (1997) ("[The statute's] detail,
its technical language, the iteration of the limitations in both procedural and substantive forms,
and the explicit listing of exceptions, taken together, indicate to us that Congress did not intend
courts to read other unmentioned, open-ended, 'equitable' exceptions into the statute [of
limitations]."); Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17 (1980) ("Where Congress
explicitly enumerates exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be
implied, in the absence of evidence of contrary legislative intent."); Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill,
437 U.S. 153, 188 (1978) ("[The Endangered Species Act] creates a number of limited 'hardship
exemptions,' none of which would even remotely apply to the Tellico Project.... [U]nder the
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, we must presume that these were the only 'hardship
cases' Congress intended to exempt."). As Sutherland has observed:
An express exception, exemption or saving excludes others. Where a general rule has
been established by statute with exceptions the court will not curtail the former nor add
to the latter by implication. Exceptions strengthen the force of a general law, and
enumeration weakens it as to things not expressed.
2 J.G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION § 494, at 923 (John Lewis ed., 2d ed. 1904)
(footnotes omitted).
294. Sturges v. Collector, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 19, 28 (1871).
295. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 661 (1834) ("There is no mode by which
the meaning affixed to any word or sentence, by a deliberative body, can be so well ascertained,
as by comparing it with the words and sentences with which it stands connected.").
296. Cf W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98-99 (1991) (noting that "the
purpose of a statute includes not only what it sets out to change, but also what it resolves to leave
alone").
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1738 [Vol. 113: 1663
Precise Constitutional Texts
in Clause 1 turn on a state's presence as a party:297 "Controversies between
two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;... and
between a State ... and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects." These
categories, in turn, include three subcategories of jurisdiction that depend
on the presence of a state and an out-of-state individual-citizens of
another state or citizens or subjects of a foreign state. The Eleventh
Amendment is phrased quite precisely to address only those three
subcategories. Indeed, so discriminating is the text that it parses a
subcategory from amidst the final head of jurisdiction
("Controversies... between a State... and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects"), leaving untouched suits between a state and "foreign States"
while restricting suits against states by "foreign... Citizens or Subjects."
As a first cut, this fact suggests at least that the Amendment's framers
carefully picked and chose among Article III, Section 2, Clause I's
categories in determining what jurisdictional immunity to prescribe.
The Eleventh Amendment's careful inclusion and omission of
particular heads of Article III jurisdiction creates at least a prima facie case
that the amendment process entailed judgments about the precise contexts
in which it was desirable (or perhaps politically feasible) to provide for
state sovereign immunity. 98 Monaco v. Mississippi itself provides the
clearest demonstration of this point. As discussed previously, the Court
there held that sovereign immunity shields states from diversity suits by
foreign states. I assume arguendo that in the Eleventh Amendment's
absence, the Court could legitimately have reached that conclusion in
liquidating the meaning of "the judicial Power" in light of the overall
constitutional structure. But given the way the Amendment parses the
language of Article III, Section 2, Clause 1, it becomes quite difficult to
sustain the Court's residual authority to recognize such immunity. As
discussed, the last jurisdictional head in Clause 1 extends the judicial power
to "Controversies... between a State... and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects"; the Amendment, in relevant part, restricts suits against states "by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." Given this obvious selectivity, it
is hard to avoid the conclusion that the Amendment reflects a considered
judgment to place suits by foreign states on one side of the line rather than
the other.
The Eleventh Amendment, however, also clearly illustrates why canons
of negative implication cannot be mechanically applied, but rather make
sense only when considered in context. Even if the Amendment's textual
297. See Marshall, supra note 23, at 1346-47.
298. Cf Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) ("'[W]here Congress includes
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or
exclusion."' (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972))).
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selectivity creates a prima facie case of negative implication, one must ask
whether its enumeration might be explained in terms other than the
disparate inclusion and exclusion of jurisdictional categories in a carefully
drawn codification of state sovereign immunity law. Here, there is a highly
plausible alternative explanation for the Amendment's narrow framing. If
(as Alden v. Maine suggests 299) the Amendment provided a specific answer
to the narrower question of "how to deal with Chisholm," then it would be
harder to find that the Amendment's precisely drawn contours reflect a
decision to go so far and no farther in establishing a sovereign immunity
exception to Article 1II. On that reading, the Amendment's enumeration
dealt with the problem at hand and made no implicit judgment about any
wrinkles on sovereign immunity that might later arise.
Although the question is not free of doubt, the contextual clues, I
believe, ultimately confirm the negative implication suggested by the text.
Initially, one might note that the Amendment, in fact, goes beyond
Chisholm's holding. Chisholm arose under the clause of Article III
extending the judicial power to controversies between "a State and Citizens
of another State." The Amendment establishes that the judicial power does
not extend to suits against states "by Citizens of another State" or "by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." At the least, such an extension
entailed making the judgment that diversity jurisdiction involving foreign
individuals warranted like treatment, even though its curtailment might
present distinctive risks of an international dimension. Still, the added
categories have a tight conceptual fit with the type of case at issue in
Chisholm. Certainly, they involved a similar threat of individuals using
diversity jurisdiction to collect common law debts from states. So while the
Amendment's text is overinclusive relative to the specific problem posed by
Chisholm, it is perhaps only mildly so. Hence, it may not be safe to rely on
that overinclusiveness alone to establish that the Amendment focused on
and provided a carefully tailored solution to the question of state sovereign
immunity in general.
But ultimately, consideration of the immediate context against which
the Amendment was adopted also suggests that the amendment process,
properly understood, involved the considered inclusion and, more
important, exclusion of categories of state sovereign immunity. Because
some might conceive of the analysis that follows as relying on decidedly
extratextual considerations, it is helpful to start with a few words about how
the analysis fits, if it does, with the premises of constitutional textualism.
The process of negative implication is a permissible textualist tool of
construction because it entails a judgment about the way a reasonable
299. 527 U.S. 706, 723 (1999).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1740 [Vol. 113: 1663
Precise Constitutional Texts
person would read certain textual cues in context.30 0 At the same time,
although a negative implication involves reaaing rextual cues, the existence
or scope of a negative implication, as Jiscussed, will sometimes be
ambiguous. For example, Article I and Article I specify impeachment as a
method of removing, inter alia, executive officers.3 °1 Even if one infers a
negative implication from that textual specification, does the text prescribe
the exclusive means for Congress to remove such an officer or for any
constitutional actor (including the President) to do so?302 Does Article I,
Section 7's elaborate prescription of bicameralism and presentment just
preclude Congress from granting interstitial lawmaking power to its own
components (viz. a single house or a committee), or does it also forbid the
delegation of such authority to agencies or courts in conjunction with their
respective powers of law execution and adjudication? Resolving questions
regarding the existence or scope of a negative implication, like any other
form of textual exegesis, entails reading the operative text(s) in context.
Sometimes, of course, a specific text will itself provide a fairly strong
indication of the terrain that it occupies, and thus of the existence and scope
of any negative implication. Imagine, for example, that instead of referring
only to certain categories of diversity actions between states and
individuals, the Eleventh Amendment had provided:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States in cases arising under this
Constitution, in cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction, or in
controversies brought by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens
or Subjects of any Foreign State.
300. David Shapiro offers some excellent illustrations of this point. See Shapiro, supra note
150, at 928 ("[A] statute requiring that any cat born on or after a certain date must be vaccinated
can fairly be taken to exclude any requirement of vaccination of cats born before that date. And a
statute imposing an implied warranty on transfers for consideration can fairly be taken not to
impose such a warranty on gratuitous transfers." (footnotes omitted)).
301. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cls. 6-7 (prescribing in detail the procedures for
impeachment); id. art. II, § 4 (providing that "[t]he President, Vice President and all civil Officers
of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of,
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors").
302. The First Congress's practical construction of the Constitution casts some light on this
question. In the course of the so-called "Decision of 1789," which established the Department of
Foreign Affairs, Congress adopted legislation unmistakably at odds with the premise that
impeachment supplied the exclusive means of removing executive officers. See Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52, 111-15 (1926) (discussing the legislative deliberations involved in the
Decision of 1789). Although not essential to the foregoing conclusion, it is worth noting that two
or three participants in the House debate had suggested that impeachment provided the exclusive
method of removal. See John F. Manning, The Independent Counsel Statute: Reading "Good
Cause" in Light of Article I1, 83 MINN. L. REv. 1285, 1315 (1999) (describing arguments about
impeachment from the House debate).
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Had the Amendment in that way more extensively picked and chosen
among the nine heads of jurisdiction set forth in Article III, Section 2, a
reasonable person could surely have read it as reflecting a comprehensive
judgment about the forms of immunity states should or should not enjoy in
our system of government. Similarly, if the exceptions enumerated in the
Amendment had been adopted with and as part of Article III (or perhaps
even if the Amendment's language had been interlineated with Article
III), 303 the relevant text(s) might have read as a more obviously integrated
enumeration of jurisdictional grants and limited exceptions to those
grants.3°4
The Eleventh Amendment's actual text speaks less decisively, of
course. It is not as comprehensive as the hypothetical amendment. Nor is it
formally interlineated with Article III (though its relationship to the prior
text could hardly be more direct). 30 5 And because the Amendment deals
with a fairly coherent subset of Article III's jurisdictional grants (suits
brought against states by out-of-state individuals), it is possible to read it as
dealing with a discrete subset of jurisdictional concerns rather than the
303. For an interesting discussion of early deliberations over the question whether to
interlineate constitutional amendments with the original document, see Edward Hartnett,
A "Uniform and Entire" Constitution; Or, What if Madison Had Won?, 15 CONST. COMMENT.
251, 252-64 (1997). Some have suggested that the Amendment's interlineations into Article III
might have produced distinct interpretive consequences, though not the precise consequences I
identify here. See id. at 264-67 (suggesting that interlineations might have made the diversity
theory of the Amendment more obvious); Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State
Sovereign Immunity, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 22 (same).
304. Such a text might have looked as follows:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to
which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more
States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of different
States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different
States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects; provided that, the Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.
Professor Edward Hartnett has suggested a different way of interlineating the Amendment with
Article III, one that perhaps carries less obvious negative implications. See Hartnett, supra note
303, at 264-67.
305. The Amendment is. after all, framed as a rule of construction directing that "the Judicial
power shall not be construed to extend" to various classes of suits against states, all of which
involve jurisdictional heads prescribed by Article III. Accordingly, although physically separate
from Article III, the Amendment has meaning only as a qualifier to that Article. While the
Amendment's drafting does not shed conclusive light on why it was framed as a rule of
construction, recent scholarship has suggested that it was framed in that way in order to trigger an
interpretive convention that would assure the Amendment's retroactive application to pending
cases. See Nelson, supra note 20, at 1604 n.222; Pfander, supra note 20, at 1364.
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broader question of how much sovereign immunity to confer.3 °6 In short,
based on the text alone, one cannot confidently determine whether the
Amendment's several exclusions of jurisdiction from Article III represent
(1) a comprehensive but pointedly circumscribed judgment about the proper
scope of state sovereign immunity in general, or (2) a narrower judgment
about the (un)desirability of allowing federal court diversity actions against
states. In the absence of additional facts, either position reflects a plausible
way to read the text.
Accordingly, to resolve the resulting textual ambiguity, any textualist
would need to know more about the Amendment's context. As discussed,
finding a negative implication depends on the determination that a
reasonable person would ordinarily associate a given set of items as a
group, so that their disparate inclusion and omission implies careful line-
drawing.3 °7 Two related considerations suggest that a reasonable person
contemplating the Amendment's text would have viewed it as a carefully
circumscribed answer to the more general question of how much immunity
to give states against the assertion of Article III jurisdiction as a whole.
First, to evaluate the Amendment's limited enumeration of exceptions,
it is helpful to know the legal baseline against which the adopters acted.3
°8
As discussed, no one doubts (or could doubt) that Chisholm directly
provoked the Amendment's adoption. It therefore supplies the most
immediate context for reading the Amendment's text. Even if Chisholm
was (in some meaningful sense) wrongly decided or at least widely
perceived as such, the broad reasoning of all four majority opinions
certainly provided good reason to think that the question addressed by the
Amendment involved the desired scope of state immunity to Article III
jurisdiction as a whole. Although Chisholm's facts presented the discrete
question whether one could bring a diversity action against a state, the
majority opinions reasoned that such suits were permissible because state
sovereign immunity had simply not survived the adoption of Article III. All
four opinions emphasized that Article III's unqualified language supplied a
306. Along these lines, if one were to subscribe to the "literal theory" of the Amendment's
text, it would strengthen the inference of comprehensiveness. Under that theory, which is
generally viewed as a less plausible reading of the text in context than the diversity theory, the
Amendment precludes the exercise of federal jurisdiction in any suit-federal question actions,
suits in admiralty, cases involving ambassadors, and so forth-in which the party alignment
matches that of the Eleventh Amendment. See supra note 68. So understood, the Amendment
precludes federal jurisdiction over an array of litigation considerably broader than the precise
class of cases involved in Chisholm. As such, one would have an easier time reading the
Amendment as a comprehensive judgment about the appropriate scope of state sovereign
immunity, rather than a mere effort to deal with the particular problem of diversity actions posed
by Chisholm.
307. See supra notes 229, 285 and accompanying text.
308. Cf W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98-99 (1991) (noting that "the
purpose of a statute includes not only what it sets out to change, but also what it resolves to leave
alone").
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sufficient basis for asserting jurisdiction against unconsenting states.30 9 Two
of those opinions asserted that state sovereign immunity was flatly
incompatible with the premises of our republican form of government.31 °
In addition, several opinions specifically invoked other jurisdictional
heads to substantiate their reasoning that state sovereign immunity did not
qualify Article III. In particular, two of the Justices reasoned that Article III
could not have left such immunity intact because federal jurisdiction so
obviously extended against the states in certain federal question cases-a
context in which the states had conceded a measure of their sovereignty
to the federal government. 31 1 Similarly, two opinions concluded that
state sovereign immunity could not have survived Article III's adoption
because of the jurisdictional head authorizing suits between "a
State... and ... foreign States," which surely contemplated a federal
forum for foreign states to pursue their grievances against individual states
of the Union.3t 2 Importantly, the Justices invoked these examples on the
ground that they represented even plainer cases for state suability than the
case before the Court. With the issue so framed, a reasonable person would
likely have thought of the problem of diversity jurisdiction against states as
part and parcel of the larger question of state immunity against Article III
jurisdiction more generally. If so, the Eleventh Amendment might well
have been perceived as a carefully circumscribed answer to that broader
question.3 t3 Accordingly, contrary to the conventional wisdom, reading the
309. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419, 450-51 (1793) (Blair, J.); id. at 466
(Wilson, J.); id. at 466-67 (Cushing, J.); id. at 477 (Jay, C.J.); see also supra note 51 and
accompanying text.
310. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 457-58 (Wilson, J.); id. at 471 (Jay, C.J.); see also
supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
311. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 464-65 (Wilson, J.); id. at 468 (Cushing, J.); see also
supra note 55 and accompanying text.
312. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 451 (Blair, J.); id. at 467-68 (Cushing, J.); see also
supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
313. This mode of analysis is distinguishable from the ratification doctrine, which statutory
textualists typically reject. The ratification doctrine assumes that if Congress extensively amends a
statute without disturbing a well-known interpretation, its action gives rise to an inference of
approval. See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1983) (inferring
ratification of interpretations of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 because
Congress extensively amended the securities laws without touching section 10(b)); Lykes v.
United States, 343 U.S. 118, 127 (1952) (giving a Treasury Regulation substantial weight because
"Congress has made many amendments to the Internal Revenue Code without revising [that]
administrative interpretation"). As a general proposition, such an inference is dangerous because
Congress may have many reasons for not amending a provision, other than its approval of the way
that provision has been construed. See Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
511 U.S. 184, 185-87 (1994) (criticizing the ratification doctrine).
The ratification doctrine, however, bears only a remote relationship to the principles of
negative implication discussed here. Certainly, if Congress amends statutory provisions other than
the previously construed provision, there is no reason to assume that its failure to amend that one
provision carries any significance at all. (For example, if instead of the Eleventh Amendment,
eighteenth-century Americans had amended Article III to eliminate circuit riding by the Justices,
the failure to mention Chisholm would have had no import.) At the same time, however, if a court
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Amendment against the contextual baseline of Chisholm, if anything, tends
to confirm an initial negative implication emanating from the text's
disparate inclusion and exclusion of categorical exceptions to potential
Article III jurisdiction against the states.314
has decisively interpreted a particular statutory provision, and then Congress amends that very
provision to repudiate the interpretation in part, the resulting negative implication reflects a tighter
and more direct inference. Consider the following example: As of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1988
authorized a prevailing party to recover a "reasonable attorney's fee" in actions "to enforce a
provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law
92-318 ... , or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." That year, in West Virginia University
Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, the Court held that the authorization to shift an "attorney's fee" did not
permit judges to shift "expert fees," which prior congressional usage had identified as a separate
item. 499 U.S. 83, 88-102 (1991). The same year, Congress overturned the result in Casey, but in
a highly tailored fashion. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §§ 103, 113(a), 105
Stat. 1071, 1074, 1079 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a, 1988 (2000)). In particular,
the amended version of § 1988 adopted a new proviso stating that in an action "to enforce a
provision of section 1981 or section 1981 a of this title, the court, in its discretion, may include
expert fees as part of the attorney's fee." 42 U.S.C. § 1988(c). Against the baseline of the Court's
prior interpretation of the phrase "attorney's fee," this highly targeted reference to two statutes
surely implies a lack of authority to award expert fees in cases arising under the many other
statutes named in § 1988's general authorization of fees. See Jenkins ex rel. Jenkins v. Missouri,
158 F.3d 980, 983 (8th Cir. 1998) (noting that the 1991 legislation's limited amendment of§ 1988
left Casey's restrictive holding intact with respect to actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
314. Caleb Nelson contends that "[a] constitutional amendment that fails to override some
applications of a Supreme Court decision is not the same as a constitutional amendment that
codifies those applications." Nelson, supra note 20, at 1618. While characteristically powerful,
Professor Nelson's contention ultimately proves too much. The Eleventh Amendment adopts a
carefully delineated set of exceptions to the nine heads of jurisdiction prescribed by Article III,
Section 2. As discussed, this circumstance ordinarily gives rise to a negative implication
concerning any unspecified exceptions. One can rebut that implication by showing that a
reasonable person would not necessarily have expected drafters to associate the included and
omitted categories in the first place. In the Eleventh Amendment context, Chisholm cuts against
such a conclusion. Given Chisholm's broad reasoning, a reasonable person reading the
Amendment's text might well have understood it as a response to the more inclusive question
defined by the Court's majority opinions. Accordingly, I do not suggest here that the Eleventh
Amendment codified Chisholm, but rather that Chisholm supplies the critically relevant context
for resolving ambiguity about whether to credit or discredit an apparent negative implication
otherwise arising from the text.
Professor Nelson also suggests that negative implication arguments are simply inappropriate
in this circumstance, because the Eleventh Amendment adopted a form of immunity different
from the traditional form. See id. at 1619 n.268. In that vein, he has marshaled impressive
evidence suggesting that the principle of sovereign immunity traditionally operated as a limitation
on the courts' authority to subject sovereigns to compulsory process. See id. at 1568-69
(describing the preconstitutional tradition). In contrast, the Eleventh Amendment-much like
Chisholm itself-dealt with the question in terms of subject matter jurisdiction. See id. at 1566.
For Professor Nelson, the Amendment's explicit focus on subject matter jurisdiction thus
precludes reading it to displace the distinct (and more traditional) category of immunity from
personal jurisdiction. See id. at 1619 n.268.
That apparent categorical distinction, I believe, cannot bear the weight assigned it. Professor
Nelson notes that the available historical records do not reveal why the Amendment's drafters
chose to frame the text as a limit on subject matter jurisdiction. See id. at 1603. As he
acknowledges, however, the drafters perhaps took their lead from Chisholm's majority opinions,
which had quite clearly treated Article III's grant of subject matter jurisdiction as the source of
federal judicial power "to expose unconsenting states to suit by individuals." Id. If that
explanation is correct, then the Amendment's limitation on subject matter jurisdiction simply dealt
with the problem of sovereign immunity by eliminating (in carefully delineated classes of cases)
the identified basis for its abrogation. The resulting focus on subject matter jurisdiction, then, does
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Second, this inference finds collateral support in (what little is known
about) the Amendment's actual adoption. As others have shown, much of
the direct impetus for the Amendment's proposal came from a series of
resolutions by state legislatures instructing their senators to "fix" the
problem perceived to exist in Chisholm's aftermath.31 5 James Pfander, for
example, has demonstrated that when faced with potentially burdensome
litigation of its own, the Massachusetts legislature influentially called for an
amendment to establish proper limits on Article J11.316 Specifically,
Governor John Hancock secured from the state legislature a final report
broadly calling for an amendment to "remove any clause or article of the
said Constitution which can be construed to imply or justify a decision that
a State is compellable to answer in any suit by an individual or individuals
in any Court of the United States. 317 The completed resolution was
circulated to other governors.318 Six additional state legislatures quickly
followed suit, adopting broadly worded resolutions patterned after that of
Massachusetts. 319 "This outpouring of state resolutions," Professor Pfander
not mean that the Amendment was unconcerned with traditional sovereign immunity as such. Nor
does that focus eliminate the possibility that the Amendment's careful enumeration of exceptions
to Article III carried a negative implication with respect to the jurisdictional heads outside its
scope.
315. See Pfander, supra note 20, at 1333-39.
316. Id. at 1336.
317. Resolution of the Massachusetts General Court (Sept. 27, 1793), in 5 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800: SUITS
AGAINST STATES, at 440, 440 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1994) [hereinafter 5 DHSC].
318. See Pfander, supra note 20, at 1337.
319. See id. at 1337-38; see also, e.g., Proceedings of a Joint Session of the New Hampshire
General Court (Jan. 23, 1794), in 5 DHSC, supra note 317, at 618, 618 (instructing the state's
senators, and requesting the state's representatives, to procure "such amendments in the
Constitution of the United States, as to prevent the possibility of a construction which may justify
a decision that a State is compellable to the suit of an individual or individuals in the Courts of the
United States"); Proceedings of the Maryland House of Delegates (Dec. 27, 1793), in 5 DHSC,
supra note 317, at 611, 611 (directing the state's senators, and asking the state's representatives,
to seek such amendments "as will remove any part of the said constitution which can be construed
to justify a decision that a state is compellable to answer in any suit by an individual or
individuals in any court of the United States"); Proceedings of the Virginia House of Delegates
(Nov. 28, 1793), in 5 DHSC, supra note 317, at 338, 338-39 (passing a resolution calling for
"such amendments in the constitution of the United States, as will remove or explain any clause or
article of the said constitution, which can be construed to imply or justify a decision, that a state is
compellable to answer in any suit, by an individual or individuals, in any court of the United
States"); id. at 339 nn.2-3 (noting the Virginia State Senate's passage of the Amendment and its
transmittal to the state's congressional delegation); Resolution of North Carolina General
Assembly (Jan. 11, 1794), in 5 DHSC, supra note 317, at 615, 615 (instructing the state's
senators, and urging the state's representatives, to "obtain such amendments in the Constitution of
the United States as will remove or explain any clause or article of the said Constitution which can
be construed to imply or justify ... a decision that a State is compellable to answer in any suit by
an individual or individuals in any Court of the United States"); Resolution of the Connecticut
General Assembly (Oct. 29, 1793), in 5 DHSC, supra note 317, at 609, 609 (requesting that its
congressional delegation secure "an alteration of the Clause or Article in the Constitution of the
United States on which the decision of the said Supreme Court, is supposed to be founded so that
in future no State can on any Construction be held liable to any such Suit, or to make answer in
any Court, on the Suit, of any Individual or Individuals whatsoever").
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notes, "provide[d] the background against which Congress acted in
adopting the Eleventh Amendment in 1794 .,,320 The spate of broadly
worded state resolutions-calling for the removal of "any clause or article
of the constitution" that "[could] be construed" to authorize suits against
states-perhaps reinforced the comprehensive sense in which Chisholm
framed the immunity question. Certainly, this historical backdrop negates
any contention that the amendment process in fact focused solely upon the
narrower question of citizen-state diversity presented by Chisholm's precise
facts.
321
In addition, the South Carolina State Senate passed a similar resolution, though the assembly
never acted on it. See Proceedings of the South Carolina Senate (Dec. 17, 1793), in 5 DHSC,
supra note 317, at 610, 611 & n.3 (directing the state's senators, and requesting the state's
representatives, to secure an amendment to "remove any clause or Article of the said Constitution,
which can be construed to imply, or justify a decision that a State is compel[1]able to answer in
any suit, by an individual, or individuals in any Court of the United States").
320. Pfander, supra note 20, at 1339.
321. Although textualists do not credit legislative history, someone who subscribed to the
strong purposivism underlying Hans and Seminole Tribe might find the Amendment's actual
drafting history relevant. If that sparse history tells us anything, it tends to mildly confirm that the
Amendment reflected a compromise to go so far and no farther. The day after the decision in
Chisholm, Representative Theodore Sedgwick, a Federalist from Massachusetts, proposed an
amendment in the House that would have broadly provided:
[N]o state shall be liable to be made a party defendant, in any of the judicial
courts, established, or which shall be established under the authority of the United
States, at the suit of any person or persons, whether a citizen or citizens, or a foreigner
or foreigners, or of any body politic or corporate, whether within or without the United
States.
Proceedings of the United States House of Representatives (Feb. 19, 1793), GAZETTE U.S., Feb.
20, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 317, at 605, 605-06. The next day, Senator Caleb
Strong introduced a narrower amendment in the Senate, one far closer to the ultimate wording of
the Eleventh Amendment: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not extend to any suits in
law or equity commenced or prosecuted against any one of the United States by citizens of
another State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign State." 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 651-52 (1794).
For whatever reason, the Second Congress ended without acting on either proposal. In the Third
Congress, Senator Strong introduced a modified version of his earlier proposal, one that
substituted the words "shall not be construed to extend" in place of "shall not extend." 4 ANNALS
OF CONG. 25 (1794). After two motions to narrow the amendment were defeated, see id. at 30, the
Senate passed Senator Strong's version overwhelmingly, see id. at 30-31 (tallying a final vote of
23 to 2). After a narrowing motion of its own was defeated, see id. at 476, the House lopsidedly
voted to accept the Senate's version and thus to send the proposed amendment to the states, see id.
at 477-78 (tallying a final vote of 81 to 9).
Because Congress adopted a proposal far narrower than Representative Sedgwick's quite
comprehensive initial draft, an intentionalist or strong purposivist might infer that the
Amendment's adopters intended go so far and no farther in defining the Amendment's coverage.
See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 111-12 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (suggesting that
if the Amendment's framers had wished to cover federal question jurisdiction, they would have
adopted Representative Sedgwick's proposal). But it would be quite difficult, even for a
nontextualist, to draw too firm a conclusion from the Sedgwick proposal's fate. So far as the
record reveals anything, it appears that the House simply never acted on the Sedgwick proposal.
Nothing in the sparse existing record indicates how widely that draft was publicized or discussed.
Nor does it suggest why the Sedgwick proposal ultimately did not supply the basis for the
proposed Amendment. At most, this drafting history suggests that some of the Amendment's
framers knew or should have known how to draft a broader proposal-a fact that is perhaps
evident without invoking Representative Sedgwick's unadopted text.
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Although the evidence does not all point in one direction, the Eleventh
Amendment appears to have offered a carefully circumscribed answer to
the larger question of how much sovereign immunity states should possess
322against the exercise of Article III jurisdiction. Because the Amendment
reflected such an obvious negative reaction to Chisholm's refusal to
recognize state sovereign immunity, one might perceive "considerable
irony" in the notion that the Amendment creates a negative implication
precluding unspecified forms of such immunity.323 But such irony abates
when one recalls that Chisholm triggered a constitutional lawmaking
process that is consciously designed to compel majorities-even broad
majorities-to compromise and accept less than a full loaf. Neither Article
III nor any other provision of the original Constitution dealt directly with
the problem of sovereign immunity, and American society had had no
previous occasion to confront the question squarely, one way or the other.
322. A similar question arguably arises in the context of the Sixteenth Amendment, which
repudiated a controversial Supreme Court precedent construing Article I, Section 9's limitation on
"direct" taxes. Compare, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 39-51 (1999) (arguing that the Sixteenth Amendment should have been understood as a
broadly transformative constitutional event that reshaped basic principles of federal taxation), with
Eric M. Jensen, The Apportionment of "Direct Taxes ": Are Consumption Taxes Constitutional?,
97 COLUM. L. REV. 2334, 2342-44 (1997) (emphasizing that the Sixteenth Amendment only
partially repudiated existing case law on the apportionment of "direct" taxes). As this Article has
shown, evaluating the negative implication of a constitutional amendment, like any other textual
exegesis, ultimately depends on context. The complex question of how to read the Sixteenth
Amendment in context lies beyond the scope of this Article.
323. Nelson, supra note 20, at 1618. Of course, the Founding generation was acutely aware
of the possibility of negative implications from constitutional amendments. Only a few years prior
to the Eleventh Amendment's adoption, an important part of the extensive debate over the Bill of
Rights turned on the concern that enumerating specific rights would impliedly negate others. See,
e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Unitary Judiciary Review, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 319, 341-42 (2003)
(discussing the negative implication concerns raised during the debate over the Bill of Rights);
Philip A. Hamburger, Trivial Rights, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1994) (same). For example,
in introducing the relevant amendments in Congress, Madison acknowledged that "one of the
most plausible arguments I ever heard" against the Bill of Rights was "that, by enumerating
particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would disparage those rights which were not placed
in that enumeration." 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 456 (1789) (statement of Rep. Madison). It is widely
believed of course that the Ninth and Tenth Amendments were adopted in response to this
concern. See Clark, supra, at 342-47. Having so recently gone through the process of considering
and guarding against the possibility of negative implications from constitutional amendments,
those who adopted the Eleventh Amendment were perhaps keenly aware that its enumeration of
limits on Article III power would potentially carry a negative implication. Of course, one might
argue that restricting state sovereign immunity by negative implication is in tension with the
preexisting rule of construction prescribed by the Tenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. X
("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."). By its terms, however, that
Amendment simply does not preclude the derivation of federal authority through a properly drawn
textual implication. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 799-800
(1999); see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406 (1819) (emphasizing that
the Tenth Amendment does not limit the exercise of federal authority to powers "expressly"
delegated to the United States). Thus, to the extent that "the judicial Power of the United States"
otherwise permits federal courts to adjudicate cases or controversies against the states, the Tenth
Amendment does not preclude the exercise of such authority.
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When dissatisfaction with Chisholm brought the Article V process to bear
on that previously unanswered question, the text that emerged quite clearly
went so far and no farther in embracing state sovereign immunity. Perhaps
the resultant line-drawing merely reflected an inability to secure the
requisite supermajorities for a broader Amendment. But if so, that would be
fully consistent with the expected play of Article V. Especially in the
context of an amendment process designed to protect political minorities,
one cannot disregard the selective inclusion and exclusion implicit in such
careful specification. If American society for the first time was explicitly
confronting the appropriate limitations on potential Article IlI jurisdiction
over suits against states, one should perhaps attach significance not only to
what the drafters placed in the Amendment, but also to what they deemed
necessary or even prudent to exclude.324 To do otherwise would risk
upsetting whatever precise compromise may have emerged from the
carefully drawn lawmaking process prescribed by Article V.
CONCLUSION
For more than a century, the Court has invoked the tenets of strong
purposivism to hold that the Eleventh Amendment means far more than it
says. Given the Amendment's perceived purpose to repudiate all aspects of
Chisholm v. Georgia, the Court read the Amendment as adopting rather
comprehensive state sovereign immunity, despite its more limited text.
When Hans v. Louisiana announced that conclusion in 1890, its method of
reasoning fit comfortably with the prevailing interpretive norms of the day.
Lawmaking bodies have imperfect foresight, and they inevitably must write
laws in inherently imprecise human language. When the text of an enacted
324. Caleb Nelson questions whether one should attach any weight to the failure to attract the
requisite supermajorities for a broader version of state sovereign immunity. See Nelson, supra
note 20, at 1618-19. Even if the Amendment's narrow delineation reflected an inability to secure
the supermajorities needed to adopt broader protections, Professor Nelson finds it implausible to
believe "that the necessary supermajorities would have approved an amendment explicitly
exposing states to such suits, or that such an amendment would then have been ratified by three-
fourths of the states." Id. at 1619. Framing the question in that way, I believe, inappropriately
shifts the burden of inertia. If one is justified in drawing a negative implication from the
complementary texts of Article III and the Eleventh Amendment, then the adoption of those texts
confers the necessary legitimacy on whatever textual implication one might properly draw from
them. If one also had to verify that a particular implication could survive the Amendment process
as a freestanding proposition, all negative implication would cease. For example, it is certainly
fair to infer that the carefully specified process of bicameralism and presentment impliedly
negates congressional lawmaking through other means. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)
(invalidating the legislative veto as a violation of Article I, Section 7's bicameralism and
presentment requirements). If correct, however, that conclusion need not be confirmed by the
further determination that the Founders could have passed a freestanding amendment
affirmatively prohibiting the legislative veto or any similar informal legislative lawmaking
devices. The same conclusion applies with respect to whatever negative implication one might
justifiably draw from the relationship between Article III and the Eleventh Amendment.
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law deviated too much from its apparent purpose, the Court thought it
proper to smooth the rough edges of statutes that perhaps represented clear
but imprecise expressions of intent. The Court's approach to the Eleventh
Amendment was of a piece with that philosophy.
Modem methodological premises are different. The Rehnquist Court
has made clear that the details of precise statutory texts typically represent
the fruits of a legislative compromise-a decision to go only so far in
pursuit of a goal or to pursue a mix of goals that are not always consistent.
The Court has also emphasized that judges in our system of government
have a duty to respect such compromises. Although the results may
sometimes seem awkward, that is the nature of compromise. Accordingly,
even when a precise statute seems over- or underinclusive in relation to its
background purpose, the Court will adhere closely to the statute's clearly
expressed terms, lest it upset one of the (frequently unrecorded) bargains
essential to its passage.
These premises apply with even greater force to constitutional
adjudication. Although modem constitutional scholarship emphasizes the
document's relatively open-ended clauses, the Constitution also includes
many important provisions that embody clear and precise policy judgments.
When that is the case, the judicial duty to respect the terms of a precise
compromise is, if anything, even more pronounced. By specifying not only
the ends but also the particular means of their pursuit, a detailed and precise
constitutional text, like its statutory analogue, may reflect an expressed
willingness to go so far and no farther in pursuit of the law's ultimate
purposes. Because of its multitiered supermajority requirements, the Article
V process for amending the Constitution gives small minorities of our
political society extraordinary power to veto constitutional change or to
insist upon compromise as the price of assent.
Accordingly, when interpreting a precisely worded constitutional
provision like the Eleventh Amendment, the Court must adhere to the
compromise embedded in the text. It must not readjust the Amendment's
precise terms to capture their apparent background purpose. And it must be
sensitive to the possibility that the Amendment's precise enumeration of
exceptions to the grant of Article III power carries a negative implication,
the product of an apparent decision to go so far and no farther in defining
the desired exceptions to federal jurisdiction. These analytical premises-
both of which are missing from the Court's Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence-reflect the reality that the Constitution is the product of a
process that, by conscious design, places extraordinary weight on the right
to insist upon compromise.
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